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Abstract
The thesis is constructed on two levels. At one level, it is an attempt to show how the
interdisciplinary approach and methods of cognitive science can be used to advance under¬
standing of the mental lexicon. To that end, the thesis begins by clarifying a methodologi¬
cal relationship among the techniques available.
At a second level, the thesis seeks to advance our understanding of a range of phenomena
which illustrates the flexibility of lexical meaning. The underlying reasons for flexibility are
analysed. Existing theories of lexical concepts are evaluated in the light of these arguments
and are found wanting. An outline theory is proposed which takes into account integration
and precization. This theory is then applied to a particular phenomenon - the mass—count
alternation in English, and a variety of linguistic criteria are used to test the questions
raised. A Space Grammar model of the theory is developed, and a means for translating it
into Unification Categorial Grammar is provided. The model is then generalised to related
linguistic phenomena. Several psychological experiments are proposed which could test the
model. A concluding chapter summarises the model and discusses some of its implications.
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Introduction.
This thesis is concerned to give a cognitively tractable account of lexical meaning. The
starting point is a set of observations of the flexibility of lexical meaning. My aim is to
understand these phenomena better, to understand how they relate to one another and to
develop an interdisciplinary approach to the problem. I begin by looking at method. On
the one hand, how can the tools of cognitive science be used to address the issues at hand.
And on the other, to what extent does the way the problem is defined affect the theory that
can be developed. I then consider alternative theories of lexical concepts. The notion of
systemic contrast and the idea that lexical concepts are concepts are considered before I
propose my own theory of lexical concepts. Issues raised by this discussion are then exam¬
ined in relation to specific phenomena, especially the mass—count distinction in English,
and a more general theory of lexical concepts is stated. Experiments which could contribute
to the development of this theory are proposed before I make some concluding remarks.
Part 1.
Groundwork.
The chapters in this part of the thesis lay down a broad outline of the framework within
which I hope to assemble a view of lexical meaning. The first chapter interrelates
phenomena and research techniques in a general way. The second begins a process of
defining the problem in such a way as to leave it solvable. There are certain classes of
phenomenon which an adequate theory ought to take into account. Indeed, I take a
stronger view. The task of building a satisfactory theory will be harder if these key




The purpose of this chapter is to make explicit a framework within the terms of which one
might do interdisciplinary research on lexical meaning. Such research offers the potential to
bring to bear the accumulated wisdom and methodological accumen of workers with
diverse perspectives on the problem of explicating the nature of lexical meaning.
As Gibson has shown in relation to vision, movement (from one perspective to another)
adds information rather than just complexity. And as J.S. Mill enjoins us in relation to
ideas, a deeper understanding is facilitated by the consideration of a variety of points of
view. That is, it is not simply a matter of avoiding the re-invention of the wheel: interdisci¬
plinary activity may - in itself - yield new knowledge and, perhaps, new research tech¬
niques.
Having said these things, I will confine myself here to some general principles.
First, the research is defined in this case by the topic to which it is addressed. This can be
made more specific. I am concerned with the role that lexical items play in establishing the
meaning of a piece of text. That is, I have in mind the characterization of meaning
advanced by Stephen Ullmann (Ullmann 1962). This conception will act as a focal point
for the study which follows: the role of any information will be determined by its relevance
to the goal of developing an understanding of the place of lexical items in the comprehen¬
sion of language.
In the paragraphs that follow, I will briefly connect with some departments of study,
sketching the relation of each to the whole. I begin by listing some key phenomena which
at the same time appear interesting and offer the prospect of shedding light on the central
topic. I then look at the principal methods available. It will be a matter of stipulation that
what I seek to characterize is the nature of lexical concepts: a lexical concept is that part of
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the information associated with a form that contributes to the interpretation of a text.1
This definition of lexical concepts turns out to exclude the notion of a prototype, where that
is defined as a (possibly structured) set of default values along certain dimensions to which
exemplars can be compared and rated for typicality in terms of some similarity metric
(examples departing least from the defaults being the most prototypical). This is because
such a definition assumes a similarity metric which is independent of knowledge, fails to
provide a stable or combinable representation and provides a representation that is too
specific. Prototypes are more like the result of an interpretative act than its seed.
The following paragraphs outline some characteristics of words, and attempt to place them
in an overall framework.
It is well known that "the word" has many aspects, and as a term can lead to confusion.
2
For instance, it has form (acoustic, orthographic or even kinetic ), morphological structure
and distributional characteristics as well as a denotation. It is worth remarking that all these
contribute to meaning as it has been defined here. Ullmann (Weinreich 1963b) has noted
that signs can vary in terms of their "transparency" at each of these levels — that is, in the
directness of their relation to their denotation. In addition to simple cases of onomatopoea,
sound symbolism appears to have an effect (Taylor and Taylor, 1962) at what we can guess
is the level of synaesthesic metaphor (Gardener 1974). Furthermore some words exhibit
their etymology and can be said to be, to that extent, more transparent semantically. Com¬
pare grandfather with uncle for example. On distribution, there is a substantive contro¬
versy as to whether, for instance, the part of speech of a word influences the character of
its denotation. Note that this is precisely the question of linguistic relativity as it applies to
syntax: does it make a difference cognitively whether a language picks out a given entity
using one part of speech or another?
1 The term "text" should be construed to include both written and spoken language, of
course.
2
That is, in the case of sign language. I set aside for the time being the observation
that, for example, spoken language has kinetic, articulatory and visual aspects in addition to
its acoustic persona.
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Different contexts may vary in the focus they place on these levels, but typically for
linguistic signs the symbolic function (ie. the denotative relation) is to the fore. Neverthe¬
less, other aspects of the word may be drawn upon in a manner closely analogous to what
Weinreich described as the hypersemanticization of language (Weinreich 1963a). That is, in
both cases greater than usual weight is given to one or more aspects: the word is pregnant
with meaning. The complement of hypersemanticization is the phenomenon of desemantic-
ization undergone by morphs which, for example, form a compound.
Having mentioned synaesthesia, I cannot avoid observing that concepts (which are tradi¬
tionally taken to be the denotation of words in psychological accounts of meaning) have
strata too. Most obviously they exist, to use Piagetian terminology, on both the behavioural
and reflective planes of thought. But, on analogy with the brain which has primitive struc¬
tures underlying the neocortex, concepts must tap resevoirs of passion as well. This aspect
of meaning is to some extent dealt with in the work of Osgood.
Anomaly is characterized in a later chapter as a lack of transparency in the combination of
words, and this is attributed to the content of the background knowledge a language user
brings to bear on his task. Background knowledge is characterized as a set of naive theories
(some transient) about reality and the current situation which give conceptual flesh to the
skeletal lexical concept. This approach takes categorization to be strictly secondary in rela¬
tion to lexical concepts, being primarily a function of knowledge of the world. Lexical
concepts are held to be incapable in themselves of sustaining reasoning, which is viewed as
a conceptual phenomenon.
It is an important fact about language comprehension that it takes place in real time. The
comprehender must dynamically allocate processing resources to the interpretation of the
words that are successively uttered. Additionally, in this same window of time, the senses
of words must be combined. Indeed, Chomsky's arguments concerning creativity show con¬
vincingly that first, some stable lexical representation and second some regular method of
combination must exist. Clearly, the rapid pace of comprehension limits the process of
inference (which must be required to access background knowledge), and we can safely
predict that a word's linguistic neighbours (among other contextual constraints) serve to
gate this process in line with the Conversational Principle of "relevance". Moreover, there
exist syntactic devices (broadly, "foregrounding") which serve to direct the focus of the
comprehender's attention to particular items. Clearly, an adequate representation must take
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these things into account. In particular, how do lexical concepts interact with the knowledge
of the world which must underpin reasoning on the one hand, and linguistic context on the
other? And what consequences do these functional responsibilities have for the structure of
the lexical concept?
I have said above that concepts are frequently proposed as the denotation of lexical items.
It is desirable, however, to connect the lexicon to external reality as well, since that appears
to be what language is "about". Note that on the account I develop, the naive theories of
the language user are held to provide that link and that, nevertheless, one requires to
develop a fairly complex notion of self (ie. internal life) in order to describe and distinguish
reference to properties and experiences of the self. Furthermore, it is valuable to fashion a
distinction between the indexical and the depictive functions of language, even though these
are very often mingled in individual utterances of a given word.
Before ending this chapter, I wish to make a few brief remarks about method and, espe¬
cially, how the research tools of different disciplines can be used in relation to each other.
Science I take to be defined by a way of proceeding to conclusions (viz. rationally and with
a willingness to address uncertainties) which is shared by any reasonable person, whether
he describes himself as a scientist or not. The secondary element that distinguishes science
from other rational enquiries is the relationship between clarification (ie. philosophy) and
empirical evidence; in science, the latter makes the running. And in Cognitive Science,
clarification still has a major role to play. As well as philosophy, the apparatus of formal
modelling and computer modelling (a-intelligence) can aid the process of clarification, with
their enforcement of high standards of rigour adding something to mere armchair reflection.
The other advantages of modelling have been well described by, for example, Chomsky
(Chomsky 1965) and Hill (Hill 1987), and I expect that it's unnecessary for me to repeat
them here.
On the empirical side, there are several sources of possible evidence. There is "linguistic"
evidence; that is, sentences uttered (or constructed artificially) and the intuitions of native
speakers about certain properties of those sentences (such as grammaticality or paraphrase
relations). The storehouse of information amassed by traditional linguists and modern typo¬
logical work are worthy of special mention here. (It is not necessary, however, to assume
that it will be helpful to make a sharp distinction between what is traditionally classed as
semantic information on the one hand, and syntactic information on the other (see Dunbar
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1984).) As well as the kind of behavioural data generated in experimental psychology, sub¬
jects can also provide more extended reflections on their subjective experience of words.
In relation to the cognitive lexicon, and the type of meaning I am concerned with, let us
first make a distinction between two meanings that a word might be said to have. On the
one hand, there is the contribution that a word makes to a perceived meaning or under¬
standing of an utterance. That is, a word plays a role in the cognitive event of comprehen¬
sion, and its meaning to the comprehender is what it adds to the message. On the other
hand, there is the meaning which users of language ascribe to a word through a
metalinguistic process of dividing up the overall meanings of utterances among their consti¬
tuents. This is lexicography. The difficulty with a lexicographic approach is precisely that it
tends to view the word in isolation and at leisure, hence omitting from consideration the
rapid march of time and the swift intrusion of other words upon the scene. As the physicist
Bohm observed, when the analysis of any system excludes a factor whose influence upon
the system is systematic, that factor will appear to have a random effect. In other words,
theoretical advance depends on the analysis including any influential factors. This is a cen¬
tral doctrine of ecological psychology, and so this thesis can be seen as influenced by that
movement to the extent that I emphasise the neglected factors of time, contextual interac¬
tion, combination and dependency.
Cognitive linguistics, a relatively new way of doing grammar which owes a great deal to
Uriel Weinreich, provides descriptive tools which attempt to represent the structure of
language and meaning in a psychologically realistic manner. It can be thought of as
founded on a re-working of Chomsky's competence-performance distinction; the domain of
idealization is contracted by drawing into the scope of competence such factors as the
3
nature of perception and memory. Such an approach is, obviously, in tune with the per¬
spective adopted here: if modelling is to lead to clarity then the model should encompass
the determinants of the phenomenon being modelled.
3
It is crucial to realise that cognitive grammars are not typically presented as theories
of performance and also that, indeed, they vary as to which "psychological" factors they set
out to incorporate.
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Given this, the relation between linguistic and behavioural data is complex, and we cannot
simply regard the latter as providing a test of the hypotheses generated by the former: they
access the phenomenon at different levels. I follow Chomsky in assuming that regularities
at the linguistic level must arise from regularities at the cognitive level, but that the rela¬
tionship between the levels may be sufficiently abstract to preclude testing the models from
one with data from the other. Rather, they provide complementary data, with linguistic evi¬
dence establishing the general framework which behavioural evidence can then refine. At a
practical level, each will inspire the other periodically, in the manner of a dialectic.
This chapter has outlined the framework within which the thesis which follows has been
constructed. The optimal marriage of the traditional disciplines which feed into Cognitive
Science has not yet been made, I am sure. Nevertheless, I hope that the relationship I adopt
will turn out to be both coherent and productive: it is for the reader to judge.
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Chapter 2.
The lexicon in time and in context.
My goal is to clarify the nature of the semantic representations which are associated with
words and which mediate between form and meaning in language understanding. Two cri¬
teria will be emphasised: an adequate lexical entry must (1) be able to fulfil a function and
(2) do so in a manner consonant with available psychological data. The function is to sup¬
ply semantic information allowing the hearer to comprehend the speaker. This chapter out¬
lines some factors whose role in perception influences the way I characterise lexical mean¬
ing.
As a first step, let me briefly review data available from studies of speech perception and
reading, which bears on the issue of "semantic timing". By semantic timing, I mean the
pattern in time of the availability of meaning. To summarise in advance, it will emerge that
meaning becomes available very quickly, but that meaning evolves over time with process¬
ing exhibiting a periodicity linked to the structure of the discourse. After examining this, I
will discuss the important role of development in the comprehension process, suggesting
that variation in the degree of analyticity of processing is a property of human perception,
and of human perception of language in particular. This evidence has important conse¬
quences for our understanding of the relationship of word meaning to comprehension. First,
then, semantic timing ....
2.1. Semantic timing
Several studies, using a variety of experimental methods, have highlighted the role of
semantic information in the recognition of words in speech and text. It appears that the pro¬
cessing system uses semantic interpretation of the earlier parts of a discourse to generate
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expectations about subsequent parts.4
Miller and Isard 1963, extending the work of Miller, Heise & Lichten, found that words
were recognised more accurately if they appeared in strings that made semantic sense as
well as just possessing syntactic order. This early finding implies that the meaning of words
in a string is employed in the identification of their neighbours, which is a particular exam¬
ple of the role of top-down information (information about what the perceiver expects) in
the perception of language. Similarly, Marslen-Wilson and Tyler 1980 present evidence that
subjects could identify words that rhymed with a target word faster in a string of "normal"
prose which was semantically constrained than in nonsensical "syntactic prose". Further¬
more, this superiority is apparent from the beginning of a clause if it is preceded by a con¬
text sentence.
More recently, Ford (1983, reported by Kennedy, note 1) found that a task in which sub¬
jects had to continuously make lexical decisions (ie. to decide for each stimulus whether or
not it was a real word), reaction time was reduced if successive items cohered semantically
rather than just syntactically.
Marslen-Wilson has developed a speech-shadowing task for psycholinguistic research which
demands that subjects repeat auditoril y presented strings verbatim. Using this task,
Marslen-Wilson 1973 and Marslen-Wilson and Welsh 1978 found a class of errors (made
even by subjects whose shadowing lagged by only 250ms) which they call "constructional
errors". These involve the subject's output deviating from the input but in a way which
conforms to local syntactic and (especially relevant here) semantic restrictions. The more
recent of these studies found that subjects corrected phonetic errors in the input string more
often when the identity of the word had been more strongly constrained syntactically and
semantically.
Morton and Long 1976 using a phoneme monitoring paradigm (see eg. Foss 1970) reported
that the higher the transitional probability between a pair of words (the liklihood of the
pairing having occurred in the past), the faster reaction time was to a phoneme on the
second word, indicating that information about syntactic and semantic links between adja¬
cent words (of which transitional probability is a manifestation) frees processing capacity to
4
Parts of this section appeared originally in my undergraduate project, Dunbar 1984.
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facilitate monitoring or, in other words, that less processing is required to identify a word if
it is strongly linked to the previous word. Once more, this implicates the employment of
the meaning of one word in the recognition of its neighbours.
Another task which yields evidence supporting on-line access to word meaning is that of
listening to a passage being read, knowing that somewhere in the reading there is a
mispronunciation which must be detected. Cole and Jakimik 1980 report their work of 1978
in which subjects reacted faster when the mispronounced word was highly likely to have
followed the previous one (likelihoodlefined as transitional probability in the same way as
Morton and Long above) - this was in addition to the finding that RT was faster if the
mispronounced word had been implied in a previous sentence or suggested in the story
title. Cole and Perfetti placed the same words in predictable and unpredictable contexts and
found that variously aged schoolchildren and college students all reacted 200ms faster to a
word being mispronounced if it appeared in a predictable context, suggesting that these
subjects made the predictions "on-line".
Indeed, Marslen-Wilson and his colleagues have demonstrated that, in context, words are
often identified before sufficient acoustic-phonetic information has become available to
identify the word (see Marslen-Wilson 1986). On average, identification of words takes
around 200ms, but 200ms of acoustic-phonetic information is typically insufficient to iso¬
late a single item and tends to leave a large cohort of possible word candidates. Gating
tasks, in which words are gradually revealed to subjects in, for example, 50ms increments,
also indicate that recognition requires less of a word in sentential context than out of it.
This phenomenon is known as "early selection". For semantic expectations to be able to
play a role, of course, semantic information about competing items must be available dur¬
ing assessment, and these researchers have demonstrated that associates of contextually
appropriate items do not receive preferential facilitation until after the recognition point.
(This result was obtained using a cross-modal priming task in which subjects heard sen¬
tences containing a word-form; visually presented associates of any item consistent with the
current acoustic-phonetic information were easier to differentiate from non-words, but only
up to the recognition point). We should note, however, that - as Foss 1982 points out - it
is only the relatively enduring post-recognition facilitation that is likely to play a role in
assisting perception of subsequent material.
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Further evidence for meaning being processed word by word lies in MacKay and Bever
1967's finding that the further right in a string a lexical ambiguity is located, the longer it
takes to spot the ambiguity.
We will not be concerned here with particular models of speech recognition and their rela¬
tive merits, since it is of little relevance to present concerns whether, for example, top-
down information can influence acoustic-phonetic analysis. The key point is that context
provides "a structured interpretative framework against which the senses associated with
different word-foims can be assessed" (Marslen-Wilson, 1986 p40) and that words contri¬
bute to that framework rapidly. Taken together, these lines of evidence demonstrate that
meaning is extracted from words as they are identified one by one from left to right. The
evidence does not imply, however, that the whole meaning of a string is evolved in this
process, and I turn now to evidence that elaborative and integrative processing of meaning
continues in time.
It ought to be pointed out that there is evidence of "late recognition" of words. For example
Shillcock, Altmann and Bard (1987), demonstrate that a large proportion of lexical items
are not recognised until a point in time subsequent to the offset of following words.5
Clearly, if words are not identified they cannot contribute to meaning. Similarly,
Warren and Sherman 1974 have found that perception of the word [cough]-eel in the sen¬
tence:
(1) It was found that the ?eel was on the axle/shoe/etc.
depended on which noun appeared in the prepositional phrase. This finding of a "back¬
wards Warren effect" is important since it suggests that identification of an item can be
suspended pending disambiguation by context without derailing the entire comprehension
process. (See also Ganong 1980). Mackay and Bever's (1967) evidence that it takes
longer to find a second meaning for a multiply ambiguous sentence than for a singly ambi¬
guous one was interpreted by them to imply that the identification of ambiguous words was
suspended until context biasing one meaning or the other was found, on the grounds that in
a multiply ambiguous sentence it is difficult to converge on a single interpretation.
5
It would be of considerable interest to ascertain whether words likely to be recog¬
nised late nevertheless still produce the priming effects observed in the studies of lexical
access discussed above.
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Metaphorically, the notion is of trying to ascend a muddy slope rather than proceeding step
by step up a staircase: in a multiply ambiguous sentence there are fewer footholds. In sum,
we have three pieces of evidence that the comprehension of language need not (indeed, on
occasion, cannot) proceed word by word.
There is also considerable evidence of an association between the phrase structure of a
discourse and processing effort. That is, the human processor appears to deal with the
incoming information in phrasal chunks. Such a model of perception makes it easier to see
scope for context sensitive processes of integration and elaboration (see below). The data
supporting this assertion is of essentially two types: on the one hand, events near phrasal
(particularly clausal) boundaries tend to be perceived as being at the boundary (eg. Bever,
Garrett and Hurtig 1973, ), or better at the boundary (Wingfield Klein
1971, Caplan 1972, Foss 1969)6. On the other hand, eye movement studies find longer
fixations at the ends of syntactic units (clauses in particular) (eg. Just and Carpenter 1980).
The evidence for clausal processing is reviewed in Bever, Garrett and Hurtig (1973), Fodor,
Bever and Garrett 1974 and Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Seidenberg 1978. The paradigmatic
click-insertion experiments required subjects to listen to strings into which a non-linguistic
acoustic signal (a click) had been placed. The subject had to identify the location of the
click. Garrett, Weber and Fodor () found that the click was perceived in a location nearer
the major syntactic boundary in their experimental sentences than it had actually been. This
suggests that the clause is in some sense a perceptual unit. Further evidence is provided by
Wingfield and Klein (1971) who report that changes of channel are located more accurately
if they occur at clause boundaries.
As Marslen-Wilson et al (1978) point out, this evidence suggests that the surface structure
of a sentence is perceptually real, but in the absence of direct evidence for what they term
"clausal processing", it doesn't explain why it is perceptually real. They develop the thesis
that the key factor is informational completeness: the completion of a clause typically
rounds off a set of previously generated expectations. They suggest that:
6
The event is typically the occurrence of a click in the acoustic signal, but in
Wingfield and Klein (1971) it was a change of channel the signal was presented in (it
changed to the right ear from the left).
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"It is never the case that interpretative activity is not being attempted, but it will
often be the case, as it were, that this activity will raise more questions than can
be immediately answered." (Marslen-Wilson et al, 1978 p225).
The prediction they make is that identification time differences between targets specified by
either rhyme or category cues will be constant unless there is a change in the amount of
contextual aid. That is, if semantic information is less available at the beginnings of
clauses then the category task should suffer more, with the rhyme task being relatively
unaffected, when a clause boundary is encountered. Also, differences in identification time
either side of the clause boundary should be attenuated if the first clause is not information-
ally complete (eg. if it contains a cataphoric pronoun). And, indeed, it is found that the
difference between category and rhyme monitoring is constant at all positions, and that
there is slowing immediately after a clause boundary only if the clause is informationally
complete. Thus processing does exhibit a periodicity, but it is as a function of informational
completeness.
Townsend and Bever 1982 examine in some detail the notion that integration with semantic
context depends on the formation of a "propositional unit". For example, they find that if
an item suffixed with -ing forms a propositional unit (if it is a gerund, for example) then it
closes perceptually and integrates with context, thus slowing continuation reading times for
a subsequent inappropriate copula. On the other hand, if it does not form such a unit (if the
stem is an adjective, for example) then such effects are not found.
Carrithers and Bever 1984 found, for a reading task, that fixation times are longer and less
affected by word length at the ends of clauses (particularly those conforming to a can oni-
cal NVN schema; non-can. onical ones get processed more fully on-line). Haberlandt and
Graesser 1985 performed a multiple regression on reading times that were available on a
word-by-word basis, thanks to their use of a serial, visually-extended, display format. They
found interactions such that sentence imagery and the number of new concepts introduced
by a sentence had a particular effect on the sentence-final word, with reading time for this
word increasing linearly as the number of new concepts in the sentence increased, for
example. They conclude, therefore, that the pause on the final word is occupied by integra¬
tion of concepts.
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It is a common finding that reading times for sentences are speeded by appropriate prior
context. Observing that prior research has often used reading times for entire sentences,
Sharkey and Sharkey 1987 set out to examine whether the locus of facilitation is integration
with prior context or whether it has some other basis, by presenting texts a phrase at a
time. They found that knowledge-based facilitation (that is, faster reading times for entities
implicated in a previously activated script) occurred only for entities in the sentence-final
position. The failure to find facilitation for other positions was not confined to sentence-
initial position. Overall, these results are taken by the authors as support for a buffer model
in which concepts are chunked (at clause boundaries) before being integrated into some
discourse representation.
One implication of a relatively strong version of the word-by-word hypothesis (that as soon
as a word is recognized it makes its full contribution to the meaning of the utterance)
would be that that contribution can be determined at the time of recognition. This suggests
that words have a fixed meaning which does not vary as a function of subsequent context,
which - as many students of word meaning have observed - is an unten able view. There
are many ways in which the meaning of a word may change subtly, and I will review the
relevant data below. The evidence from the studies reviewed above, however, is clearly
consistent with the view that meaning develops over time. It will be an aim of this project
to provide a characterization of lexical meaning that allows for this.
2.2. Semantic development
The motivation for my interest in the perception of language becomes clear now. There are
some processes which it would be desirable to find time in perceptual activity for:
processes of elaboration and integration. The brief review has indicated that such time
does exist. The next two sections contain some more evidence and some more ideas on
how that time should be filled; the third outlines the general relationship between lexical
semantics and "reference" that will be assumed.
2.2.1. Elaboration
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One relevant feature of human performance is that word meanings are flexible. That is, on
different occasions of use the sense of a word is capable of varying. Halff, Ortony and
Anderson 1976 describe, for example, changes in the sense of RED according to the iden¬
tity of the noun it combines with. Barclay et al. 1974 discuss variation in the quality of a
given property as a cue for a noun according to the nature of the verb; for example, heavy
serves as a better cue for piano when the verb was lift. Barsalou 1982 demonstrates that
the verb phrase in a sentence can affect the availability of properties of the grammatical
subject. Let's examine this evidence in more detail.
Barsalou (1982), in rejecting the extreme views that on the one hand the whole meaning of
7
a word is context-independent (CI) and that it is, on the other, a function solely of context
(ie context-dependent, CD ), used a semantic facilitation task to test for CI and CD com¬
ponents of meaning. Several seconds after having read a sentence, in which one noun
phrase was signalled as the target by virtue of being underlined, subjects were cued with a
"semantic property" whose ownership by the target they had to verify. The dependent vari¬
able was the time taken to make the verification, and Barsalou found that a certain subset
of properties received verification times on average 145 ms slower when prior context had
not reinforced them than when it had. These properties he classified as CD and opposed to
properties verified equally quickly whether or not context reinforced them - CI properties.
This work can be directly related to that of Barclay et al. 1974 who reviewed then current
theories of lexical representation and decried their emphasis on the inflexibility of word
meaning. They assert, for example, that the representation of BALL in the two sentences :
(2) the man hit the ball
(3) the man hid behind the ball
is different. Although obviously the same in as much as the meaning is distinct from "for¬
mal dance", the representations are nevertheless said to differ in "size". The notion is that
7
Barsalou attributes this view to Katz who argued in fact that while context had a
role, that role was too unwieldy to formalize, and was attacked for that stance by Bolinger
1965 who accused him of a false dualism and suggested that such "knowledge of the
world" meaning as whether or not an entity typically wore shoes could be just as well ex¬
pressed by semantic markers (binary features).
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distinctiveness is not absolute but is a function of context. This important theme is dis¬
cussed in more detail in the next two chapters. In an experiment, the meaning of the verb
in sentences was found to affect which semantic properties functioned as effective memory
probes for the object noun phrase. For example, the probe "heavy" cued "piano" more
effectively if it had been lifted than if it had been "played". They found, moreover, that a
given probe-verb combination couldn't retrieve any old noun phrase ("heavy" could not cue
an "infant" which had been "lifted" as effectively as it could a "piano"), hence demonstrat¬
ing that the property is a flexible possession of the noun and not an invariant attribute of
the verb. The authors propose that :
"the way in which an unambiguous noun was psychologically instantiated was
governed by the relevance of each of its semantic properties to the event described
as a whole" p479.
In considering the Barsalou and Barclay et al studies, it needs to be remembered that there
is a considerable delay between initial perception and subsequent response. That is, they
employ successive tasks, evidence from which points to the conclusion that post-"on-line"
processing develops the meaning of a word relative to its linguistic (and, probably, wider)
context. This conclusion can be related to Miller 1977's argument that knowledge of the
world operates on lexical entries to relate them to context and one another. Miller has, like
many others, also argued (Miller 1978) that the extensive lists of senses of particular words
which lexicographers turn out (see eg Nida 19757 are an artifact of not abstracting the
analysis from contextual considerations.
Barsalou suggests two ways in which CD properties may be activated: either by inference
rules (similar to Miller, 1977) or via the lexical entries which can release these portions of
meaning if triggered by associated context. For example, he suggests that the meaning of
EAT can be manipulated by the meaning of whatever is eaten:
(4) he ate the steak/soup/sandwich
Barsalou states :
"Given the existence of CD properties, the meaning of a word is not a fixed set of
properties that is activated as whole every time the respective word is activated"
p87.
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Kunzendorf 1976 asked subjects to verify that species such as IRIS were "flowers" or
"plants". The exemplars were presented in a list which was made up of flowers and either
trees or weapons, and he found that subjects were faster to confirm exemplars as plants in
the weapons list than they were to confirm them as flowers in the trees list. Kunzendorf
argued that static theories of categorization could not explain why in certain circumstances
it was easier to identify an entity as a member of a more general category, and that it was
necessary to conclude that in different contexts different sets of feature would be attended
to. Specifically, being a plant would distinguish a flower from a weapon but not a tree and
so it's plant-hood would be more salient in the former case. With this study we have to
bear in mind, however, the opportunity that the nature of the materials affords the subject
to develop a task-specific strategy.
Halff et al (1976) presented their subjects with 19 sentences containing the adjective RED.
Subjects were required to judge the relative redness of each of the 19 "red" objects denoted
in the sentences. They find that when the rankings of the upper and lower bounds of red¬
ness in each context were established, subjects had rarely judged either pairs with overlap¬
ping intervals to be different, or pairs without overlap to be "equally red". This suggests
that the different instantiations of red can be represented as ordered intervals. They also
found that in around 20% of cases, the interval associated with a context included the
interval for another context, and in a handful of cases this other context also contained the
interval for a further context. This finding makes it unlikely that the interval is the same
width in all contexts, and rules out the possibility that in context RED could be represented
as a point. This is convincing evidence the context influences the range of plausible or
likely values a concept may take, delimitting an interval within the potential range of the
concept in isolation.
Anderson and McGraw 1973 argue that general terms are instantiated as specific exemplars.
In their first experiment, they explicitly asked subjects to form and report "a vivid concrete
picture", but in the second no biasing instructions were given. In this second experiment,
subjects' recall of previously presented sentences was cued by low frequency exemplars of
the category whose perceptual similarity to the high frequency associate presumed to be
instantiating the category was an independent variable. They found that the more similar
low frequency associate was a significantly better cue. For example, WOLF enhanced recall
of
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(5) The animal [dog] ran under the bush.
more than SQUIRREL. Anderson et al. 1976 extend this work, arguing that instantiation
allows selection from an indefinitely large family of potential meanings "a sense which per¬
mits a coherent overall interpretation of the message" (p667). They present evidence that
particular terms serve as better cues than the original more general terms for sentences like:
(6) The woman [actress] was outstanding in the theatre.
Crucially, this advantage of particular terms did not obtain for control sentences containing
similar lexical material arranged in different relations, thus ruling out a possible explanation
for the effect in terms of associations between the cue and the lexical material. The authors
are careful to note, however, that in free recall particular terms were substituted for general
ones only about 11% of the time, implying some representation of the general term. From
a formal point of view, too, we should be hesitant about representing a general term as a
specific example, since for well-known Berkleyan reasons the latter may not provide an
appropriate set of inferences.
This argument is analogous to the argument against some prepositional accounts of text
representation: that is, they fail to account, for example, for Garnham's finding that "fried"
is a better memory probe for the phrase "she cooked the chips" than "cooked" itself. What
it is suggesting is that when the "conglomerate structure" or "mental model" is put together
it is not assembled like a lego model in which the constituents do not affect one another's
structure. I am emphasising, then, what Gombrich 1960 terms "the beholder's share"; the
linguistic signal under-specifies the intended interpretation, and the hearer must work it out.
2.2.2. Undifferentiated and non-egalitarian reference
The concept of reference is central to most if not all theories of meaning, and a view on
reference will be elaborated in the following section. For now I will merely assume that the
reference of an expression is that which it picks out. Since I won't be presenting an exten-
sional account of reference, this account cannot be faulted on the non-existence of unicorns,
or water on the moon, for example. One difference between this and an extensional account
of reference is that here the speaker is unaware of what is being picked out and of exactly
how it is being picked out.
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The discussion up to now has emphasised that, at the level of the word, linguistic symbols
(necessarily) underdetermine the referent. But, at the level of the sentence, something more
precise is articulated. That is, complete utterances make something (a description, an inten¬
tion, a desire, whatever) clear. It is, of course, the case, however, that the meaning of a
sentence is not always conveyed with uniform precision, and in this section I will argue
that the concept of undifferentiated reference can help us understand some well-known
phenomena of this type. What I shall seek to argue is that because sentences as psycholog-
O
ical objects exist only relative to a process of comprehension , and because this process
exists only relative to a motivated hearer, the ploy of idealizing away from these processes
and motivations risks distorting our view of how best to represent lexical meaning.
Specifically, these factors lead to degrees of differentiation of reference, and this
phenomenon in turn has deep implications for the way we choose to represent meaning.
First of all, consider the sentence:
(7) How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the ark?
Erickson and Mattson 1981 conduct three experiments in which they establish that many
people fail to notice the error in this sentence even if
i) time pressure was removed;
ii) they were shown an example containing an analogous error;
iii) they read the sentence out loud;
iv) the inconsistent name had a different phonological structure;
v) the inconsistent name was placed in a focal position.
The authors describe this as an instance where people don't accurately comprehend the
input even "when the understander possesses all the knowledge necessary for correct under¬
standing" (p541). They do find, however, that the inconsistent name must be semantically
similar to the correct one. For example, Noah and Moses are both Old Testament grandees.
What I would claim is happening is that preliminary analysis indicates reference to an
event; the hearer's goal is to retrieve a property of that event (the number of animals of
each kind) and so the reference is not further differentiated because further differentiation is
not relevant. If this is correct, then we are forced to distinguish between consequential
"reference to" and instrumental "reference with". That is, the processing of the meaning of
g
Clearly sentences exist relative to processes of production as well.
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the constituents of the sentence is geared to the task in hand, and we can exclude as the
"lexical entry" for Moses the sum of our knowledge of him in toto. The processes of
comprehension, then, use words as clues to or filters of information that may be germane.
Let us briefly consider what one might call "the thesis of egalitarian and fully differentiated
reference" to which the account I am describing stands in contrast. Ray Jackendoff's
thought-provoking book (Jackendoff 1983) develops the idea that one can use language to
refer to more than just "things" (see also Jackendoff 1978). In traditional set theoretic
semantics, nounphrases are taken as logical constants (constants unless intensional logic is
employed, in which case interpretation is relative to a model) which refer to entities in the
world. But the "meaning" of a sentence is a truth value (or set of truth conditions) and the
semantics of all other constituents is built up recursively from just these types. Jackendoff
argues the necessity of enriching the range of types of logical constant so that, for example,
a prepositional phrase can refer to a #path# a #direction# or a #place#. His reasoning is that
for pragmatic anaphora10 to succeed, the listener must be able to "project" (see Jackendoff
(1983) pp22-29 for an elucidation of this concept) an entity corresponding to the pronoun.
For example, to comprehend the utterance "Johnny asked me to bring that when I go there
tomorrow" the hearer must be able to project some #thing# which that refers to and some
#place# which the pronoun there is used to refer to. He argues that syntactically
differentiable mechanisms are available for pragmatically referring to, for quantifying over,
and for expressing a relation of identity with #places#, #directions#, #actions#, #events#,
#manners# and #amounts#. This he takes as prima facie evidence for the existence for
corresponding ontological categories. This view is lent some support by Jane Hill's
discovery (personal communication), that in her computer model of the acquisition of early
language, (Hill 1983, Hill 1986), the appearance of a distinction between where? and
what? questions in the adult input forced the formation of two distinct categories of entity.
9
It is, of course, the case that non-standard logics can employ different ontologies.
Indeed, we will have cause to examine ones which use both different notions of entity and
of truth in the course of this investigation.
10
Pragmatic anaphora involves using a pronoun to refer without furnishing an an¬
tecedent. The hearer must recover the entity from his knowledge of the context. For ex¬
ample, "will you pass me that?" has a pragmatic pronoun as its final constituent.
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On Jackendoff's account, therefore:
"a simple sentence like... Floyd broke a glass violently... includes five referring
expressions, picking out two #things#, an #event#, an #action#, and a #manner#."
(Jackendoff 1983, p58).
Referential properties are associated with every major phrasal constituent (defined by an
X-bar theory of phrase structure), unless any are explicitly marked to the contrary by the
surface form of a sentence (eg by negation: "there is no unicorn in the concourse"). He
argues that it is not legitimate to reduce these categories to #thing# because there is no
more straightforward correlation between #things# and things than #events# and events:
projecting a #thing# involves "complex mental computations" (p47). Thus the logicians'
(and consequently many linguists') assumption that a semantics founded on the notion of
individual constant ("#thing#") has a solid and unproblematic base is false. It's false
because so much goes into "a psychological treatment of what standard logic treats as the
simplest possible expression" and because "the idealization to a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions is inadequate." (p47).
It is entirely reasonable to hold that there are different sorts of entity that can be referred
to, and that proposition will not be disputed (see also Langacker 1982b, Miller and
Johnson-Laird 1976). But although Jackendoff makes a strong case that it is not neces¬
sarily correct to assume that the "thing" is ontologically a priori, it may nevertheless be
that it, or some other category, is in some sense ontologically primary. For example, Keil
1979 claims that the ontological categories develop out of one another by a process of
differentiation during childhood, the development of events from objects being one instance
he cites. That is, although #things/objects# are not trivially correlated with reality, their
correlation may be simpler than that of events. Another alternative would be to argue
instead that the concept of "scenario" is primary, and that early language involves relatively
undifferentiated reference to entities participating in a scenario. It seems, then, that while
Jackendoff is right to draw attention to and to question the reductionist assumption of stan¬
dard logic, he is insufficiently hesitant about substituting an assumption of his own: we can
identify positions between Jackendoff and logic which suggests that his position is poten¬
tially open to empirical question.
The other observation that we must make of Jackendoff's treatment is that - because it
explicitly omits processing considerations - it does not confront the issue of understanding
being relative to processing. Nor does it consider the effect of having a specific goal of
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understanding upon the representation evolved. And, as we will see, both these factors lead
us to the views first that the meaning of a sentence does not necessarily consist of referents
for each major phrasal constituent and second that not all referents should be represented at
the same level.
I have suggested that the fundamental entity in language might be the scenario: can this
claim be justified with respect to language acquisition? It has been argued that children's
single-word utterances denote complex informational structures: for example, Shoe! might
mean "mummy is putting my shoe on" when uttered in an appropriate context. The analysis
of holophrases is one aspect of the debate in the literature over the methodological strategy
of "rich interpretation", and few investigators would claim that single-word utterances are
as syntactically rich as Bloom 1970 for example, once suggested when proposing reduction
transformations for two-word utterances. But many have held the view, nevertheless, that
the child is trying to refer to some participants in a process and to convey a set of relation¬
ships among them (eg Greenfield and Smith 1976). In a holophrase, then, a single symbol
refers to several entities.
More recent studies, however, have been taken by their authors' as suggesting a different
interpretation of the earliest utterances of children. Bates et al. 1983 describe early mean¬
ings as being components of language games. For example, the child Carlotta(12 m) would
say bam always at a certain moment in a tower demolishing game. These authors argue that
at this stage the child doesn't have her words, she does them. They describe development
as a decontextualization process in which a word begins to stand for the rest of the script.
Nelson 1983 argues that scripts are conceptually basic, and characterises language develop¬
ment as the "cannibalization" of these scripts to provide parts that can be employed in new
situations. (She hypothesises that this can begin when a single object plays several parts
within a script). The script is a first layer of representation; analysis produces further layers,
but the script is preserved. As evidence that the child's representation is in terms of events,
she cites Church (1966) who describes how a 12mth old responded to the word bath by
taking off her clothes, turning on the taps etc. Nelson cites also the Hallidayan "pure per¬
formatives"; under this analysis one talks of a "naming script" which is a part of a "reading
script", for example. Vygotsky 1962 argues, rather earlier, for a strikingly similar position:
"Semantically, the child starts from the whole, from a meaningful complex, and
only later begins to master the separate semantic units, the meanings of words, and
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to divide his formerly undifferentiated thought into those units." (pl26).
We might paraphrase this as: language development is a process of differentiation of refer¬
ence. Maximally undifferentiated reference, by contrast, arises when a syntactically com¬
plex utterance is taken as referring to only one entity.
I wish to claim, however, that the possibility of an interpretation of a sentence not
differentiating referents remains throughout childhood and into adult life, as in the case of
the semantic illusion described above. In this I take a line parallel to that of Donaldson
1978:25 on "egocentrism" (cf Piaget 1926) and disembedded thought in general (Donald¬
son, Grieve and Pratt 1983).
"what is being claimed is that we are all egocentric through the whole of our lives
in some situations and very well able to decentre in others. Piaget would not
disagree with the claim that egocentrism is never wholly overcome.... [But] I want
to argue that the difference between child and adult in this respect is less than he
supposes...."
The first phenomenon illustrating this is the use by young children of "event probability" as
a "preference rule" (cf Jackendoff 1983) in reaching an interpretation of active and passive
sentences. Strohner and Nelson 1974, for example, find that between about 2 and 4 years of
age, children make errors in the interpretation of active sentences which denote unlikely
events.
(8) The mouse chased the cat.
is acted out as a moggy pursuing an mouse. Such errors must, argue Strohner and Nelson,
be due to the employment of a "most likely scenario" strategy because neither a "com¬
petent" (cf Chomsky 1965:8ff) analysis nor an analysis based on an "N-V-N = agent-
process-patient" word order strategy would yield errors. My claim is that the "probable
event" strategy involves undifferentiated reference to a scenario (in this case, a "predation"
scenario) rather than projection of the two entities in a given relationship, with projection
based on the major syntactic phrases in the input string. Instead, the main verb summons a
scenario (or script, schema, frame, whatever; cf Minsky 1975 and, Verschueren 1981)
which fills slots (argument places) as appropriately as the remaining material (in the two
NP's) allows. That is, the three conceptual constituents have no independent cognitive
existence; rather they are emeshed in a set of relationships and the child takes the sentence
as referring to a single, minimally differentiated, event.
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Support for this view comes from the additional finding in Strohner and Nelson 1974 that 3
year old children will employ the word order strategy on what they term "reversible" active
and passive sentences.
(9) The Spurs player kicked the Arsenal player.
This is a reversible sentence: the event is equally plausible whoever is assigned the role of
agent. Thus, the word order strategy seems to be used at first as a fall-back position iff the
probable event strategy fails to yield a clear decision. This could be modelled in structural
terms by assigning greater weight to the former heuristic (cf Jackendoff, 1983 ch8) but let
us, from a processing perspective, assume that the former is a "quick and dirty" analysis of
the string, which passes "control" to a word order strategy only if it fails. If this assump¬
tion is correct, then we can see why the child's interpretation is relatively undifferentiated:
it is based on only a preliminary analysis of the input.11 What was Carlotta's only mechan¬
ism for dealing with words is developing into a processing heuristic for Strohner and
Nelson's slightly older subjects.
I have argued, then, that aspects of children's performance on tasks involving the interpre¬
tation of sentences can be understood in terms of a phenomenon of undifferentiated refer¬
ence arising out of a processing strategy. If this is correct, we can justifiably expect to
encounter a similar phenomenon among adults, and I contend that this is so. Indeed, it per¬
vades ordinary language use to an extent rarely revealed by formal analyses of sentences.
For example, Broadbent 1981 has the following to say about improbable sentences:
"... sentences are systematically understood in ways that sober application of the
official structure of the language would stigmatize as incorrect ... in fact, hasty
adult readers may have to re-read the original sentence to see exactly what was
wrong." (p376)
He refers to a study by Herriot (Herriot 1969) showing increased reading times for improb¬
able sentences for adults, which implies that the strategy has not totally vanished.
11
It must be noted, of course, that the account here doesn't explain why children
develop beyond this stage of accepting decisive preliminary analyses of strings (eg. they are
eventually able to interpret improbable sentences correctly). Although Strohner and Nelson
1974 provide some intriguing evidence with a bearing on this issue, it is beyond the scope
of the present work to pursue this.
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This view of language understanding is a common-place among students of text
comprehension (eg. Bransford and McCarrell 1977, Garnham 1981), who would generally
argue that the representation of a text is a representation of an event (the event described in
the text) rather than a text. That is, not a list of representations of successive sentences. The
sort of evidence that is adduced in support of such claims is that, for example, memory
contains more than the text provides at face value, leading to confusion among paraphrases
of material that does appear with information that is only implicit
There is also evidence (Pichert and Anderson 1977) that people remember a passage
differently according to the perspective they are asked to take, which supports the notion
that the motivation for processing a sentence can affect the way it is processed. Similarly,
Barsalou 1981 has demonstrated that people form concepts according to their goals. An
example of such a concept would be "food suitable for dieting". (Lakoff 1984) has demon¬
strated how languages institutionalise culturally important categories which can seem
heterogenuous to the cultural outsider.
It is standardly argued that referring expressions do not necessarily generate new referents
in the model but will frequently be linked up with individuals already in the model (the
central exemplar of this type of referring expression being, of course, the pronoun). This is
modelled by Johnson-Laird 1983 in terms of a superficial prepositional representation for
each sentence of the text being operated on by a set of rules for creating a model (which,
as has been noted in the literature (Garnham 1981, Reichgelt), is very like the creation of
discourse representations in DRS theory). Such rules would stipulate, for example, when it
was appropriate to introduce a discourse referent to the model. Indeed, several studies have
been able to demonstrate the consequences for processing time of increasing the difficulty
of bridging inferences required to make these connections (Clark and Haviland
1977, Sanford and Garrod 1981).
Here it is important, then, to take into account the purposes of the hearer in listening to a
piece of language, and to recognise a distinction between "referring to" and "referring
with". The former is the prototypical "reference" of linguistic and philosophical work. The
italicized NP in:
(10) The man in the corner called out to us.
"refers to" a certain individual. But it is not always useful to project an entity
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corresponding to every NP in a text: it may be, for example, that the reader's purpose is to
leam the attitude of the writer towards some topic. Consider the following short passage:
General Sibson came into the room and poured a large brandy. He said: "those
goats will get what they deserve." A wry smile crossed Peter's lips: "and you, will
you get what you deserve when this war is over?"
In such a case the text is read as "referring to" the attitude in question "with" intermediate
reference to concepts such as "goat" and "war", but neither the topic (the behaviour of
officers and men in a war) nor the attitude is explicitly referred to. This is not to say that
the referring expressions in such cases go unprocessed. To be sure, in order for the text to
be interpreted, they must be processed. What is being claimed is that they are processed
less fully (cf Bradshaw 1974, Lackner and Garrett 1973).
Conrad and Rips 1986 report a study of sentence-picture verification in which they sys¬
tematically varied the pieces of information that were "given" by systematically manipulat¬
ing a prior context-setting interrogative. On the assumption that those aspects of content
that are extracted from the target sentence first will be compared with the picture first, they
hypothesise that subjects will be faster to reject pictures that are discrepant with respect to
the earliest information to be extracted. They found that disconfirmations were fastest when
the false components included the given term. In their discussion, they suggest that given
information receives prior but more superficial attention. Similarly, Engelkamp and Zimmer
1983 found that subjects shown pictures depicting a scene described by a preceding sen¬
tence were likely to prefer looking at the picture of the entity that had been placed in focus
by clefting. They hypothesize that focussing devices result in "deeper" processing, in the
sense of processing that brings about greater elaboration.
There is a close parallel with the cognitive asymmetry of the subject and object of a sen¬
tence. Evidence for this is reviewed in Engelkamp and Zimmer 1983. Anderson (1976)
incorporates this observation in his ACT framework (by notating the 'subject of a proposi¬
tion' differently from an 'argument of a relation'), arguing that the object of a sentence is
not simply referring and rejecting what he calls flat propositional theories in which all
nounphrases are treated as arguments to the verb. Strawson 1967 regards this asymmetry as
"obvious" (pl06), and it is also incorporated by RW Langacker who uses a reversal of
foreground and background to account for the difference between active and passive sen¬
tences (Langacker 1982b). The psychological underpinning of passivization is discussed in
Allerton 1982 (pp48ff).
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Engelkamp and Zimmer 1983 also examine what happens when passivization and clefting
suggest different foci ie. when they conflict as in sentences like:
(11) It is the motorcyclist by whom the girl is welcomed.
They found that gaze switching between the entities (as depicted in a drawing) was greater
for sentences harbouring such conflict.
Langacker (1983) gives a more highly elaborated view of the theory developed in Lan-
gacker (1982), and in that more recent paper Langacker develops an argument that con¬
structions related in transformational theories by the "dative shift" rule (and which, under
the Katz-Postal hypothesis that transformational rules don't change meaning, would have to
have the same meaning) differ in terms of the conventional imagery (or metaphor or con-
strual) that they provide as a vehicle for the content words. Thus,
(12) John gave the box to Dave.
emphasises the "path" (traversed by the box), whereas
(13) John gave Dave the box.
emphasises the resultant state, in which Dave is in control of his new possession. Hence,
the choice of construction is a matter of the "relative salience" (Langacker 1983 p49) of the
entities referred to. He points out that this difference has consequences for the acceptability
of instantiations of the construction: because it's difficult to construe a fence as a control¬
ling possessor
(14) The shortstop threw the fence a ball.
is slightly odd. And because it is hard to imagine leaving a path that is not salient:
(15) I threw her the ball, but it never reached her.
and
(16) I went down the office, but never got there
are also anomalous.
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Allerton (1982) similarly observes that valency relations and surface relations are indepen¬
dent, for purposes related to the given-new distinction and textual coherence. Of particular
note are the relations between lexical items such as elude and miss, which will participate
in truth-conditionally equivalent propositions, but arrange their arguments differently on the
surface. A relevant finding in the psychological literature is Hampton's recent discovery
(Hampton 1987) of the non-commutativity of typicality ratings for exemplars of complex
concepts. Specifically, he found that subjects do not give the same rating for a given exem¬
plar for putatively conjunctive categories of the following form:
(17) An X that is a Y.
(18) A Y that is an X.
Rather, greater weight was systematically given to the term appearing in the relative clause.
Hampton suggests that this may be due to the primacy of new information.
Langacker develops a formal framework (Space Grammar) to permit representation of such
distinctions, and some aspects of this system will be described in a later chapter. The
relevant point here is that the difference between constructions (such as active v. passive,
or unshifted v. shifted ditransitives) can be understood partly as a difference in the relative
prominence given to the entities participating in the process being described - the same
event can be portrayed differently.
In conclusion, I claim that making a distinction between differentiated and undifferentiated
reference as the consequence of an interpretative act (and its processing corollary, the "to"-
"with" distinction) can give us a theoretical handle on some superficially unconnected
phenomena. This distinction seems likely to be related to a processing distinction and to
arise out of the fact that language is used.
Many other investigators have proposed bi-partite models of processing along broadly these
lines. Gibson 1950:211 says:
"the perception of everyday life is very often schematic ... but perception can be¬
come literal whenever the observer needs to discriminate."
Neisser 1967 makes an analogous distinction between two stages of processing, and Wason
1977 contends that the difficulties some subjects experience in coming to terms with the
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solution of the 4-card problem arise because of the nature of the pre-analytic framework in
which they first cast it.
It is likely to be something that intellectual development affects, with increasing maturity
being reflected in increasing ability to differentiate reference. It is possibly something that
is affected by cognitive style; one might predict, for example, that field independent sub¬
jects would be more prone to differentiating reference than field dependents. It is also,
probably, affected by linguistic variables. For example, one might expect undifferentiated
referents to receive less elaboration of meaning, and this could be used to test whether
backgrounded information is relatively undifferentiated.
2.2.3. Referential perspectives
It has already been noted that different constructions can be used to describe a single situa¬
tion. In this section I wish to build on this notion, and to discuss something of the relation
between linguistic meaning and the world.
Strawson (1967) argues against the view that the meaning of an expression is a referent, or
that the meaning of a sentence is a truth value. These are, instead, characteristics of some
use of an expression. Meaning, he suggests, consists of general directions for the use of an
expression; in other words, conventions governing use. Thus Strawson puts forward a view
of meaning broadly compatible with the view being developed here; on a particular occa¬
sion of use, an expression will have a referent, and this referent is a more specific sort of
thing than the meaning of the expression itself. Johnson-Laird 1987 puts forward a perspec¬
tive on meaning that appears to be equivalent.
We should note that on occasion the world can pre-empt the process of inference and con¬
struction by making a referent perceptually available. This provides specific properties.
Thus, for example, if I ask you to glance at "the first word on the page", many of the pro¬
perties of that word are fixed (such as its identity, its form and so on). On the other hand,
imagining the last word of Noam Chomsky's next book leaves the instantiation of the word
WORD more open. We can define two extremes; at the one end the entity is entirely fami¬
liar; at the other it is entirely unknown. Obviously, definite articles and possessives are
likely to anticipate instances of pre-emption. Strawson points out that some types of expres¬
sion are more dependent on context than others; a pronoun does not pick out anything
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without some context, for example. Nevertheless, given the degree of support from context
that its type requires, any nounphrase can be used under conditions of extreme familiarity
with the referent.
What, then, can an expression communicate if the referent is already known? Most obvi¬
ously, it may form part of a sentence that predicates a new property of that entity, and in
the extreme case the referential expression may function merely as a tag or pointer to the
entity in question, having - in the sense in which J. S. Mill suggested that proper names
were meaningless - no meaning. More typically, the referring expression will have some
descriptive content and will contribute a fresh perspective on the entity in question. Thus
we have the elegant variation of journalism, and the inelegant variation of ordinary conver¬
sation. As Strawson noted, the predication of a simple subject-predicate construction may
be conveyed by a definite nounphrase. For example:
(19) Napoleon was the greatest French soldier.
Here the nounphrase is functioning at the opposite end of the spectrum from a tag. Attri¬
butive reference (Donnellan 1966, Johnson-laird and Garnham 1979) has essentially this
character. The definite description in
(20) The man who left his wig (whoever he is) is guilty of robbery.
is not referential; rather, it attributes to a reference target (as yet unsighted) certain proper¬
ties.
It can be argued that proper nouns are not like common nouns because one can ask about
the reference or the meaning of common nouns, but only about the reference of proper
nouns (Kempson 1977). Our notion of referential perspective and "degree of pre-emption"
avoids this problem rather neatly. Because pre-emption is a matter of degree, there is no
discontinuity. To make this argument persuasive, it should be pointed out that proper names
can manipulate perspective in at least two senses. First, there is a difference between the
expressions Barry and Professor Richards (which refer to the same individual and are
proper nouns), which might, as a first approximation, be termed "honorific". Second,
characteristic properties of Professor Richards can be attributed to Dr Myers by utterances
like:





I have emphasised that referring expressions and sentences portray entities and situations,
and that the speaker can choose to portray a given entity or situation in different ways by
his choice of words or construction. In later chapters, I will look in detail at a particular
example of the manipulation of perspective by referring expressions; the mass-count dis¬
tinction. In general, entities can be referred to using either mass or count nounphrases in
English. The difference is essentially one of perspective. For example, the phrase
(21) a vast expanse of table
highlights a particular aspect of the table in question.
2.3. Conclusions
The term "conclusions" is perhaps too conclusive to describe the speculations I put forward
here. Clearly much remains to be done in working out a theory of psychological meaning
which accounts for all the relations among symbol, world and mind. Nevertheless, I hope,
in these first two chapters, to have sketched a useful survey of what I take to be relevant
data, and to have drawn some appropriate conclusions regarding the process of interpreta¬
tion. Interpretation is viewed here as a constructive process in which attention plays a criti¬
cal role. Syntactic devices and lexical items provide constraints on the process of construc¬
tion. We can describe two sorts of definition that might be given to a word. On the one
hand, there is the meaning which users of language ascribe to a word through a
metalinguistic process of dividing up the overall meanings of utterances among their consti¬
tuents. This is lexicography. You start from the interpretation and apportion sections of it to
the component phrases of the utterance. On the other hand, its meaning can be viewed as
the contribution that a word makes to a perceived meaning or understanding of an utter¬
ance. That is, a word plays a role in the cognitive event of comprehension, and its meaning
to the comprehender is what it adds to the message. On this view, which I take to be more
compatible with the empirical findings I have outlined, the word does not so much provide
material for the constmction of a representation, but a tool. In particular, lexical concepts
integrate with each other, and this process of integration extends over time and influences




Having outlined a framework in Part 1, I focus now on the key issues. In part, this is done
by considering some important ideas which have been put forward as theories of word
meaning. My approach to these theories is critical, but I aim to retain the valuable insights
which one invariably finds associated with any major theory.
In chapter 4, I will discuss prototype theory and its limitations, but first I will tackle two
issues which may otherwise distract us. Firstly, what relationships hold between meaning
postulates, semantic components and, indeed, other formal devices such as semantic net¬
works and predicates? And secondly, can a purely systemic account of lexical meaning
12
suffice as a psychological theory? These questions are closely entwined in the literature,
but I will discuss them separately.
In the final chapter, I present an informal description of my own "Lexical Concepts" view.
The rest of the thesis will explore this approach.
12
The second part of this chapter will appear as Dunbar 1989.
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Chapter 3.
The importance of notation and system.
In this chapter I briefly examine two issues which together seem to have occupied twentieth
century lexical semanticists heavily. The first arises immediately in any practical attempt to
do lexical semantics, and is concerned with the problem of representing meaning ortho-
graphically. The second concerns a theoretical concept that has been highly influential, the
notion of systemic contrast. I make no secret of my view that neither of these questions
provides a research path for profitable cognitive science.
3.1. Notation.
The principal differences among notations concern the interpretation given to elements and
the processing assumptions associated with the notation. Semantic components, for exam¬
ple, are generally interpreted as abstract concepts and are, in particular, held to be distinct
from elements in the object language. Meaning postulates, on the other hand, are relations
of entailment among words of the language under study. Thus:
(22) man: [+HUMAN] [+MALE] [+ADULT]
and
(23) man —> male
are, respectively, componential and meaning postulate analyses of the English word man.
It is sometimes argued that a meaning postulate analysis has the advantages of permitting
partial definitions and of avoiding the need to assume that words are interpreted by decom¬
position into semantic primitives (Fodor et al. 1980, Johnson-Laird 1983, Lyons 1981).
(For further evidence that "componentially" more complex items carry no heavier process¬
ing burden, see Kintsch 1974). Others take the view that these assumptions are independent
of the notation used (Bierwisch 1970, Leech 1981). Leech (1981) argues, rather, that
describing semantic components as abstract concepts has the advantage that the same
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components can be used in the analysis of different languages, whereas separate postulates
would have to be provided for French chien English dog and German Hand. Lyons would
argue strongly, however, that it is not for linguistics to thirl itself to a particular set of
assumptions about the nature of mind (ie. that there are concepts or that these concepts may
be universal) (Lyons 1968, Lyons 1977, Lyons 1981). (Leech 1981 specifically avows a
weak universalist position). Kempson 1977:chll is sceptical about any claim that the
difference between components and postulates is more than superficial.
13
Allan 1986, preferring the term predicate to "meaning postulate" , concludes that predi¬
cates are equivalent to components and goes on to interrelate entailment and set member¬
ship (Allan, 1986 ppl72-173). Indeed, a typical componential scheme will include some
redundancy rules like [+BOVINE] —> [+ANIMATE] fleshing out basic lexical entries; such
rules draw the two formalisms still closer.
It has been asserted that a componential analysis is limited (relative, presumably, to both
network and meaning postulate accounts) in not being able to account for relational attri¬
butes (Cohen 1983), but Leech 1981 shows how to encode both polar and relative opposi¬
tions in terms of components.
Comparisons have also been made in the psychological literature between semantic network
theories (eg Anderson and Bower 1973, Anderson 1976, Collins and Quillian
1969, Rumelhart and Norman ) on the one hand, and "set-theoretic" (componential) ones on
the other (eg. Smith, Shoben and Rips 1974). Semantic networks represent words as
embedded in hierarchies; the meaning of a word is assumed to be the sum of the properties
it inherits by way of connection to other words. In more sophisticated versions, links other
than the ubiquitous is-a are permitted between nodes. Hollan 1975 argues that the
difference between nets and sets is merely notational and points out that a network can be
defined as a set of linked nodes which is equivalent to a set of (concept, feature) pairs.14
Rips, Shoben & Smith's (!975)reply does not contest this structural isomorphism, arguing
only that the distinction matters with respect to processing considerations (what operations
consume resources and whether there need be complete decomposition).
13
His reason for preferring the term predicate is quite simply that he wishes the ele¬
ments of his analysis to be part of a metalanguage rather than the object language.
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These authors conclude that:
"Apart from these substantive matters, there seems to be little reason to prefer net¬
works to sets, except as a matter of theoretical convenience" (pl57).
Anderson (1976) argues that the principal advantage of nets is that they represent a con¬
venient notation for analyzing (memory) search, and in chapter 5 he proposes a specific
procedure for translating network representations into linear ones as required.
Johnson-laird (1983) suggests that:
"In the absence of any principled constraints on the processes that can be em¬
ployed in setting up or interrogating semantic networks, the empirical content of
the general theory of semantic networks is unclear" (p214).
He does, however, commit himself to the view that meaning postulates are distinct from
components, claiming that only the latter can account for certain experimental data.
Johnson-Laird's supposed refutation of meaning postulates rests on the mistaken assump¬
tion that the notational device carries theoretical weight (Johnson-Laird 1987). To carry it
through, he is forced to prescribe that "[subjects] should search for postulates of [a specific]
form" (pl93, my italics).
A meaning postulate account can work, however, if it is not burdened with the additional
assumptions prescribed, but rather is granted some others.15 Specifically, let us assume that
the subject engages in parallel in serial searches of two stacks of meaning postulates:
Stack 1.
Vx (xe -{jug, knife,...)) —» x is not a substance
Vx (xe -{sherry, ammonia,...)) -» x is a substance
Vx (xe -{toffee, wood,... )) —» x is a solid
14
In fact, Hollan points out that a function assigning a value to each edge of the di¬
graph is also necessary for equivalence to the feature theory defined by Smith, Shoben and
Rips 1974. This is because Smith et al's Feature Comparison Model takes variation in cri-
teriality into account (see below).
15
This model was first presented to a Mental Lexicon workshop in the Centre for
Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, on 16th July, 1987.
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Stack 2.
Vx (xe -{vase, syringe,... )) —> x is not connected with consumption
Vx (xe -{jug, toffee,... ^) —> x is connected with consumption
Vx (xe -{toffee, plate,... )■) -> x is connected with eating
Vx (xe -{toffee, cake,... —» x is consummable
Searching of each stack terminates when the key postulate is arrived at. The fundamental
assumption that makes this model work is that search proceeds from less specific to more
specific meaning postulates. One further assumption: for each rule an item passes (apart
from negative rules), add 0.1 to the probability of recall. For example, toffee passes two
rules in Stack 1, and three in Stack 2; while plate passes no rules in Stack 1, but two in
Stack 2. The predicted probabilities of recall are tabulated along with the percentage of
words correctly recalled, as reported by Johnson-Laird, Gibbs and de Mowbray 1978, in
the following table:
Table 1. Comparison of Predicted and Obtained Recall








This model gives a fairly good fit to the recall data, accounting for a little over 95% of the
variance of the means reported (r= 0.9766). The object is not, however, to propose a seri¬
ous model of behaviour, but simply to demonstrate the general point that meaning postu¬
lates could handle such data.
These arguments serve to confirm our suspicion that the theoretical context is of greater
significance than the notation. Collins and Loftus 1975 clinch it when they say that:
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"Network models were developed as a method of representing features in a com¬
puter" (p410).
Jackendoff approaches representation from a different angle, arguing that in principle
semantic relations are to be derived by processes of conceptual induction (Jackendoff
1983:ch6). He argues for his approach from two directions. Firstly, generic categorization
judgements can behave like ordinary categorization, in that, for example, there may be
fuzzy margins. And secondly, an initial a priori deductive relationship between some
categories (required to get the ball rolling), cannot simply be assumed. (This second argu¬
ment will also be used against systemic accounts of meaning in the discussion below). It
is, therefore, necessary to allow what he calls "TYPE-inclusion" judgements to be made on
the same basis as judgements that particular tokens are instances of certain types. Sense
relations, such as entailment and hyponomy can then (following Katz), largely be derived
from generic categorization judgements.
Nevertheless, he eventually reaches a view similar to ours with regard to notation. In addi¬
tion to categorization judgements, he provides inference rules which he describes as han¬
dling deductive property inheritance (that is, the same thing as meaning postulates and the
rest). The two rules interrelating three types of representation are shown below (where "X"











Syntactically, 2 is a sort of "property raising" transformation; any entity that is an instance
of some category can have that category as a property.
Because he emphasises a Grammatical Constraint (ibid., ppl3-16), Jackendoff rejects some
notations because they do not map easily onto the form of English. Jackendoff's theory
differs, then, in according importance to the form of the notation as well as in his invoca¬
tion of the notion "judgement", of which more later. He argues, however, that
network/meaning postulate theories are notational variants of markers (ibid., pi 23). In
closely relating attribution, inference and sense relations, he adopts a position in line with
the consensus of previous research outlined above.
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In short, then, the content of any device for representing the meaning of words stems
largely from associated assumptions, rather than the form of the device. Here I will talk in
terms of parameters and their values, but let me emphasise that this does not amount to a
hypothesis about lexical meaning. In order to avoid confusion, the term "parameter" is
chosen because "feature" is sometimes used in the psychological literature to mean "feature
+ value". For example, Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976) state:
"We take "feature" to mean any particular value of an attribute that a percept must
have in order to satisfy a test based on the perceptual predicates." (pl37)
Certain issues have emerged as substantive in the preceding discussion, and I must briefly
sketch a stance with respect to each. Regarding completeness of definition, I do not claim
that the definition given of any lexical item is other than partial, both in the sense that the
particular analysis is incomplete and also in the sense that lexical concepts are, as argued in
chapter 1, subject to processes of instantiation. A specific position on the related decompo¬
sition issue will be developed (along the lines of Langacker 1982b, Langacker
1983 and, Leech 1981) in due course. See Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976) pp326-333 for an
interesting discussion of decomposition and completeness of definition. On the issue of
universality, I will have little to say, but any claims will be made explicitly at the appropri¬
ate point. Perhaps the most important associated assumption (at least from the philosophi¬
cal point of view) and the most rarely explored, concerns the source of an interpretation for
the notational atoms, and this brings us to the second lemma which I wish to argue.
3.2. Word meanings and distinctive features.
The classical answer to the question "what is word meaning?" is generally ascribed to Aris¬
totle: in learning a concept one disregards particulars and extracts what is common to the
class.16 In other words, a mature concept is a set of common features, shared by the enti¬
ties in what has come to be known as the word's "extension". This solution has, until com¬
paratively recently, dominated psychological and linguistic (not to mention lexicographic
and anthropological) theorizing on the topic.
16
This section has benefitted from detailed comments from Karen Lyon and from dis¬
cussions with participants in the Mental Lexicon workshop, to whom I am grateful. They
should not, however, be held responsible for flaws; for these, I must be held to account. A
paper based on this section was not read at the XXIII Linguistisches Kolloquium in Berlin,
August 1988.
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For example, Wundt 1894 modelled concept learning as a process with two phases: first
generalization, and then abstraction of features of meaning. This paradigm was the focus of
most research into concept formation in the behaviourist learning theory school up until the
1960's, when pioneering investigaters such as Zaslow 1961 first began to argue that the
concepts of natural language did not fit the classical mould. The classical concept acted as
telos in Vygotsky 1962; children whose thought processes were still developing progressed
through intermediate stages (eg complexes and chains) towards the achievement of these
"scientific concepts". According to Clark 1973, children learn word meanings by inducing
the common features and accreting them over a fairly long period to lexical entries.
In linguistics, this philosophy has emerged in the componential analysis of Katz and Fodor
1963 and its heirs (notably Bierwisch 1970, Leech 1969). A special case of the view is its
subordination to the Saussurian notion of systeme (Saussure 1966). This, indeed, is the
typical form of the classical view in linguistics: the features that represent the meaning of a
word are just those which distinguish it from others in the relevant semantic domain
(Leech, 1969), and from these "markers" (set up on the basis of distinctiveness) various
semantic relations can be defined.
It was with the purpose of explicating the notion of "relevant" domain that the concept of
"semantic field" was developed (Coseriu and Geckeler 1981, Miller and Johnson-Laird
1976, Trier 1931).
The same view has been held by others who emphasise that the meaning of a word derives
from its relations with other words (Lyons 1963, Lyons 1981) and who therefore adopt the
notational device of the "meaning postulate".
The issue, then, is the question of whether words are meaningful solely in relation to other
words in the same language: a word means what it means because of what it does not
mean. This view has been held by linguists such as Bierwisch and Lyons, and comes from
the Saussurian tradition. Lyons, for example, puts it like this:
the sense of a lexical item [is]... identical with, the set of relations which hold
between the item in question and other items in the same lexical system." (Lyons
1968)
Let me emphasise that the object here is not to criticise a particular linguistic theory or
theorist. It would be too easy to take a quote out of context and represent that as the sum
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of a theoretical edifice. Rather my approach is essentially interdisciplinary. I will look at
the question of how successfully the linguistic abstraction can be transferred to the domain
of cognitive structure. That is, to what extent can the concept of systemic contrast be suc¬
cessfully applied to a description of language as situated in the mind.
For many enterprises, this is not an important issue. For example, it is irrelevant to the lexi¬
cographer constructing a dictionary, for whom the systemic abstraction is probably a useful
tool. However, it is timely to raise the issue not only because of its intrinsic interest but
also because of the current rapid development of two areas of research which to a certain
extent employ the abstraction as a background assumption.
1. Cognitive linguistics uses the notion of deriving meaning from location in a structured
system. See, for example, Langacker 1982b.
2. In connectionist models, "meaning" derives from links in a very literal manner, and col¬
leagues will sometimes talk informally as if this were the same thing as systemic con-
17
trast.
Again, my intention is not to criticise the research strategy. Research programs may profit
greatly from the implicit rapports with the work of de Saussure. Nevertheless, both these
areas of research draw the lexicon into the cognitive domain, and ultimately they must con¬
front the issues raised here.
There are four issues:
• Learnability
• Derivation of semantic relations
• Inherent interaction with context
• The existence of degrees of contrast
3.2.1. Learnability
17
It is of course simply wrong to make this equation; it is necessary to distinguish
distributed links from local relations. Nonetheless, the metaphor is clearly influential.
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A system must have at least two parts. If there is only one part, it has nothing to relate to,
and it cannot be giv en an interpretation in terms of non-existent relations. What, then, of
the very first word learned? How can the lexicon bootstrap itself?
One might propose that there are "hidden words" present in the "empty" lexicon of the
infant language learner. Words such as EGO, OTHER, or some ontological concepts, such
as "the object concept" are obvious candidates. Note, however, that now we are using
extralingual relations, and we have broken faith with the strong definition of lexical mean¬
ing quoted above. This, of course, is not a problem for any real theory of language learn¬
ing. The problem only arises if we try to force a certain linguistic abstraction into the cog¬
nitive domain.
Jackendoff 1983 makes a similar point (see above), cf however Fodor 1975). The problem
is that it is difficult to see how the mesh of relations could be initiated.
3.2.2. Derivation of relations
An important advantage of the techniques of systemic contrast, such as componential
analysis, is that they yield a representation of the system from which it is easy to derive
lexical relations. The following table gives an illustrative analysis of four words using two
markers:
MAN WOMAN BOY LAD
MALE
ADULT
+ - + +
+ + - -
An analysis like this lets you derive important lexical relations in a straightforward manner.
For example, it is immediately clear that BOY and LAD are synonyms (in the terms of the
analysis). You can also predict that a sentence like
(24) This man is a woman.
is contradictory (on one reading) because the two nouns have conflicting values for one
feature.
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However, it is possible to have systemic contrast without easy derivation of relations. This
is demonstrated by studies which use multi-dimensional scaling (MDS). This technique
requires subjects to rate a set of lexical items along a set of scales. For example:
LION —How fast is a lion (1-7)?
—How round is a lion (1-7)?
etc.
All the ratings for all the subjects for all the words are then boiled-down by a statistical
technique which reduces the system to a set of locations in an n-dimensional space.
If mere distinctiveness is all that we require, then why not use the two-dimensional solu¬
tions to multi-dimensional scaling studies (eg. Fillenbaum and Rapaport 1971, Marx
1983, Smith, Shoben and Rips 1974)? If n-valued markers are permitted (Ladefoged
1971, Leech 1981), then it is in general possible to supply unique coordinates for each lex¬
eme using just two dimensions: for example, Smith, Shoben and Rips 1974 classify a selec¬
tion of animals along two dimensions which they label "size" and "predatoriness". Con¬






We have systemic contrast, but where are the lexical relations? How, for example, could
one derive the hyperonymy of BIRD to CHICKEN? Some configurations appear more






Three difficulties come to mind. First, scaling the axes. How far apart must two items be








We would need to supply a similarity metric with which to measure semantic distance, and
a threshold with which to evaluate semantic distances.
The second difficulty lies in the interpretation of axes. It should be noted that subjects did
not give their ratings directly on these dimensions, but that these dimensions are a statisti¬
cal summary of data from many subjects using several other dimensions. The axes can
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usually be labelled roughly, but there is a serious difficulty in saying precisely what the
nature of the oppositeness is.
And thirdly, a two-dimensional semantic space is too crude to articulate all the relations we
might want. Specifically, it could not supply all the relations of oppositeness, for example,
that we might need. There are other, perhaps more profound, difficulties with MDS, but
my purpose is to demonstrate that it is not systemic contrast per se that supplies an analysis
of lexical relations. That is, distinctiveness or contrast does not, when combined with
rigorous application of a principle of economy, suffice to motivate features that can account
for sense relations.
3.2.3. Interaction with context is inherent
It is well known that within different semantic fields, words take on different senses (Ben-




It is obviously not good to have to postulate two lexical items DOG (one for each field)
which would nevertheless be extensionally equivalent (though perhaps with a different typi¬
cality structure - see below) just to save the analysis. Assuming, instead, that these are two
uses of a single lexical item, we are le. d to address the question of how to characterize the
meaning of that lexical item in such a way as to allow it to interact with both semantic
domains.
I will discuss context effects on word meaning in more detail in the next chapter, but I
want to give a suggestion here of the dynamicity of this interaction.
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Fillmore has remarked (Fillmore 1988) that EPISCOPALIANS can't be opposed to BOYS
in the same way that GIRLS and MEN can. Imagine, however, the following scenario: a
troop of boy scouts, washed out of their camp site by rain, and a coach load of churchgoers
on a touring holiday, arrive at the Hotel Duomo, say, at the same moment. It would be pos¬
sible for the manager to say something like:
(25) Put the episcopalians on the first floor and send the boys away.
Clearly, Fillmore has in mind the non-orthogonality of boys and episcopalians, but in our
scenario the groups are functionally orthogonal, and so the opposition is plausible.
This dynamicity implies that the interaction is inherent in lexical expression. This notion of
inherent interaction will be developed in later chapters.
There is an important point to be made here. When is an abstraction so abstract that it cor¬
rupts the description? That is, sometimes an abstraction abandons a factor that is crucial to
understanding some phenomenon. If it does this, it is not helpful.
Gibson has discussed this in relation to visual perception. The paradigm in psychology was
to study perception in terms of static "snapshots" of the visual field. Gibson and his fol¬
lowers have demonstrated that patterns of texture in the optic flow (that is, the continuously
moving flow of reflectances on the retina) can specify invariances in the environment. In
other words, motion turns out to be essential to understanding certain phenomena of visual
perception.
Guillaume (Guillaume 1984) has discussed motion, too, but he discussed it in relation to
word meaning and in relation to the work of de Saussure. Guillaume writes of the move¬
ment from potential to actual, and it is precisely this notion that I emphasise here. I will
argue later that it is in the realisation of lexical concepts as concepts that contextual interac¬
tion inheres.
3.2.4. More and less contrast.
There is a marked subset of uses of words which are more contrastive. Some differences
in the linguistic properties of these uses are described in the following paragraphs.
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First, of course, these uses tend to be marked physically using stress in spoken language,
and a bold typeface or underlining in written language. For example:
(26) Did you get Trixie a dog [and not a cat] ?
Moreover, contrastive stress has syntactic implications. Consider, for example:
(27) That a man got the job pleased him.
Here the pronoun can be coreferential with the noun-phrase a man only if that noun-phrase
is employed contrastively, the structure of the sentence ruling out coreference on any other
reading. Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Seidenberg 1978 report two similar cases of an
interaction between contrastive stress and acceptability. They argue that a subordinate
clause like:
(28) Although the drink is quite cheap beer,
is alright only if beer is stresed contrastively. For a non-contrastive reading, they suggest
that it's much better to substitute a pronoun for drink, as in:
(29) Although it is quite cheap beer,
They also remark on the relative acceptability of subordinate clauses ending with an adjec¬
tive which is/isn't given contrastive stress (getting it being better). For example:
(30) Although the new door is very expensive steel,
Their attention was drawn to this by "very long" (p236) times taken by their subjects to
spot a target which followed the adjective when it appeared as required by their experimen¬
tal procedure without contrastive stress. According to Zwicky and Sadock 1975, (31)
(31) Why not move to Chicago?
unambiguously has the illocutionary force of a suggestion unless there is contrastive stress
on not, in which case the sentence is semantically ambiguous between a suggestion and a
question (p25). This ambiguity is semantic because the crossed interpretation of (32)
(32) Why not move to Chicago and Maine?
is not possible. (The crossed interpretation is the one in which the speaker is questioning
one move while suggesting the other; see chapter 7). Thus, distinctive meaning does exist,
but it is distinct.
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This evidence suggests that contrastive stress is not merely an emphatic device.
These phenomenona belong to parole rather than langue. The question that must be asked,
however, is how we make sense of the implication that other uses are less contrastive. I
believe this goes to the heart of the matter: there is meaning other than the meaning that
comes from the words not spoken. I explore the question no further at this point, because
my purpose is merely to raise questions.
I have presented, then, arguments that a purely systemic theory of lexical meaning leaves
questions unanswered about learning; does not necessarily explain sense relations and has
difficulty with accounting for contextual variation in contrast sets. Furthermore, when
meaning is distinctive this is typically linguistically marked usage. The burden of this dis¬
cussion is that the lexicon can't interpret itself.
In sum, I have examined the linguistic abstraction of systemic contrast and found some
puzzles that will have to be resolved before a cognitive transplant can succeed. It may be a
useful abstraction for some tasks, but for cognitive modelling we need to introduce a
dynamic to the Saussurian etat de langue. The lexicon must be designed with a need for
interaction with context in mind. The view that word senses consist merely of relations
with other words and that, hence, the vocabulary serves as its own interpretation is not a
viable theory of lexical meaning.
Before leaving this topic, it's worth noting that contrastive usage can be selected by the
situation rather than the explicit choice of one of the participants in a discourse. Thus, for
example, the utterance:
(33) I'm sorry, I can't come tonight... I'm visiting friends.
can be rather awkward when addressed to a relatively new aquaintance, since it can carry
the implication that the addressee is not a friend of the speaker (ie. that friends is intended
contrastively). It can be salvaged by epending other. The contrastive interpretation here
appears to be triggered by its own social significance. That is, it seems to be that just
because the distinction is crucial at a given stage of a relationship, the participants become
sensitive to it. This point bears further investigation.
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Chapter 4.
Lexical concepts as prototypes.
18
This chapter examines prototype theory as a theory of lexical concepts. Although proto¬
type theory offers useful constraints on a characterization of concepts, it fails as a theory of
lexical concepts because it shares with the classical view the assumption that lexical con¬
cepts are concepts. To preview, the argument will hinge on the dynamic, constructive and
knowledge dependent nature of concepts on the one hand, and the requirement that lexical
concepts should interface successfully both with other lexical concepts and with different
and changing bodies of knowledge on the other. Essentially, GOE (Goodness Of Exem¬
plar) structure is reasoned to be a property of the instantiations of lexical concepts as con¬
cepts. First, however, let's consider prototypes.
It is by now a cliche that, contrary to the classical prediction, concepts are "fuzzy". The
principal observation is that category membership is not a uniform, all or none, binary
matter. Firstly categories tend to have vague boundaries as a consequence of the properties
of objects being samples from continua. For example, it can be unclear whether a given
object is a cup or a vase (Labov 1972), and at these margins categorization decisions tend
to be more difficult (Jackendoff 1983, Smith, Shoben and Rips 1974). Secondly, it appears
that in practise necessary features of meaning can be difficult to isolate (Wittgenstein
1953), except in the case of technical vocabulary (see below). Thus, categories possess a
family resemblance structure, with some members being more closely related (similar) than
others. And thirdly, categories seem to be structured around some centre (a good or ideal
exemplar) with members rated according to their typicality (centrality or goodness).
According to Rosch and Mervis 1975, an item is central in a category to the extent that the
total cue validity of its attributes is high (ie. the "prototype" is maximally like members of
the category and minimally like non-members) and, hence, family resemblance leads to the
formation of a prototype. Alternatively, for some categories like colour terms, the focal
18
A paper based on this chapter has been published as Dunbar and Myers 1988.
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points are given (neurophysiologically) and universal, with vocabulary in such domains
being assimilated during acquisition to these focii. The core meaning of a category consists
of these good examples ""surrounded" by other category members of decreasing similarity"
(Rosch 1973:112).
This internal structure of categories has been shown to affect performance on a variety of
cognitive tasks. Subjects, for example, agree in their rating of exemplars for "goodness" of
category membership, and these ratings correlate highly with attribute overlap (ie. highly
rated exemplars tend to be attributed with more common properties of the category in ques¬
tion). Furthermore, people tend to agree as to the order in which to complete hedged pred¬
ications: for example,
(34) Pink is a sort of red.
would be a more frequent completion than
(35) Red is a sort of pink.
This indicates a shared conception of landmark colours. The final finding I'll mention is an
effect of category structure on the time subjects take to make categorization judgements.
They tend to respond quickly when either the exemplar is not a member of the category
and the two are highly dissimilar or when it is a member and the two are very alike, but to
make rather slower responses otherwise. This can manifest itself in terms, for example, of
faster positive verifications for typical than atypical exemplars.
An early attempt to model this phenomenon was made by Smith et al (1974) who
employed the process of "Feature Comparison", and argued that categorization was a judge¬
ment of similarity between the properties of the exemplar and those of the concept. They
used Lakoff's work on hedges to justify a distinction between what were termed "charac¬
teristic" and "defining" features. The features of any given concept would be ranked
according to definingness, and this ranking would be utilized by a two stage comparison
procedure. At the first stage, all features would be considered in a global, overall assess¬
ment of similarity of two concepts. If they had sufficiently similar (or dissimilar) dimen¬
sions and values on those dimensions to exceed a criterion, then the decision could be
made straight away - this being likely in the case of affirmative decisions about "good"
exemplars, since they will tend to have greater similarity to the category. If the value were
too low, however, then a second stage would follow in which defining features only were
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compared. It would be the need to undertake the second stage that would slow decisions
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for less typical members. The argument of these authors is, then, that typicality is a func¬
tion of characteristic features shared. That defining features will not exhibit GOE structure
is a characteristic theme of Smith's publications through Osherson and Smith (1981) to
Smith and Osherson (1984) (see below).
Collins and Loftus 1975 extend the basic network theory of Quillian in various ways, and
include adaptions designed to handle the prototypical structure of categories. Although the
original model did allow differences in the criteriality of links (this had not been realized
by many critics), Collins and Loftus elaborate the mechanism. They argue that matching
processes involved in categorization judgements consist of the collection of evidence (posi¬
tive and negative) until some threshold for acceptance is reached. Their contention is that
this process is essentially the same as that described by Smith et al (1974) - typicality
effects on categorization tasks are a function of similarity - although they go on to
emphasise that subjects have other strategies available in this task, such as searching for a
counterexample (eg. a hen that is not a bird). The collective view of these papers is some¬
times termed the "probablistic" view of prototypes (Medin and Smith 1984).
An essentially similar view is suggested by Jackendoff (1983), who proposes that "prefer¬
ence rules" underly categorization judgements. Jackendoff argues that, apart from a small
number of necessary "well-formedness rules", the meaning of a word consists of a set of
weighted heuristics (preference rules) representing typicality constraints on concepts. The
closer to the default values of the more preference mles, the "better" the exemplar and the
more "stable" the categorization judgement (with extra weight, of course, being given to
preference rules with higher weights). Like Neisser 1976, he suggests that the overall
schema or "set of preference rules" can be used to supply default values. Jackendoff pro¬
poses that this gives an account of the stereotypical character of images in the limiting case
of projection of [TOKEN, TYPE[Y]]; what gets projected is a skeletal #thing# daubed with
the default attributes of TYPE[Y], Although Jackendoff is critical of Smith et al's (1974)
notion of definingness, his proposal to weight the heuristics is equivalent. Further, he fails
19
It is not clear from their paper what would occur in the second stage that does not
occur in the first, because they are not explicit about the averaging mechanism of that glo¬
bal comparison.
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to offer a detailed account of the speed of categorization facts described above. (We shall
return to the issue of "necessary" or defining conditions below). Jackendoff's work is
nevertheless interesting, particularly since he surveys a range of other psychological
phenomena which such rules might underly and draws out some tentative links with recent
work on the function of the neocortex.
I will argue that although goodness-of-exemplar ratings indirectly reflect the meaning of a
word, there are some good reasons for doubting whether the semantic part of a lexical
entry, the lexical concept, should be characterized in such terms. Four arguments will be
provided in support of this contention: (i) prototypes cannot be combined; (ii) some proper¬
ties inherent in prototypes are not inherent in lexical items; (iii) prototypes are not coherent
in isolation from cognitive models; and (iv) prototypes are not constant (i.e. their inferential
relations vary). In sum, prototypes do not display those properties that would enable lexi¬
cal concepts to play a role in a natural language understanding system. Let us examine each
of these deficiencies in turn.
4.1. Prototypes can't be combined compositionally.
One way of formalising the concept of prototype that has been adopted in the literature is
Zadeh's "fuzzy logic" (Zadeh 1965). The key attraction of fuzzy logic is that it replaces
the characteristic functions of set theory, which are binary (an entity is either in the set or
out of it; the predicate is either true or false of any particular entity; the "middle" is
excluded), with characteristic functions which assign values anywhere on a continuum
between 0 and 1. Such functions offer an appealing analogy with distributions of "goodness
of exemplar" (GOE) ratings (Roth and Mervis 1983). Thus, it has been argued, degree of
membership can be formalized in terms of the relative truth of the predication.
Discussion centres around the translation rules of fuzzy logic, and so one has to begin by
emphasising that translation rules in any logic can be formulated independently of the
model theory, and are not fixed once and for all time. Thus, one of the manoeuvres made
to avoid criticisms has been to suggest alternative translation mles.
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He talks of the relative stability of competing categorizations. He may have in
mind a parallel distributed processing (PDP) model of such phenomena.
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Translation rules function in a logic to indicate how, given the interpretations of its consti¬
tuents, the interpretation of some construction may be determined. Thus, for example, in a
standard predicate logic the set of objects which are truly red squares is defined as being
the intersection of the set of objects which are red with the set of objects which are square.
This is specified by an appropriate translation rule.
One contention of critics is that the corresponding function in fuzzy logic, telling you how
relatively true it is that some object is a red square from information about how red and
how square it is cannot be defined. Osherson and Smith (1981) examine fuzzy intersection
in relation to the concept striped apple, which they take to be intersective. The obvious
translation rule in fuzzy logic (the "min" rule) entails that the "goodness" of a complex
concept cannot exceed its goodness as an example of either constituent concept. But, argue
Osherson and Smith (1981), a striped apple will be a better exemplar of the category
striped apple than of apple, and so this translation mle is not adequate.
Oden (1977) proposed as an alternative, a multiplicative rule, which he attributes to
Gougen (1969), whereby the GOE rating of a complex concept will be the product of the
21
GOE ratings of its constituents. To test this he asked subjects to judge the truth of pairs
of sentences e.g. robins are birds and beds are furniture. He sys¬
tematically varied the degree of rated truth of the individual statements in such pairs and
attempted to predict the truth of their conjunction. What he found was an interaction
between the ratings of the constituent statements. This could be better modelled by the mul¬
tiplicative rule than by the minimum rule. Although the multiplicative rule is a better match
to subjects' intuitions about complex statements, it too has serious shortcomings. For exam¬
ple, an object cannot have a higher rating with respect to how good a member of the con¬
junction of A and B it is than its rating for exemplariness in either of the constituents.
Indeed its GOE rating must be lower, unless both of its constituent ratings are 1. Hence
this mle, like the minimum mle, cannot allow any striped apple to be a better striped apple
than it is an apple. Nor, to take a less exotic example (Osherson and Smith 1982), can it
allow a pet fish to be a better example of a pet fish than it is an example of a pet or of a
fish, and this is clearly not the case. A goldfish is a good example of a pet fish, but it isn't
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prototypical of either pets or fish.
Osherson and Smith (1982) sketch a proof that, in fact, no simple function of the consti¬
tuents can adequately characterize their conjunction. This is done by imagining a cube and
a ball which metamorphose in such a way that each gradually approaches the other's shape.
At the half-way point, the object should be equally as good a ball as a cube. If the good¬
ness of something's membership in a conjunction is a simple function of its goodnesses in
the constituent categories, then this entity should be a round ball to the same degree that it
is a round cube - a conclusion that violates one's intuitions. Thus, no simple function of
constituent goodnesses can predict correctly the goodness of an exemplar in a complex
category.
By way of response to these arguments, Zadeh 1982 discusses the "normalization" of com¬
plex concepts (raising the maximum value of the set to 1 by dividing all values by the pre-
normalization maximum). This is said to be brought about through focussing on an inter¬
section "by giving it a label" (p291). This makes it technically feasible for a member of
this set to have a higher degree of membership of it than of either of the constituent sets.
Like ranking (discussed below), this result is achieved by considering the "absolute" good¬
ness of members of a complex category to be a function of their relative goodness with
respect to one another independently of their goodness in the constituent categories, while
deriving that relative goodness from goodness in constituent categories. Both work (to
oversimplify) by assuming that in any category there will be a "best" member, and stipulat¬
ing that that member's rating for goodness should be 1. The crucial difficulty with normali¬
zation, pointed out by Osherson and Smith (1982), is that, if it is based on the "min" rule it
only takes account of one half of the conjunct. For example, two red squares will be
equally good as red squares so long as their values for the poorer of these properties are
equal. Thus, if they are equally poor shades of red, even if one is a worse square than the
other, they will be equally good red squares (so long as both are better "squares" than
"reds"). This is counter-intuitive. Osherson and Smith (1982) also demonstrate that if a
multiplicative rule underpinned normalization, then if the best red flower were a perfect
flower it could not be a perfect red thing, because its goodness as a red flower would have
to be less than 1 in order to prevent the product of the constituent goodnesses of any red
21
As Oden (1977) notes, both rules have the merit of yielding the same results as the
rules of standard logic when truth is idealized.
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flower equalling their normalized product, and hence the goodness of the complex concept.
But, these authors ask, what contingency is there among properties that impels no entity to
be perfect in more than a single respect?
Jones 1982 agrees that a flaw with the "min" rule is that it uses information from only one
of the constituent concepts. Taking as an example the concept bird, he advocates defining
the conceptual domain not as the set of all readily envisionable birds, but as the ranked set
of all possible birds. Degree of membership is then defined as the inversion of the rank of
an exemplar, with better members having lower ranks. The translation rule can then be that
the goodness of a representative of a complex concept is the inverted rank of the negative
product of its goodness in each of the constituent concepts. This mle is demonstrated in
his paper to give reasonable results, and works because the relative order of exemplars
within a complex category determines their goodness. The problem with the scheme, as
Osherson and Smith (1982) point out, is the invocation of uncountably infinite domains - if
the domain is uncountably infinite (and Osherson and Smith demonstrate that it must be),
then there won't be enough integers (there's only a countably infinite supply of integers) to
rank them all. Changing the domain to the extant set of exemplars would be objectionable
since it would suggest that entities one had never encountered would determine one's con¬
cepts. For any other specifiable domain (see Osherson and Smith (1982) for a challenge
that amounts to this claim), it will remain impossible to provide an ordering, since for any
two exemplars you might order, there will always be an intermediate entity.
Even if ranks could be assigned, there are instances of concept conjunction that Osherson
and Smith (1982) assert would defeat the scheme. Jones' rule could not permit an entity
which is prima in two categories to be a better exemplar of their conjunction. But, although
Paul Newman [was] both the best actor and the most handsome entity, he [was] more
highly rated as a handsome actor. It's a bit like the best athlete was a decathlete, who reg¬
ularly scored more points than anyone else ever had, yet never broke a world record in any
individual event. Paragons, it would seem, rise above the canons of logic.
Cohen and Murphy (1984) describe concept combination as:
"a process of combining representations according to certain generative rules
within a domain of knowledge." (p51)
They take from the knowledge-representation literature in AI the notion that sub-concepts
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may specialize a super-concept by role modification (nouns are treated as frame-like, hav¬
ing slots called "roles"). They emphasise that the process is "asymmetric [and] knowledge-
dependent" (p51), where by knowledge-dependent they mean, for example, that which role
gets modified will depend on context, different contexts promoting some roles for
modification more strongly than others. They argue that domain knowledge also modifies,
for example, some of the role values of pet when it is used in pet fish. Thus, knowledge of
the world influences the typicality structure of complex concepts which consequently, they
continue, will not be predictable on the basis of the constituent concepts alone. They also
note that the effect of a role value specification on typicality can depend on the setting of
other roles. For example, the effect of baldness on a man's typicality depends on his age.
Effects of correlational structure such as this would, then, have to be considered in evaluat¬
ing typicality with respect to complex concepts, but this would entail further use of domain
knowledge.
A crucial problem facing any approach to conceptual combination is that the two terms in
the conjunction may not be interchanged without altering the typicality rating of an exem¬
plar in the complex concept. Although the min rule is undoubtedly wrong to consider only
one of the constituents in determining exemplariness in the complex concept, it is not the
case either that each contributes equally, as would be predicted by the multiplicative mle.
As Hampton (1987) has recently shown, for example, a constituent contributes more to the
determination of exemplariness in a complex concept when it is playing the role of modifier
than when it is playing the role of the head. His study used expressions of the type: noun
plus relative clause modifier, for example Games which are sports. He found that a given
instance (eg. chess) might be rated more highly in relation to this form of the putative con¬
junction than the other (ie. Sports which are games ) Moreover, whenever there is a
"head-modifier" relationship between the terms, the head is typically the one that deter-
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mines the superordinate category . Thus, for example, a cow catcher is a type of catcher,
and not a sort of cow; a milk bottle is a kind of bottle, and not a dairy product; and a pan¬
cake is pottable but not a pot. Such non-commutativity confounds the attempt to model the
combination of prototypes by means of fuzzy logic.
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Hampton ( op. cit. ) has produced tentative evidence that entities may be treated
subjectively as members of a complex category even if they are regarded by the same sub¬
jects as non-members one of the constituent categories.
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Thus there appear to be two difficulties confronting attempts to model the combination of
concepts by means of fuzzy logic: first, the knowledge-laden nature of combination, and
second its asymmetry. However, even if one could find a way to combine prototypes com-
positionally, there are other reasons for not adopting them as a lexical representation.
4.2. Lexical indeterminacy of types.
My second reason to doubt that lexical concepts have a prototype structure is motivated by
the finding that some properties inherent in prototypes are not inherent in lexical items.
Nunberg's first and obvious point is that many words can be used to refer to more than one
sort of referent. He argues that this is a very general process that is not adequately handled
by trying to list all the different senses. He proposes instead to list only a few senses from
which other uses may be derived by general pragmatic principles. The principles may be
summarised in the following way: the designatum, or basic sense of a word, can be used to
refer to an entity if the cue validity of the referential function (RF) mapping from the
designatum to the entity is sufficiently high to clearly and unambiguously pick out the
entity in question from any alternatives. Cue validity is the exactness with which cues (in
this case, referential functions) pick out a given referent. Take for example, an exam script.
This object may be considered with respect to two relations: firstly, it is related to the set
of examination candidates, and secondly it is related to a set of markers. Now candidates
produce only one script while markers handle more than one, and indeed, more than one
marker may be involved with a single script. Therefore, the referential function from the
exam script to the candidate will have a higher cue validity than the referential function
from the exam script to the marker. Consequently, if a speaker says, while pointing to the
exam script, He has a good grasp of the subject, he will refer to the candidate. (Given cer¬
tain assumptions about the background knowledge of speaker and hearer).
Nunberg's argument continues as follows: Just as we can talk about relative cue validity of
referential functions in cases of deferred ostension, such as the one we have just described,
we can also use relative cue validity to determine which senses of a word are most basic.
Consider the word form Dylan. This can be used to refer either to a singer, Bob Dylan, or
to his work, the songs of Bob Dylan. Which of the two is more basic? In order to compute
this, we must determine the cue validity of the referential function from singer to song and
the inverse referential function from song to singer. The more basic sense of Dylan is
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taken to be the one in the domain of the referential function with higher cue validity. Since
the cue validity of the referential function from Dylan to his work is greater than the cue
validity of its inverse, Dylan designates the man.
Nunberg next considers the cases in which we are most interested for the purposes of this
paper, cases in which it is not clear which of the two referential functions has greater cue
validity. That is, there are cases in which cue validity appears to be equally high in both
directions. Of his several examples we will consider just one. It concerns the choice
between a token or a type reading of a phrase, e.g. three trees. Either this refers to tokens
(the trees themselves) or it refers to types (different species of trees). In this example cue
validity is the same for the referential function from trees to species of trees as it is for the
inverse function from species to trees. That is, each tree is of just one species, and each
species picks out just some trees and not others.
If Nunberg's arguments about cue validity are correct, then his conclusion with respect to
the type-token distinction is of great interest and relevance to our own argument. Rumelhart
(1987, talk to PHLING Conference, Edinburgh) has recently observed that prototypes could
as easily be termed types. But if that is the case, choosing prototypes as the characterization
of lexical concepts would imply that the type sense is more basic, with the token sense
being derived from it. However, this is precisely the asymmetry that Nunberg argues we
cannot empirically justify. Therefore his data do not provide support for the view that lexi¬
cal concepts are to be characterized in terms of prototypes.
4.3. Coherence of prototypes.
Prototype structure has usually been described with respect to some similarity metric, where
similarity has been taken as both the criterion of category membership and the principle
underlying conceptual coherence. Things belong together in a category if they are
sufficiently similar to the prototype. The prototype reflects the central tendency of
instances in relation to the dimensions along which similarity is computed. However, this
position has been challenged by those who believe conceptual coherence is determined by
the theories people have about their physical and social worlds, and in terms of their
current goals. According to Murphy and Medin (1985), GOE ratings that we discussed ear¬
lier are "heavily constrained" by knowledge of the world, and conceptual coherence is
derived from a theory that explains why things are the way they are.
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As Miller (1978:104) once wrote: "lexical knowledge ... is not isolated from [the] general
conceptual system; the lexicon has a cognitive structure only because it is an integral part
of everything a person knows and believes." Earlier, he and Johnson-Laird (Miller and
Johnson-Laird 1976) had argued that semantic fields have a conceptual core that derives
from the implicit theories shared by members of a linguistic community. In a similar vein,
Lakoff (1987) observes that our categories are not determined with respect to properties of
the real world, but in terms of "interactional properties" related to our exchanges with that
world. And this is so even in the case of basic level categories. We "structure and make
sense of our experience" in terms of cognitive models (roughly, what others have called
variously images, frames and scripts). Cognitive models are defined "relative to idealized
circumstances". Consequently, idealized cognitive models are what give rise to the proto¬
type structure of our categorizations, not the lexical concepts that cue them.
4.4. Instability of prototypes.
Another doubt as to whether lexical concepts are prototypes arises from recent studies
which have provided evidence that typicality structure is not a fixed property of a word,
and that its focus can be shifted by context.
Roth and Shoben (1983) base a study on a finding of Garrod and Sanford (1977) that the
speed of anaphora resolution depends on the semantic relatedness of anaphor and
antecedent, as if resolution involved category membership verification (when the
antecedent is more general than the anaphor). Roth and Shoben examined whether reading
times were affected by a single GOE structure in differing contexts, or whether context
could affect speed of resolution by changing GOE structure. The finding was that resolution
for typical exemplars (typical for the category in isolation) was slower when the context
was biased to make that exemplar a bad fit than when the context was neutral. Thus robin
is a poor exemplar in the context The bird walked across the barnyard.
Barsalou and Sewell (1984, reported in Barsalou (1985)) found that GOE structure can
change dramatically when people take different perspectives on a concept. Their subjects
rated exemplars (e.g. robin, ostrich, swan) for typicality as birds, but assigned them
different degrees of centrality according to the cultural perspective ("American", "African",
or "Chinese") they had been asked to assume. These results held for both taxonomic and
goal-derived categories. Thus, people can flexibly generate different concepts in different
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contexts.
Barsalou (1985) also found that the way gradedness is determined varies with context.
Before rating artificially constructed exemplars (fictional people) as members of certain
categories, subjects performed one of two discrimination tasks which involved selecting the
"best" candidate for some job (employment). For half the subjects the fictional people were
divided into "PE teachers" who jogged with varying degrees of regularity, and "current
affairs teachers" who read newspapers with differing frequency. For the rest of the subjects
these joggers and readers were known as "Q" and "Z" programmers, a designation unre¬
lated to the defining features of the categories. Additionally, all joggers shared up to three
"characteristic pastimes"; newspaper readers shared a different three. Barsalou found that
the basis for GOE ratings was principally the category ideal when this ideal was related to
the name of the category (i.e. better exemplars indulged more frequently in the defining
activity), but that GOE structure was a function solely of central tendency when the
defining activity was not related to occupation.
What these various findings illustrate is that prototypes are unstable; they vary with context.
4.5. Summary.
Four arguments have been presented indicating that lexical concepts are not idealized sum¬
mary representations corresponding to prototypes. Prototypes as defined appear to be




The previous chapter has cast doubt on the viability of characterising lexical concepts as
prototypes. The requirement that in the process of comprehension these prototypes must be
combined appears to be difficult to satisfy within the constraints of compositionality. Furth¬
ermore, the prototype associated with a label is not stable.
To address the question of what lexical concepts are, let me first ask: if prototypes are not
the semantic portions of lexical entries, then where does GOE structure come from?
Murphy and Medin 1985 argue convincingly that typicality structure derives from the
(more or less naive) conceptual theories people have about the world. Relevant arguments
were given in chapter 4. GOE structure, they say, is "heavily constrained" (p304) by
knowledge of the world: conceptual coherence is derived from a theory that explains why
things are the way they are. For example, birds can fly because they have wings. A con¬
cept would be represented as a set of correlated attributes "plus underlying principles that
determine which correlations are noticed" (Murphy and Medin, 1985 p298, Table 1). With
the aid of Lawrence Barsalou, Murphy and Medin develop an example showing that, given
an appropriate scenario, a superficially odd category such as "prime numbers-or-apples"
could be coherent.
Schank, Collins and Hunter 1986 develop an analogous position with respect to concept
formation, rejecting knowledge-blind induction. Jackendoff's (1983) expression of a similar
view was discussed in chapter 3. He argues that categorisation is a function of judgement.
These views are close to Carey 1984 who argues that the oddities of definition which
Piaget observed in young children are not a consequence of any inadequacy of representa¬
tional format, but rather are due to an insufficiency of domain specific information.
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There are also correspondences with the discussion in Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976 of the
"cores" of semantic fields. For them, lexical concepts are sections of theories. That is,
meaning is given in conceptual terms. Conceptual cores are shared within a linguistic com¬
munity, but the conceptual periphery can differ between individuals, particularly (it is
claimed) as a function of age and education. Miller and Johnson-Laird is a large and
detailed study, and perhaps as a consequence of scale, ambiguities in the account arise
sometimes, with the authors appearing to say incompatible things at different points.
Specifically, the role of decision tables, and their relation to conceptual cores is not clear.
Decision tables serve processes of identification and recognition, coordinating the
functional-perceptual schemas of a group of lexical concepts organized by some conceptual
core, which provides a relative location for each lexical concept in a given field. The deci¬
sion tables, it is argued at one place, interrelate lexical concepts through shared functional
or perceptual conditions. However, slightly earlier (p696) it is argued that the connotative
part of lexical concepts includes relations to other concepts.
A second ambiguity concerns the relation between lexical concepts and cores. On p300 it
is suggested that decision tables and theories can be revised separately and independently,
but the subsequent characterization of lexical concepts as including functional-perceptual
schemas, knowledge and relations to other concepts suggests that the lexical concept is a
part of the theory and that therefore any revision to the lexical concept must de facto be a
revision of the theory. Perhaps, however, they have in mind a distinction between local
revision and global reorganization. It would seem to be fair to conclude that Miller and
Johnson-Laird assert that lexical meanings are concepts and that such concepts exist only
within some (naive) theoretical framework. Miller 1978 states the following:
"lexical knowledge ...is not isolated from [the] general conceptual system ; the lex¬
icon has a cognitive structure only because it is an integral part of everything a
person knows and believes."(1978,p83)
Barsalou 1986 notes also the ability of people to construct ad hoc categories as required
(particularly goal-derived ones). He proposes that "category representations are temporary
constructs in working memory" (1986, p651). These representations will reflect context-
independent (CI) information, which is stably represented in memory, context-dependent
information (CD, see Barsalou 1982 for details of the CI-CD distinction) which is added.
Recently occurring information also gets added; this is required to account for data he has
showing that GOE structure of concepts changes within individual subjects, performing in
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identical contexts but at times separated by relatively short intervals (a week). The direction
for research that he stresses is the study of "how explanation guides the contruction of tem¬
porary representations in working memory" (1986, p651).
The role of background information in the form of "theories" is crucial in determining the
GOE structure of a concept, then. And instability can be attributed to flexibilty in the
choice of theory.
Now we can look at lexical concepts. A characterisation is needed that allows the lexical
concept to interface with (different) theories, but which also allows it to combine with other
lexical concepts.
Barsalou has partitioned concepts into three sets of properties, and has proposed that these
properties be constructed into concepts under the rein of something like the "theories" of
Murphy and Medin (1985). I propose to follow Barsalou in treating concepts (as tradition¬
ally defined) as, largely, "fictions created by theorists out of convenience" (1986, p652). To
say that the meaning of a word is a concept is to adopt the position of a lexicographer; a
perfectly respectable stance, but one tangential to the investigation of the comprehension of
language.
I propose, however, that, rather than having a set of context-independent properties in the
lexical entry, lexical concepts consist of unvalued parameters. These parameters cue infor¬
mation from currently active theories. Lexical concepts can be combined before cueing, so
that the information cued is determined by a composite lexical concept. In other words,
combination affects the way information is cued.
Two considerations favour this view.
Firstly, context-independent properties would have to present the same difficulties as default
values. Any default values and GOE structure associated with CI information has to be
derived from some theory because, as we have seen, prototype structure is merely a symp¬
tom of theoretical organization. Unless we are convinced that CI properties have fixed
values, lack graded structure and remain constant under combination, we cannot unhinge
them from theories. The values for the parameters will be provided by some currently
active theory. Once the parameters of a lexical concept and the structure of a (group of)
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theories have been combined, it may be possible to discern a concept. However, the
description of "reference with" in chapter 2 is a reminder that a concept need not be gen¬
erated directly.
Secondly, one argument given against the notion of "necessary conditions" is that, for
23
example, a "bird" remains a "bird" even if its wings are removed. (This argument is used
by Collins and Lofitus (1975) to criticize the notion of defining features in Smith et al
(1974)). In other words, it is difficult to think of an aspect of the meaning of a term that
cannot be optional in some context. Cohen 1979 argues that examples of such "cancella¬
tion" (as he terms it) are frequent: stone lion and plastic flower being but two he gives. His
proposal, then, is that rather than have two words lion, the linguist does better to allow an
adjective like stone to cancel a feature such as [+ANIMATE].24 It's significant that this
kind of modification does not lead to any sense of "anomaly" (unlike examples such as
"sincere cobble" and "mauve idea"), even when the entity portrayed is thoroughly novel,
like a "vegetarian lion". Let me make the following assumption: the bizarreness reaction
characteristic of anomaly occurs due to difficulty encountered in combining concepts. If this
assumption is correct, then the examples also suggest that anomaly is not born of a lack of
fit between the words and the preferred scenarios of background knowledge. That is, it is
not a clash of values but the absence of an appropriate parameter that creates the difficulty.
This suggests that modification sets a value on a parameter of meaning, and if a suitable
parameter is available (whatever its usual value) the modification is transparent and does
not give rise to anomaly.
23
I am aware that Barsalou's CI properties do not have epistemilogical necessity asso¬
ciated with them. That's why I depend here not on the existence of the examples but on the
lack of anomaly surrounding their use.
24
Actually, of course, it's a <feature, value> pair. Note that here our set-theoretic
metalanguage begins to fail us, as might have been predicted on the basis of the discussion
in Chi. For example, is the set of "stone lions" a subset of the set of "lions"? I don't think
so. This, incidentally, is further evidence that combinations need not inherit necessary pro¬
perties of their constituents. It reinforces the argument that concepts such as "lion" with
necessary conditions like "isa biological entity" are conceptual rather than lexical; they arise
only when a lexical concept and theory are joined. That is, the lexical concept "lion" does
not by itself have these properties, and when it is interfaced with a different theory under
adjectival constraint (eg. "stone") the properties may be absent.
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The relationship between this alternative and Barsalou's view can be viewed in terms of a
25
distinction between type emergence and type coercion. Under type emergence, a property
emerges in the course of processing, whether it is tame or exotic. Parameter setting would,
for example, be a case of type emergence. On the other hand, if values are set in the lexi¬
con (like Miller and Johnson-Laird's definitional properties, or Barsalou's CI properties),
then the type must be coerced into taking a new value (or a value outside the default range,
for defaults). This is closely connected with the distinction between selecting and creating
meanings (Clark and Gerrig 1983); do the processes of language perception select among
candidate lexical meanings, or can they construct new meanings "on the fly" so to speak?
This distinction is also applicable in the domain of syntax, particularly in connection with
"recategorization". Words sometimes crop up in unusual syntactic contexts. For example:
(36) Who did you sneeze before seeing?
SNEEZE is recategorized as a transitive verb here. There are two ways of looking at this.
Either SNEEZE is an intransitive verb which is changed into a transitive one, or else it is
unspecified for syntactic category, and this information is assigned by context. The "selec¬
tion restriction" approach gives SNEEZE a categorization which would rule out this string
(for reasons of ungrammatically). For example, in Unification Grammar SNEEZE would
have too few parameters to absorb an object nounphrase. In Cohort theory (Marslen-
Wilson and Tyler 1980) it is assumed that the cohort would have to be depleted on the first
pass because the syntactic information about the word to be identified would exclude
SNEEZE; a new cohort would have to be formed with syntactic censorship abandon ed
before SNEEZE could be recognised.26
The difficulty lies in explaining why SNEEZE is given the particular interpretation it is -
the syntactic information is used in deciding what that interpretation should be. In the
framework of type coercion, SNEEZE is converted into a transitive verb, and hence type
coercion turns selection restrictions into transfer features (Weinreich 1966). Note that a type
emergence account would imply that subcategorization information could not be used
25
I am grateful to Ewan Klein for sketching type coercion for me; this passage would
not have emerged without that sketch.
26
A more recent formulation of the role of context in the cohort model (Marslen-
Wilson 1986), still fails to address the role of context in interpretation.
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predictively by the HSPM. Other examples are described in the next chapter, in which
linguistic criteria for determining which account is appropriate in each case are discussed.
Returning to word meaning, we can ask "how specific are the meanings in lexical entries?"
For example, does a noun like CHEESE have a mass interpretation in the lexicon, or is the
mass-count distinction an emergent property of nounphrases, with lexical entries vague in
that respect? In exploring these issues and developing this account, we shall turn shortly to
a more thorough discussion of the mass-count distinction in English. Particular attention
will be paid to the tension between the apparent existence of shadow lexicons (potential
lexicons which contain for whole classes of words counterparts which have undergone a
uniform semantic transformation) on the one hand, and phenomena of lexicalization on the
other.
5.1. Lexical concepts, theories and lexical flexibility.
This section indicates in general terms how the characterisation of lexical concepts and the
relationship with theories that I have described can deal with various phenomena of lexical
flexibility and precision. Specifically, I discuss diachronic change, metaphor, classical con¬
cepts and conceptual interaction.
5.1.1. Diachronic change.
Splitting concepts between lexicon and theory clearly gives us a handle on certain
diachronic phenomena. It is frequently asserted that the meanings of words change as the
theoretical understanding people have available in relation to the entities denoted develops.
This suggests that as the conceptual system changes then so will the meaning of words.
Cohen (1962) describes in some detail the history of the debate on this matter, particularly
as it affects diachronic change (sec also Cohen,1979). Tlaus philosophers have argued that
word meaning is in 'flux' (Robinson, 1953 ; Sadock,1979) and that it has fluidity (Shi-
bles,1977). Vygotsky (1962) gives this notion perhaps its clearest articulation:
"The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual move¬
ment back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought. In that pro¬
cess the relation of thought to word undergoes changes ...."p!25.
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This is easy to model here simply as a change in the theory. It follows in evitably that any
concepts later generated with that theory will be different from what they could have been
before. Piaget and Inhelder 1968 provide striking evidence for similar phenomena within
the developing child. In one experiment, he showed non-conservers a tilted beaker of
water and asked them some days later to draw what they had seen. Their drawings
reflected a lack of understanding about the way fluids behave. However, when he asked
them on a subsequent occasion - after they had achieved conservation of volume for liquid
(a Piagetian 'milestone') - to reproduce what they had been shown several months before,
he found that their memories had 'improved'. These results are interpreted to mean that
memories are interpreted in the light of the child's current knowledge of the world.
5.1.2. Metaphor
Some types of metaphor may be amenable to analysis in terms of a change in domain.
Fraser 1979 presented a group of subjects with metaphors and invited them to interpret
these out of context. Although none found any difficulty in supplying an interpretation, the
interpretations varied a great deal from subject to subject. This suggests (if we assume that
metaphor is an efficient way of communicating accurately) that, normally, contextual con¬
siderations constrain the process of understanding which interprets a metaphorical expres¬
sion. (This isn't to say such considerations aren't applied to "literal" utterances). Indeed,
speech act theorists, such as Searle 1979, take this to be axiomatic, arguing that metaphori¬
cal utterances are understood precisely because a literal interpretation would be nonsense -
and so the speaker makes use of contextual information in order to construe the utterance
informatively on the second pass. This approach which characterises metaphors as garden
paths does not, however, coincide with the available psychological evidence.
Rumelhart 1979 reports an experiment by Gibbs in relation to the comprehension of
indirect requests. Gibbs tested the three stage "speech act" model of Clark & Lucy and
found that it accounted for the data only if test sentences were presented out of context.
Tourganeau and Sternberg 1982 report an experiment by Harris (1976) in which no
differences were found in the processing times for literal and metaphorical sentences. And,
finally, Ortony et al. 1978 found a difference but that this was diminished by extended con¬
text.
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This evidence suggests that a single process handles both 'literal' and 'metaphorical'
language, with deeper understanding of utterances emerging only over time (cf Rumelhart's
notion (1979) that they are fitted to schemata, which are similar to Schank's scripts
(Schank and Abelson 1977), as particular instances of those general abstract concepts and
understood in terms of them). The point I wish to emphasise here, however, is that this
evolution of meaning appears to occur in the same way for both literal and metaphorical
utterances. The more recent finding of Janus and Bever 1985 has to be taken into account
too, however. They found that when reading times were monitored phrase by phrase rather
than just sentence by sentence they were able to measure increased durations for sentential
metaphors.
It seems likely that we can distinguish two sorts of metaphor: major and minor. That is,
there is a distinction between elaborate "literary" and "scientific" metaphors on the one
hand (Kittay and Lehrer 1981), and minor metaphors which involve merely the assimilation
of a lexical concept to a novel domain. Here is an example of a minor metaphor:
(37) Wishing her pupils a good morning, the dragon demanded their homework.
In this example, the concept of "teacher" acts as a theory and provides an interpretation for
all the shared parameters of "dragon", so that the "dragon" looks more or less like a
"teacher". FIERCE, let us assume, is not a parameter of teacher and so this is added.
However, the ferocity is the ferocity of a lady teacher. This will be different from the fero¬
city of a dragon or, more subtly, of a male teacher. That is, the interpretation of the added
parameter is related to the topic.
This could, in a simplistic way, be formalized as the attachment of a new node to a theory
which for simplicity's sake I'll assume is a fragment of semantic net. The node is the vehi¬
cle, and its site of attachment is the topic. By changing to different fragments of network,
different metaphors can be generated. I call this concept "plastic inheritance": nodes can
change their location in the net and so change their inherited default properties. This is
reminiscent of the practice in lexicography of differentiating senses of a lexical item by
relating each to a different field (Benveniste ).
Of course, even minor metaphor is more complex than this. A more detailed account of
plastic inheritance will be developed in chapter 9.
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One might argue that the account relies on a kludge: the specificity of the parameter can be
crucial. If, for example, TEMPERAMENT had been substituted for FIERCE, this presum¬
ably would have been a parameter of both "teacher" and "dragon". This dependence on
specificity sneaks in default ranges. Even if parameters are characterized as free variables,
information about type can act as a default. There are really two issues here. One concerns
the nature of metaphor in general. A general theory of metaphor would say something like
"the ground consists of the necessary features of the topic plus the characteristic features of
the ground." I leave the specifics of this statement for the theory of metaphor. However,
this version of the statement will illustrate my point. If the parameter was TEMPERA¬
MENT, it would probably not be a context-independent feature of "teacher". On the other
hand, it would be a characteristic property of "dragon". It would therefore be included. Let
me repeat that it is for a theory of metaphor to indicate which classes of parameter are
likely to be used and how this affects the quality of the metaphorical expression. The
second issue is central to my account. Lexical concepts have no semantic value. Semantic
value is only generated in the context of some naive theory which interprets the parameters.
The default ranges implied by the differentiation of parameters are therefore different in
kind to the defaults of prototype theory. Rather than being part of the material of a seman¬
tic representation, they are tools with which some representation can be constructed.
A small difficulty is that there is no sharp distinction between the two types of metaphor.
Take, for example:
(38) The cup of the hill lay before us.
It's obvious that we are being told something about the shape of a feature on the hill, but
how do we decide that it's not function that should be contributed ie. the cup of the hill
might be the part that yielded water, for example. In other words, a typical metaphor will
demand that the hearer deploy a certain inferential facility in addition to simple inheritance
of default values.
While lexical meaning is flexible, lexical use can be very precise. Speakers can convey
their ideas with great precision. This is paradoxical. How can vague words express precise
ideas? The next two sections discuss mechanisms which allow this.
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5.1.3. Classical concepts
My general approach can also deal with the occurrence of classical concepts, because we
can allow that more precise theories can yield more sharply defined concepts. In other
words, prototype structure is a contingent rather than a necessary property of the represen¬
tation of background knowledge.
Medin and Smith 1984 discuss possible roles for classical concepts. One can imagine that
classical concepts, like prototypes, might be derived from conceptual theories. They might,
for example, be the product of rational (or rationalizing) thought about particular concepts,
based on knowledge of the world, pretheoretic notions of what is plausible, and so on. I
believe that this is what Vygotsky 1962 meant by the phrase scientific concepts. Such con¬
cepts are much closer to "ascribed meaning" than "lexical meaning" (see above).
Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman 1983 present evidence that even concepts which can be
given a clear and complete definition (eg, "odd number", "woman") display a prototypical
structure in the experimental paradigms alluded to in section 2.1 above. That is, not only
are subjects willing to rate numbers such as 561 as "less odd" than numbers like 3, but
they also take less time to verify that a statement describing the latter as an odd number
was true than for the former. The experimenters' argument goes that, because the concept
"odd number" is definitional, and yet there are exemplary odd numbers, then exemplariness
is not directly concerned with category membership: their argument against accepting these
results as confirming and extending the prototype model hinges on rejecting the possibility
that people who could use numbers in arithmetic could be vague (conceptually) about their
"oddness". To explain why people sometimes deal in prototypes and sometimes in classi¬
cal concepts, we have to take into account the variations in attention and consideration that
people give to ideas, and accept that on some occasions they bring more detailed
knowledge to bear than on others (either because they have it, or because they can tolerate
it). Note that more knowledge doesn't necessarily mean less conceptual overlap
(Murphy and Wright 1984).
One of the difficulties with the classical view as a theory of lexical meaning stems from the
fact that words must frequently be used to describe novel entities which only partially
resemble familiar ones. That is, people put the vocabulary they command to the best use
they can in describing their world and communicating their messages. As Slobin 1982
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states,
"Language evokes ideas ... linguistic expression is a highly selective and conven¬
tionally schematic map. At the heart of language is the tacit convention that most
of the message can be left unsaid, because of mutual understanding."(pl32)
And hence the deployment of lexical items in the composition of this drawing can be a pro¬
cess of approximation - it is not expected to be exact; the hearers' processors expect to
have to join the dots and shade the bounded areas. Thus, the word game is used both
indoors and out, to describe the behaviour of teams and individuals motivated with as much
variety of intention as exists among human beings. These are just a couple of the dimen¬
sions (or parameters) along which any particular game may take up a position. It is this
chain of resemblances that leads to the "family resemblance" structure of categories which
Wittgenstein 1953 described. And it is this family resemblance structure which makes it
difficult to define concepts classically. Typically, classically defined categories are defined
by human stipulation and can be found confined to some specific domain of rational human
activity, such as the Law, a science and so on. Often in science such definitions are work¬
ing definitions, acknowledged not to necessarily correspond with reality but to provide a
necessary basis for rational enquiry. For example, one might want to define literacy as:
"being able to read page-X of book-Y and answer questions-Z correctly"
for the purpose of comparing teaching methods, while still accepting that there are better
though vaguer definitions of the term.
This need to use words may well account for some of the overextensions in children's
27
early language (Anglin 1983, Nelson 1983). For example, my own daughter (Romy)
employed the form /wit)/ ( swing ) to label a drawing in a book of children playing on a
slide (at 18mths). By 22mths, however, /Jut/ ( chute ) was in her vocabulary and was used
appropriately. How should this change be characterized? Is it that adding a new item nar¬
rows the meaning of /wig/, or is it rather that there is no longer any need to call upon /wig/
to enter the breech? This requires further research. One test might be corrigibility; one
would expect a child with an overextended lexical entry to be less willing (or able) to be
corrected than one pragmatically solving a problem.
27
But probably not for underextensions. See Anglin (1983).
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Classical concepts, I have argued, represent theoretically motivated precizations of lexical
concepts. Their logical character and special inferential properties derive from the tight
structure of the theory used to actualise the lexical concept.
5.1.4. Contextual combination
Nida 1975 has suggested that, in general, the larger a text is, the more precise the meaning
becomes. This suggests a second mechanism for precization: the actualised concept is more
precisely defined by a text which places more constraints on its interpretation. In short, it is
the process of combination which introduces precision. More generally, this approach also
offers an account of contextual interaction, to which I have already alluded and which I
will discuss in more detail in the next chapter.
The obvious example is adjective-noun combination. In combination, lexical concepts par¬
tially overlay one another in a manner governed by the syntactic structure of the text.
Thus, for example, an adjective will overlay a noun, masking some parameter(s). For exam¬
ple:
(39) a red cup
In this example, the adjective masks the parameter COLOUR. Masking will constrain the
way information can flow into the semantic representation from background knowledge. On
the one hand, this makes the actualised concept more precise, and on the other it creates the
conceptual adaption evident in semantic interaction. Conceptual adaption arises as back¬
ground knowledge flows. For example, if the current theory specifies that the default
material out of which cups are made is china, then that expectation hones the flow of infor¬
mation about colour. Thus, there is a process of mutual constraint and entropy reduction.
There are two further effects that arise from the way modification draws focus onto a pro¬
perty. First, the property tends to be given greater prominence. Barsalou (1982), in research
discussed elsewhere in this thesis, suggests that this only happens for a subset of properties
which he terms context-dependent properties. And second, there is a reduction in categorial
fuzziness in relation to that parameter— the size of the borderline is reduced.
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Within this framework, contrastive stress can be characterised as a hedge, masking the lexi¬
cal concept with an implicit relationship or set of relationships. For example:
(40) a vase
This might be contrasted with a cup or, alternatively, a bowl. If it is the former, then the
lack of a handle might be sufficient to render a vase a felicitous description of the object
depicted in figure la. On the other hand, opposed to a bowl, figure lb would be a good
vase; a poorer one if opposed to a cup. The opposed category influences the instantiation
of defaults. Obviously, this gedanken experiment might be checked empirically, using
Labov 1972's techniques.
Paradoxically, contrast can also be used to redeem a borderline instance. For example, one
might say that figure lb depicted an unusual cup, only to be corrected "it's a vase". This
type of use is connected with "pre-emption", discussed in chapter 2.
There are three problems that I have not solved that will arise with this approach. The first
two are general, however. First, there is the problem of explaining why one theory rather
than another is active at any given time. Second, I have not explained how an adjective
knows which parameter(s) to overlay. We can't rely on there being a transparently
appropriate parameter such as COLOUR available always. The process of "docking"
modifier and head will typically have to be steered by background knowledge. This brings
me to the third point - timing. I have not said enough about when information will start to
flow from the different knowledge structures or about when and how semantic information
from two items in a given syntactic structure will interact. I will have little to say about
Figure la. Figure lb.
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these matters, aside from some general remarks in chapter 8.
Adjectival modification is discussed in more detail in Dunbar (in preparation, a) and Franks
(in preparation).
5.1.5. Internal lexical structure
A final issue is the question of relationships among semantic properties. Many investiga¬
tors (see, for example, Boas 1988) have emphasised the need for any representational
scheme to supply information about the way the properties and parts of an entity are organ¬
ised in relation to one another. I will deal with this question in detail in chapters 9 and 10.
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Part 3.
From Lexicon to Phrase.
This part of the thesis examines the distinction between coercion and emergence. Chapter 6
develops the general ideas in relation to a variety of linguistic examples, some semantic and
some syntactic. It shows that the distinction is relevant to these examples and introduces
some criteria that might be used to test the distinction. Chapter 7 applies these and other
tests to the mass—count distinction in English. Chapter 8 puts forward a theoretical account
of the data that has been observed. In this part of the thesis, I focus especially on depen¬
dency relations and their influence on the way lexical concepts combine.
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Chapter 6.
Dependency and Lexical Vagueness.
So far, I have begun to characterise a psychological, a cognitive account of meaning, and
have examined the role of lexical concepts in that system. Various properties of lexical
meaning have been described, such as the requirements for composition and interaction
with knowledge, and I have begun to characterise lexical concepts in such a way as to take
account of these considerations. The fundamental issue of concern in this thesis is, stated
plainly, what information belongs in a lexical entry? So far I have been lead to the conclu¬
sion that, semantically, lexical entries contain unvalued parameters which act like sophisti¬
cated valves controlling the flow of information into some ultimate representation; the lexi¬
cal concept is one tool in this constructive activity.
In examining the combination of concepts, the psychological literature has been handi¬
capped by two difficulties, as I observed above. On the one hand, asymmetries in the pro¬
cess need to be accounted for, and on the other, the process must be successfully interfaced
with knowledge of the world. In a later chapter, I will develop the ideas mentioned at the
end of chapter 2 regarding knowledge, but in this chapter and the next, I intend to provide
an account of one aspect of the asymmetry of combination - dependency.
I've already mentioned, in connection with nominal compounds, that we must expect the
syntactic structure of language to contribute to the manner in which concepts are combined.
I wish to spell out in some detail exactly what issues dependency relations raise for a
28
psychology of the lexicon.
The other purpose of this chapter is to sharpen the coercion-emergence distinction by refer¬
ence to specific examples. As well as clarifying the distinction, this chapter uncovers some
criteria which can be used to test the distinction.
28
Dependency, in general, is the notion that one constituent requires another.
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In the next chapter I will examine a particular example of lexical combination to illustrate
the relationship between combination and the coercion-emergence distinction. The example
will be tested against the criteria listed here. To keep the analysis "clean" at this stage, I
29
will choose an instance in which the role of knowledge of the world is simplified.
6.1. Dependency and type emergence
30
Briefly, there are two main roles of syntactic information in conveying meaning :
1. It makes relationships among the constituents of sentences explicit (both within and
between the major phrasal constituents), providing information about function-argument
structure that is central to the calculation of truth-conditions. This can be signalled by word
order and inflection in different languages.
2. Prominence relations are signalled and thus discourse is given structure (sometimes
called "given-new structure") through manipulation of focus. This is done through conven¬
tional deviations from can: onical form, described in transformational terms by rules such as
extraposition, clefting, pseudo-clefting and so on.
Both types of device may be used to suggest one perspective on some thing or event rather
than another, and we can operationally characterise this as producing differences in the
information about the entity that is made available. I have discussed in particular the
amount of information made available in chapter 2, with reference to examples such as
dative shift.
It is this role that I'll concentrate on here: the mechanism by which meaning can be mani¬
pulated by such factors as the presence or absence of linguistic context, the internal struc¬
ture of linguistic context and so on. In other words, the way the flow of information can be
manipulated by the way words combine and the properties of the words they combine
with. An important issue will be whether when context manipulates meaning it coerces a
29
Many thanks to Jim Miller and Ewan Klein for their comments on an early (1986)
draft of this chapter.
30
The function of conveying cultural solidarity by indicating a shared tradition will be
set to one side.
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change in an underlying meaning, or simply makes an adjustment in the way information
flows.
There are various properties which, reflectively, we might be inclined to associate with
some particular lexical item. In chapter 1, I identified a view of lexical meaning which
sought to go beyond this lexicographic perspective, and the following sections examine the
issues involved in more detail. In particular, how can one argue for associating some pro¬
perty with a lexical item as opposed to the phrase(s) in which it appears?
By examining these issues in relation to cases exemplifying the central phenomena, I hope
to clarify such questions. I begin by illustrating contextual influence on lexical meaning,
and examining its relation to the syntactic organization of language. Then, I consider how
one should represent the flexibility of the valency of some English verbs. Finally, I con¬
sider the implications of alternative views as to the locus of certain aspectual properties.
Let's examine first the combinatorial relations between a verb and its arguments - here,
meaning and dependency are closely entwined. Although most of the psychological litera¬
ture on concepts has focussed on nouns, and occasionally verbs, a key issue in traditional
grammar and modern valency theories is the nature of the semantic relation between a verb
and its arguments. There are two complementary ways of approaching this question. On
the one hand, to what extent can arguments tailor the meaning of the head of the construc¬
tion? And on the other, to what extent are the number, category and role of its arguments
inherent properties of the verb?
6.1.1. Semantic tailoring and dependency
In combining, concepts exert influence on one another, as we have seen. I turn now to
further evidence of such effects, and examine their relation to dependence. Allerton (1982)
employs the term "semantic tailoring" in this connection, which conveys the conceptual
fine-tuning involved. Allerton argues that nouns tend to be stable in meaning in com¬
parison with verbs and adjectives which are semantically tailored by the noun. In particular,
the direct object of a transitive verb and the subject of an intransitive tailors the verb,
standing in the relation of specifier to the verbal core (Keenan 1978, Smith 1980).31 Com¬
pare:
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(41) The child/nose/tap runs.
(42) Mother stripped the girl/bed/tree/wallpaper/engine.
A striking parallel is available in the work in computational linguistics of DeJong and
Waltz 1983. They argue that if the selection restrictions of direct object and verb fail to
match, the object should be taken as referring literally and used to generate candidate
processes. The most contextually suitable of these is then aligned with the verb actually
used and - roughly speaking - their meanings are unified. DeJong and Waltz do, however,
present as a caveat an example in which a verb can be the literal constituent attended by a
metaphorical noun phrase, and it is trivial to demonstrate that any of the surface grammati¬
cal relations can be metaphorical. Nevertheless, it would appear that an interesting tendency
has been described.
Similarly, although according to Allerton (1982, pl9) an adjective is subordinate to a noun
(whereas an object is semi-subordinate to a verb), it is worth recalling that Halff,
Ortony and Anderson 1976 found that the sense of RED changes according to the identity
of the noun it combines with. Once more, however, we need the caution that the transfer of
properties may be two way: recall that Barclay et al. 1974 demonstrated variation in the
quality of a given property as a cue for a noun according to the nature of the verb; for
example, heavy served as a better reminder of the word PIANO when the verb was LIFT.
Furthermore, Barsalou (1982) demonstrates that the verb phrase in a sentence can affect the
availability of properties of the grammatical subject.
A related approach has been employed in the Japanese MU Machine Translation project to
aid the accurate translation of Waga verbs (basic verbs, functioning like MAKE, DO etc. in
English) (Sakamoto, Ishikawa and Satoh 1986). In this project, the case of the arguments to
the verb is used to restrict the possible meanings of the verb. The cases are in turn linked
by co-occurrence restrictions to particular groups of the semantic markers which are used to
classify concepts. For example, the verb:
31
I leave aside the question, raised by Allerton, of whether or not the direct object of
a transitive verb is a "deep subject" of a corresponding intransitive.
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is given a reading like HIT, STRIKE, COLLIDE when the "subject" is an object or physi¬
cal phenomenon while the "object" is an object or place (yielding light hits a slope, for
example). On the other hand, it is read as UNDERTAKE, BE ENGAGED IN, DEAL
WITH when the "subject" is an object with will and the "object" is an action.
The question of whether a distinction in meaning arises through coercion or emergence is
clearly germane here, and these examples indicate the generality of the problem, as well as
its relation to dependence.
6.1.2. Transitivity and dependency
Next I tackle transitivity, which as a topic has long attracted students of meaning because it
inhabits the area between syntax and semantics. Is the transitivity of a verb predictable
from its meaning, syntactically inherent or an emergent property of a string (Kilby 1984)?
Why are some verbs transitive, some intransitive and others flexible? Consider the flexible
ones; why are some of the "ergative" type while others are not? There is not time to tackle
all these issues, but in the case of flexible verbs the question can be put: is one pattern
basic with the other derived by a coercive process or is the valency an emergent property
of the sentence as a whole?
We have already seen that the problem of contrasting type emergence and type coercion
arises with respect to examples like:
(43) Who did you sneeze?
Here a normally intransitive verb is used transitively. Ultimately such cases may be an
interesting test, for if the manipulation of valency is ever an instance of coercion it must be
here. However, since the purpose for the moment is partly to trawl the linguistic literature
for advice, we will be better served by an examination of analogous cases which are part of
conventional usage and which have therefore received the attention of professional students
of the language.
Lipka (Lipka 1972) argues that subcategorizing verbs as bluntly transitive or intransitive is
uninformative, pointing out in particular the productivity of rules adding a component
CAUSE to the meaning of the verb (converting one-place verbs into two-place ones, for
example) and deleting objects (reducing the number of arguments, of course). Clearly,
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however, he views these processes as changing the underlying valency of the verb; the
metaphor of "transformation" hangs in the background. Lipka cites Jespersen, Lyons and
Poutsma along these lines, quoting the last-named on the "floating nature of transitiveness"
(Poutsma 1926 pp45-90), but this tradition has ignored the possibility of type-emergence.
Lyons 1968, in relation to object-deletion, notes that it has been suggested that eat in sen¬
tences like:
(44) We never eat at 5 o'clock.
is a pseudo-intransitive or "absolute" usage of a basically transitive verb. He also regards
ergative verbs as being basically intransitive verbs which can be transformed by a causa¬
tion "operation" introducing the causer as subject. For example:
(45) The wheel turns —» John turns the wheel.
He also points out that in the past productive morphological processes have lexicalised
similar transitives (eg. FELL, ROUGHEN, STERILIZE), and argues that, by analogy, the
ergative verbs should be seen as undergoing a zero-derivation. In short, Lyons employs the
morphological analogy as evidence that the process is coercive and, further, that the causa¬
tive is the derived pole of that process.
Superficially, Halliday, to whom Lipka also refers, seems to lean more towards considering
transitivity as an emergent property, since in systemic grammar the "transitivity system" is
a system of choices (or "contrasts") available in, say, English, in respect of the number,
role and type of arguments & "circumstances" (cf. circonstants), aspect and so forth, with
choices being made at the level of the clause. In the jargon, the "entry condition" for the
transitivity system indicates that transitivity is a property of units of the "rank" of clause
(Berry 1975). The transitivity system can interact with the "voice system" leading to elision
of elements. It is the case, however, that each new choice (or specification) within the sys¬
tem narrows the range of verbs that are permitted; in short, verbs are classified according to
transitivity.
The alternative that is not in the end addressed, then, is whether it might in fact be the
case, for example, that the presence of a direct object triggers the causative interpretation of
ergative verbs, rather than insertion of the hypothesised causative zero-morpheme.
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One writer who does address such questions is DJ. Allerton (Allerton 1982). He offers
32
four possible accounts of surface differences in the valency of a single form.
a) There may be two verbs with the same form. For example, compare:
(46) They hailed the leader all day.
(47) It hailed all day.
b) A single verb may have two valencies, thereby exhibiting polysemy or "class cleavage",
the latter term being due to Bloomfleld.
c) A single verb may have a single (compound) valency which admits alternative instantia¬
tions.
d) Finally, a single verb may have a single (simple) valency which can be transformed by
syntactic rule into another.
We will not be further concerned with the first of these; the third and fourth may be com¬
pared to type emergence and type coercion respectively, while the second I shall provision¬
ally term "lexicalization", although this assumes more than Allerton does.
To which does he assign object-deleting and ergative verbs? And how does he defend the
assignment? Object-deletion is given the third solution (compound valency): the object is
bracketted in the valency frame and thereby signalled as optional (with the proviso that for
some of these verbs an ellided object must be contextually recoverable). Very little argu¬
ment is provided for the application of this solution to verbs whose objects need not be
contextually recoverable (such as READ, WRITE, PAINT), beyond the claim that the
meaning of the intransitive does not specifically exclude the understood object, which will
in turn remain easy to "activate" (p70). It should be noted that Allerton has no qualms
about the observation that some object-deleting verbs tend to have "absolute" readings
when used intransitively (eg. he has eaten, John believes, Sally drinks ), arguing that such
hyponymic restrictions in verb meaning are "context-governed" (p71), with the ordinary
32
I retain Allerton's ordering since he derives terminology from it. He mentions the
fifth possibility of a lexical transformation, but dismisses this, arguing that it must in prac¬
tice reduce to either (a) or (d).
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readings remaining potentially available.
In the case of the ergatives, Allerton regards the two surface forms as being too discrepant
and the semantic relation too irregular for a compound valency solution to be tractable. He
considers type coercion (ie. the fourth account) but argues against this first because it is not
clear which of the two should be regarded as most basic (cf Lyons above) and, second,
because the rule is not completely general, failing in the case of verbs like PROPEL and
DRIFT (p75). His preferred solution for ergatives is, then, "multiple valency", the second
account.
Although there is not time to elaborate the point here, I believe that it may be possible to
overcome Allerton's objection to a type-emergence account of ergatives. We would require
a means of deriving the variation in the semantic relations from the inherent meaning of the
lexical items involved, together with a schema encompassing both possibilities. This may
be possible if some suggestions made by Kilby (1985, ch2) are followed up in the spirit of
Gibson and Langacker. Pressing for such a result would have two obvious benefits:
1) Removing multiple valency removes a local ambiguity and therefore simplifies parsing.
2) In order to derive the requisite schema, it appears that we will need to develop our
understanding of the temporal contour of the interaction of lexical representations and
knowledge of the world, a question of deep theoretical importance.
It should be noted that such questions have been of concern in both a-intelligence and
psychology, as well as linguistics. Boden , for example, asks just which slots conceptual
dependency schemata should include - how fine-grained should the representation be? In a-
inteligence, however, workers have shifted the boundary of debate, tending to proliferate
slots to enrich the representation. This is to be expected, given their emphasis on inference.
In psychology some relatively recent work has examined differences in the way nouns and
verbs are organised. In particular, Huttenlocher and Lui (1979) sought to explain findings
like greater release from proactive inhibition for nouns (compared to verbs) partly in terms
of the dissipation of semantic connections to concepts associated with the slots of verbs
(see Dunbar 1988).
- 83 -
Both these approaches have focussed on the dependence of the verb on its arguments for
full instantiation of its meaning. This is the other side of the dependency coin; in traditional
grammar, the emphasis is placed on the dependence of the arguments on the presence of
the verb, without which they could not appear. It is interesting that in his Space Grammar,
Langacker chose to draw a contrast between autonomy and dependence in which it is the
dependent item that requires the presence of slot-fillers. That is, in Space Grammar, depen¬
dence is semantic incompleteness.
6.1.3. Aspect and emergence
Let us push the next example further in order to sharpen the contrast between the mechan¬
isms and to draw in the issue of ontological constraint. The contrast between emergence
and coercion arises again in relation to aspectual distinctions found among verbs of motion
in English: to what extent can a single verb accommodate more than one meaning?
In relation to this example, we can also address the more specific question: can a rule be
formulated to the effect that there is a certain degree of difference of meaning such that no
two meanings that far apart can be alternative, contextually determined, readings of the
same word, and if they are expressed by the same word-form, then they are homonyms?
We can profit here by considering briefly the ontology of concepts, because it is ontological
barriers that we find are said to be insurmountable. Keil (1979) has claimed, for example,
that ontological categories are arranged in a hierarchy subject to a constraint called the
"M-constraint". The M-constraint simply states that the hierarchy must be a hierarchy: no
instance of an ontological category may also be an instance of an ontological category on a
different branch of the tree. The same assumption is implicit in Jackendoff (1983):
"Which major ontological category is expressed by a particular major phrasal con¬
stituent depends on the semantics of the head." (p68).
Jackendoff identifies two readings of word-forms associated with motion verbs. Take for
example GO; compare:
(48) The lorry went from Ardlui to Tyndrum.
(49) The road went from Ardlui to Tyndrum.
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He postulates two semantic predicates corresponding to these readings - GO and GOExt -
but is unable to decide whether to equate these. Note that technically, within his system,
they can't be identical because state-hood is a necessary condition on the GOExt predicate,
while being an event is a necessary collorally of GO. Nevertheless, Jackendoff hedges on
this, pointing out that the distinction between the two uses is largely determined by linguis¬
tic context. The examples given above illustrate this: the difference between road and lorry
appears to tailor the meaning of the verb. In the second example, the subject has "... [low]
motility" (pl73) and we are hence inclined to assign a "state" reading, whereas the first
example is interpreted as denoting an "event". We might also point out that the extentive
interpretation appears to be accessible with all motion verbs, including novel ones. For
example:
(50) The path darted about among the trees.
(51) From the helicopter we see how the city drifts into nearby villages.
33
(52) The hedge sinclaired around the cottage.
The problem for Jackendoff s theory as it stands is that if GO and GOExt are distinct predi¬
cates, then there will have to be a shadow lexical entry for every motion verb, whose
necessary condition is the predicate GOExt rather than GO. Furthermore, there would have
to be a meta-lexical rule predicting the existence of this shadow in order to account for the
potential ambiguity of any novel denominal verb, for example. The key to this difficulty is
that the semantics of the head of a major phrasal constituent are the fount of its ontological
category, but ontological category is part of a necessary condition on motion verbs and can¬
not, as things stand, be evaded. And it is precisely because their ontological categories are
different that GO and GO£xt cannot be equated.
33
Since this verb is (I believe) a new denominal, I should explain the intended mean¬
ing. A "Sinclair" is a low, battery-powered, slim, three-wheeled bicycle. To Sinclair is,
therefore, to move with a low profile. Thus, for example, prone soldiers might Sinclair
across a field on their hands and knees in order to make small targets of themselves.
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Let's press for a better analysis. Jackendoff (1983) rightly points out that Miller and
Johnson-Laird (1976) cannot handle extentitive interpretation in their account of aspect, but
we will find that the process of amending their analysis so that it does will give us the clue
to solving Jackendoff's problem. The relevant predicate from their account is TRAVEL:
TRAVEL(x): Something x "travels" from time tQ to time t if, for each t. such
that tQ<t.<t , there is a place y. such that R( (AT(x,y.)) and:
(i) Rt+1(not AT(x,y.))






(Where F is a predicate meaning that the locations "y" and "z" are distinct). If we add the
following clause:
POSS(Rl=R2)
and amend the subscripts of the quantifiers accordingly, we provide a definition which
allows for both extentive and eventive interpretations. Note that this also handles cases
which Jackendoff does not. In particular, time travel where "R2" is earlier than "Rl".
However, we should perhaps take note of our intuition that such cases are at best atypical;
perhaps we could place our clause within the scope of a Jackendovian PREFerence operator
and amend it slightly :
PREF (Rl laterthan R2)
If this does represent the beginning of a hybrid solution, then clearly the answer to
Jackendoff's difficulty is to make the event-state distinction a preference rule rather than a
necessary condition. Ontological category would then still depend on the semantics of the
lexical head, only now these semantics would be subject to contextual instantiation. We
have a "type emergence" approach in which semantic extension is not necessarily hampered
by ontological considerations.
There is, however, an alternative analysis. Although sentences like "The road goes..." refer
to what are states in the real world, they are conceptualised as events. That is, event-hood
is a necessary condition of GO, there is no GOEx{, and when an entity with low motility
(like a road) is assigned the trajectory of a motion verb (cf Langacker 1982), then it is
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profiled as being in motion. This could be realised as a kind of metonymy - each section of
the road is successively profiled; what is moved (conceptually) is the location of the profile
(rather than the road). Under this analysis, GO could be viewed as a sort of transfer feature
(see below), making it a case of type coercion. This alternative does allow that ontological
boundaries limit semantic extension. (There is a clear link between this and linguistic rela¬
tivity, which is considered further in Dunbar 1988).
Although there has not been time to resolve this dilemma, it has illustrated the issues in
some detail, showing that both approaches can be developed. The distinction between
coercion and emergence should now be clear enough.
6.2. Vagueness and type emergence
Before proceeding, I will relate the distinction between coercion and emergence to the trad¬
itional philosophical distinction between ambiguity and vagueness. When a form is associ¬
ated with more than one category, it can be either vague or ambiguous with respect to the
distinction between them. A good example of vagueness would be the relation between cup
and the colours "red" and "blue". If I say there is a cup on my desk, then the proposition
expressed is simply vague as to whether the cup is red or blue. On the other hand bank is
ambiguous between a geographical feature and a financial institution.
The relationship between the two distinctions is as follows. First, if a term is vague in
some respect (say, colour) then its membership of that type must emerge through, for
example, modification by an adjective. Thus, type emergence can issue from vagueness
through a process I'll term "precization" (after Pinkal 1983). Type coercion occurs when a
new specification overrides a previous one. Thus, for example, (assuming for the moment
that custard has "yellow" as a specific property) red custard exhibits type coercion. Fre¬
quently, when a term that is vague in relation to some distinction is regularly and con¬
sistently used with a particular value, a specific sense of the term is lexicalised which
corresponds to that usage. For example, CANE was originally a "stick", vague as to func¬
tion. However, it now has a conventional reading in which the function is specified as "aid
for walking" (roughly). This conventional specification of additional meaning I term lexical-
ization. Lexicalization is a pre-condition of psychological ambiguity.
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In the next chapter, I will take a detailed look at the mass-count distinction. There are two
goals: to press the emergence-coercion distinction hard, and to examine the role of closed
class "grammatical" morphemes as a special case of linguistic context. Naturally, it is to be
hoped that a satisfying account of the syntax and semantics of the mass-count distinction
will emerge. These results will be integrated with those of chapter 4 in a semi-formal
model of the interpretation of noun-phrases to be presented in chapter 9.
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Chapter 7.
The mass-count distinction in English.
This chapter focusses on the mass-count distinction as expressed in English. As will
become clear, this phenomenon illustrates the combination of two lexical items standing in
some relation of dependency to one another. The phenomenon also relates to the questions
raised in chapter 2 concerning the use of referring expressions to place alternative constru-
als on an entity. It is a good example to tackle because it is relatively knowledge-free in
the sense that, at a coarse level of analysis, the semantic alternation involved is constant
across lexical fields. This allows the focus on the key issues to remain sharp.
I begin this chapter by discussing the nature of the mass-count distinction. Then I apply
tests and criteria, some of which were catalogued in the last chapter, to the mass-count dis¬
tinction. By doing this I plan to demonstrate that the distinction arises through the interac¬
tion of determiners with lexical concepts. I concentrate at first on simple noun-phrases, but
later the discussion will decalage to encompass transitivity, aspect and classifier construc¬
tions.
7.1. What is it?
In English, there are two sorts of noun (or two ways of using a noun, depending how you
look at it): mass nouns and count nouns. Syntactically, the two are associated with comple¬
mentary sets of determiners. And semantically they are associated with different sorts of
referent; by and large the referents of mass nouns tend to exist in the world as globs of
liquid or stuff, while counts tend to have "built-in modes, however arbitrary, of dividing
their reference...." (Quine 1960:91).
In many grammars of English, this distinction is taken as a syntactic subcategorization of
nouns (see also Ziff 1964)). Indeed, as Crangle has noted, entries in published dictionaries
implicitly encode a specification in this respect, (Crangle 1984). For example:
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Banana A tree... cultivated largely in tropical and subtropical climates.... (OED)
This definition implicitly conveys the informationthat it's acount noun.34 But is this a pro¬
perty of nouns or of the noun-phrases in which they are used? Study of this will allow us
to begin to discover the extent to which the significance of a use of a linguistic sign is
partly an emergent property of its combination with its linguistic context. First, however, I
wish to make the case for regarding the distinction as semantic rather than merely formal.
For the distinction to be semantic, there must be a systematic difference in meaning
between the categories. Firstly, I know of no philosopher having the intuition that there is
no difference in meaning; that is, at a reflective level, analysts tend to agree that there is a
semantic difference, and there is a rough consensus as to the nature of the difference
(although there is disagreement in relation to important details - see below). Secondly, as
Allen (1981) has shown, some nouns do not show equal affinity for both mass and count
noun phrases. It could be argued that this is a case of syntactically conditioned, even arbi¬
trary, complementary distribution if it wasn't that these patterns correlate with semantic pro¬
perties. For example, certain superordinate terms (eg. furniture and equipment) resist
appearance in a count noun phrase rather firmly, but such words have in common that their
referent is a perceptually heterogeneous set of entities. Thirdly, an argument can be made
on the basis of co-predicability patterns (cf Keil 1979, Nunberg 1979, but see also Keil
1979) that the mass-count distinction is sensitive to meaning. For example, count terms but
not mass terms can be COUNTED
(53) *Do have three (of) some cheese.
Nunberg (1978) argues that for a case of polysemy to be established (one lexeme with
more than one meaning), it is necessary (but not sufficient) that the different meanings be
extensionally distinct, but in the case of the mass-count distinction this requirement appears
not to be met. To be precise, an apple is apple but apple is not necessarily an apple.
Thus, at least in the cases felicitously described by count usage, both mass and count terms
are applicable. Let me give an example. If I arrive at customs with an edam, it is the case
that I have a cheese. Nevertheless, should an exciseman enquire whether I have some
cheese among my things, the answer must be that I do (unless I am a determined
34
Sinclair 1987 argues that dictionaries should do this more systematically.
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smuggler). The semantic difference that I have established here is that mass terms lack one
entailment that count terms possess.
However, we need not rely on an argument from an extensional difference because (as indi¬
cated in earlier chapters) I do not intend to give an extensional account of reference. My
position is that the difference is cognitive: these two readings of a noun differ in the way
that they cause the noun to interact with knowledge of the world; they differ because they
highlight different information by offering alternative perspectives on (or construals ol) an
entity. Shortly the nature of this difference will be discussed in more detail. However, this
general view does avoid some pitfalls of a realist approach.
Some researchers have advocated a realist approach (Cheng, cited in Bunt 1981); let us
examine the most obvious difficulties it faces. I have already noted that a single entity can
be referred to in either fashion. Assume for the moment, however, that this cannot happen,
and that a particular entity is classified as either count or mass. First, there are cross-
linguistic and diachronic changes in classification. For example: the French un meuble con¬
trasts with English *a furniture. An example of diachronic change is dust, which is typically
portrayed as a mass term in contemporary English, but which Jesperson 1914 (pi 18) claims
would once have been more frequent in the form: a dust. It is not credible to assert that
the entity has changed its essential nature. Secondly, even within English, as McCawley
(1975, reported in Gathercole 1985) has pointed out, we get pairs such as noodles-
spaghetti, garlic-onions, and rice-beans whose members are ontologically alike yet are
differentiated with respect to the mass—count distinction.
Finally, note that abstract nouns such as honesty typically fall into the mass-noun class
("The distinction between material and immaterial mass-words seems linguistically
irrelevant... [they] take the same quantifiers... [and] may leave the category of mass-words
and take the plural form just as other mass-words (kindnesses)." (Jesperson, 1949 p438)).
It is hard to see what could be the basis of an ontological class that could span both con¬
crete and abstract nouns, while excluding count nouns.
Against the observation of dual applicability, the realist might argue that, indeed, two
different things are being referred to, perhaps calling them the object and the substance
(Parsons 1970). Thus, for instance, different speech communities may be focussing on
different entities (rather than focussing on different aspects of a single entity). There is a
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basic insight shared by both views (ie. that objects are not referentially atomic), but I
believe the realist version is unten able. First, it still doesn't handle the problem of abstract
nouns (Pelletier (1979), for instance, proposes simply omitting abstract nouns from the field
of investigation for this reason). And second, it seems obvious that these "entities" have no
existence independently of one another - destroy the gold and you destroy the ring; remove
the ring and you remove the gold. In other words, the only coherent way to interpret these
"objects" is as aspects of a single entity. I characterise the distinction, then, as an alterna¬
tion of cognitive perspective.
7.2. Is it lexical?
Having established first that there is a distinction, and having then gone into some detail to
characterize it, we are in a position to consider the fundamental question of whether the
distinction is lexical or phrasal. I begin by trying to apply some of the criteria that we
have seen applied to the phenomena discussed in the previous chapter.
Lyons used the presence of an analogous morphological rule to argue for both coercion and
the direction of coercion. From a psychological perspective, we must draw a distinction
between diachronic change and synchronic process: although change must, at the time it
occurs, involve a psychological dynamic, that dynamic may ossify over a (relatively long)
period so that its path is no longer active. Therefore, the argument from morphology can
only be suggestive. Furthermore, there are derivational processes in both directions. To
derive mass from count, there is the suffix -age (eg. bag — baggage); and in the opposite
direction the agentive suffix -er can derive a count noun from a mass noun (eg. milk —
milker)',
Allerton (op. cit.) argued that similarity of the surface forms favoured compound valency
(which I have claimed is analogous to valency). Here he means that the occupants of case
roles in the event denoted by some verb are realized in the same grammatical relation. This
is a difficult analogy to pursue, but mass-count alternation does not affect the basic struc¬
ture of the NP as far as the order of head and modifier (some red cheese; a red boy) and
so forth goes. In short, the distinction does not create surface complexity, and so this can¬
not be put against a type-emergence account.
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Allerton's other argument concerned the simplicity of the relation. However, like similarity
(see chapter 4), simplicity is relative to background knowledge and the only basis we have
for assessing it (quantifying it is out of the question) is our intuitive judgement. Nunberg
(1979) has introduced the more workable concept of cue validity in this connection. When
more than one reading can be given to a term, we naturally want to know whether one
sense is more basic, while others are derived from it, and cue validity is a possible criterion
for assessing this. Nunberg argues, as I explained in chapter 4, that a term can only desig¬
nate something which will function efficiently as a cue for derived readings.
Referential functions as described by Nunberg are similar to the construal rules (CR's) dis¬
cussed by Miller (1978). It is perhaps important to note that this type of rule can only sug¬
gest hypotheses to be tested about the interpretation - it cannot algorithmically yield an
interpretation. To be more specific, if there is more than one CR or RF that could be applied
on a given occasion, there is no way of deciding which should be applied other than trying
35
them out in turn. If there was a way, then the CR's would be redundant.
The cases in which we are most interested for present purposes, are those in which it is not
clear which of the two referential functions has greater cue validity. That is, there are cases
in which cue validity appears to be equally high in both directions, and which Nunberg
consequently classifies as polysemous. Might it be that this symmetry obtains between the
mass and the count senses of nouns? Nunberg mentions that it might, but does not deal
with the mass-count distinction at any length.
There are seven cases to consider:
basic
basic













Here the term "basic" indicates the unmarked, most usual reading; other terms describe the
status of readings derived from this which can be contrasted in terms of the mass-count dis¬
tinction. Broadly speaking, the referential function involved in deriving a count reading is
"unit-of", while derived mass readings are typically "pulp-of".
First, the derivation of count readings. In novel cases, the size of the unit is not necessarily
fixed and has to be inferred from background knowledge. Whether the context isolates a
unique unit will probably vary from noun to noun and, indeed, from situation to situation.
It is instructive to consider the German phrase ein Brot which literally translated reads a
bread. If we assume that the intended interpretation of this nounphrase is as a "natural
unit", we can infer its denotation by asking "what is the natural unit of bread?". The
answer suggests three possibilities: a roll, a slice or a loaf. In fact, the correct translation
would be a loaf, but because the phrase is not lexicalized in English we would need to con¬
sult either the situational context or a native speaker to determine this. However, even in
English, certain units will be lexicalized for certain substances. Which units are lexicalized
can depend, of course, either on the laws of nature (such as when a water is a body of
36
water) or by convention. We can safely assume that the cue validity of some word for a
given reading is increased when that reading is lexicalized: if context licenses more than
one unit, then preference can be given to lexicalized candidates (unless the speaker has
"marked" the phrase). Given the account of lexicalization sketched roughly above, the
availability of a lexicalized reading will be relative to the set of currently active theories,
36
Note that the extent of such waters can vary greatly, and that this concept leaves
open questions like "where does one water begin and another end?" Such questions arise in
philosophy. Pelletier 1979 takes a strict interpretation of Quine's definition of sortals and
suggests, for example, that the noun thing is non-sortal because its denotation fails to pro¬
vide criteria for division of reference. (This is one of a group of arguments he puts forward
for distinguishing the sortal v. non-sortal distinction from the mass-count distinction). How¬
ever, the absence of precise criteria for individuation is somewhat beside the point, and will
not trouble the less realist concept of reference adopted here. The essence of sortals is
countability, and count terms profile an entity as countable, requiring only that individua¬
tion be possible in principle on at least a post hoc basis. Without this qualification one
would be forced to question whether any novel readings of basically mass concepts were
sortal.
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and so will vary from context to context.
I will assume that symmetrical cue validity is precluded by idiomatization.
The pulping or grinding that derives mass readings from countable concepts seems to be a
straightforward mapping, although there may be some doubt as to how many tokens a
given heap of pulp could reconstitute. This is not a serious difficulty, however, and matters
will be even simpler where lexicalization has occurred.
In fact, the Universal Grinder usually has a filter constructed by background knowledge
draped over its outlet. This, for example, will assure the removal of pips, stalks and outer
leaves from foodstuffs. At least, such filtering is invariably incorporated in cases of lexi¬
calization. The other major RF deriving mass readings involves conceptual re-orientation,
but I will discuss this more fully below.
The minor (less general) RF's display a gradient from lexicalization to idiomatization which
leads one to ask whether the structure of a referential function can in itself be responsible
for idiomatization. This certainly seems to be so for the RF "artefact typically made-of"
which sometimes sets up count senses of mass concepts, particularly when technology
moves on leaving the lexicon of the language looking like an industrial museum. Examples
include: iron; rubber; nylon(s); paper and card. I tabulate here some RF's that might con¬
nect a sortal with a mass reading.
Examination of this kind of data may allow us to make more precise the intuition that an
increase in semantic distance increases the liklihood of lexical split (Bybee 1985). For now,
however, I observe that a variety of RF's are available, and that whether two readings are
related polysemously will depend on which RF relates them, on which of the possible
Referential Function
meat-of
artefact made-from a part-of
For example:
chicken; lamb




woman [abusive]; Pele; Dylan






readings are lexicalized and also on background knowledge and the situational context.
Closely related to simplicity is the notion of productivity, which Lipka adduced (see
above). It is an important aspect of the data (noted by most who have considered the topic)
that the distinction is not absolute. Frequently, nouns take on different senses according to
which determiner has been employed. That is, the distinction is relative to the choice of
determiner. This has led many to suggest that the distinction is one between mass and
count usage of nouns rather than between mass and count nouns, (see eg Pelletier 1979).
This is highly productive, and we have already seen the construal schemata involved
(although they will be discussed in more detail below). Pelletier (op. cit.) has argued, in
relation to his Universal Grinder, that this alternation is possible for any concrete noun. The
small set of exceptions, as I have noted, characteristically have a heterogenuous collection
as their denotation. Pelletier quotes Gleason to the effect that if alternative readings sound
odd it's just a matter of securing the right context to render them plausible. This is reminis¬
cent of the discussion of ad hoc categories in chapter 4.
One feature of productive mles is semantic predictability (ie. compositionality). In their
discussion of aspect, Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) argue that verbs should be
subclassified for aspectual distinctions because of an interaction between different verbs and
formal markers of aspect:
"The effect of the progressive... depends on the time schema of the verb it is ap¬
plied to." (p443)
By and large there are no such interactions between nouns and, for example, different
determiners. Here are some examples:
"count" concept a boy some boy
"mass" concept a jam some jam
"count" an onion some onion
"mass" a garlic some garlic
The meaning of each determiner is obviously the same no matter which noun it appears
with. (This criterion corresponds roughly to Zwicky and Sadock's test of inconstancy under
substitution and is also used by Cartwright 1975).
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Obviously, we must take into account lexicalization - the conventionalization of a sense or
form that was initially derived by some active process (Bybee 1985, Langacker 1982b).
One assumes that there is a culturally conventional concept to which the phrase a cheese,
for example, alludes, and which does not require construction de novo so much as recollec¬
tion. (Details of this will be discussed in a later chapter). A frequent corollary of lexicaliza¬
tion is idiomatization - a radical drift in meaning - and this is found in cases such as an
iron [the domestic appliance] and a glass [the drinking vessel] (see Close 1975). Neverthe¬
less, even in such instances the corresponding "mass" noun (iron, glass) can be used in a
count term (an iron, a glass) denoting a unit of the substance if the situational context
licenses it (for example, think of a foundry). Indeed, these new uses may also be lexical-
ized - although it's a bit archaic a glass can denote a telescope, for example. This under¬
lines the productivity of the alternation, and it would seem that if mass and count readings
are distinguished lexically, it is necessary to provide a shadow lexical entry for every noun.
Given the existence of other (orthogonal) sorts of polysemy (such as type-token, see
chapter 4), there will be a rapid proliferation of shadow lexicons unless we follow Nunberg
37
in confining each family of designata to a single lexical item.
One hypothesis (the Shorthand Expression hypothesis; the phrase is Clark 1983's) is that
the derivation of novel readings depends on the el ision of material from an "underlying"
partitive. Thus, a wine is merely the surface realization of, for example, a glass of wine;
and a sentence like:
(54) John ordered a large coke, but the waitress spilled some.
has the words of it ellided from its tail. That is, there would be a single reading from which
a novel reading could be derived. While clearly ellipsis is possible, and is probably the
most favoured reading of the sentence above, it depends upon the presence of an antecedent
and so cannot underly all cases. In particular, the choice of classifier is context-dependent
(Bunt 198}), different classifiers being appropriate for different substances. Furthermore, in
different situations, different classifiers may be required for the same substance (Ware
1975): a beer may refer to "a pint", "a keg" or "a barrel" depending on whether it's being
ordered for lunch, for a party or for the cellar of a pub. It could be argued that the
37
Nunberg (1981) doesn't take a specific stand on the mass-count distinction, suggest¬
ing only that it may be a case of polysemy.
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underlying string is a CLASSIFIER of substance, with the classifier being instantiated by
context, but in the absence of specific evidence for the proposed abstract "archimorpheme",
this will turn out to be a notational variant of the account to be proposed here. For cases
of true ellipsis (ie. those involving anaphora), a separate mechanism will be proposed
below (although I will not be concerned with anaphora per se).
Zwicky and Sadock (1975) catalogue a range of tests of the ambiguity-vagueness distinc¬
tion. Two of their semantic criteria have already been discussed: "plausibility of systematic
ambiguity" (being heightened by the formal marking of the meaning distinction in some
other langauge) corresponds to the discussion of morphology. "Plausibility of lack of
specification" corresponds to the earlier discussion of simplicity. Some of the tests, such as
the criteria for establishing the occurrence of "the intersection of patterns", and tests for
changes in transformational potential, are not relevant (except to the extent that they cover
the same ground as Allerton's point about similarity of form). They deal at length, how¬
ever, with some special cases of tests of transformational potential - tests for the applicabil¬
ity of rules which require identity of sense. These tests are pertinent and deserve close
examination. Put at its simplest, these tests require that a single occurrence of a given form
should be capable of being given both readings in a single utterance without being physi-
38
cally repeated.
Using conjunction reduction we can first establish that mass and count terms are of broadly
the same type:
(55) Sam wrapped some cheese and an apple for Mrs Goggins.
cf.
(56) *Sam wrapped quickly and some cheese for Mrs Goggins.
Having done this initial screening, we can apply some more stringent tests based on the
material shared ie. recovered in one conjunct from appearance in the other. Here, identity
38
For the purpose of these tests, I define the following symbols: *c and ?c. They indi¬
cate intuitive uninterpretibility of the sentences they precede, on a crossed reading of the
antecedent/residue, where a crossed reading is one in which the contrasted interpretations
are both given. Note that although these tests are not restricted to one theory of grammar
(TG), their interpretation is heavily theory-dependent, as we shall see.
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of sense at a more specific level is required. A wide range of tests is available, the main
differences among them residing in the syntactic properties of the material el.ided. How¬
ever, all deletion tests (which I consider first) give similar results.
First, some tests in which the ellided material does not constitute a syntactic constituent:
VP deletion and gapping: (some examples have preceding context to clarify the intended
readings)
VP deletion:
(Fred has an iron to mend, while Derek has a sack of iron to sell).
(57) *c Fred had insured his iron, but Derek hasn't.
(Danny loves cheese and Robin often buys an edam).
(58) *c Danny might share his cheese with you and Robin always will.
(Stan's favourite dish is a plateful of fried mushrooms, while Ollie prefers a (single) stuffed
mushroom).
(59) *c Ollie would finish his mushroom but Stan might not.
Gapping:
(60) *c Brad read his paper in the shop and Scott on the train.
(61) *c Leslie ate her cheese at home and Sally on the train.
(62) *c Derek spilled his cream in a cafe and Simon in the manse.
As I have indicated, my intuitions suggest that neither construction permits crossed read¬
ings, whether the marked reading is idiomatic, merely lexicalized or neither. This suggests
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that the mass-count distinction is an ambiguity rather than a vagueness.
In the following tests, the shared material is a constituent:
Conjunction reduction:
(63) *c Jane unplugged and Lucy smelted her own iron.
(I asked Jim for a pint of No.3 and Dave for some beer.)
(64) ?c Jim, with dignity, and Dave, brusquely, refused to buy the beer I re¬
quested.
(65) ?c Sam and Fred each tossed down their cheese.
(I sold Bill a double-decker and Tam a kilo of scrap.)
(66) ?c Bill and Bob (each) sold their bus for a profit.
Again, idiomatization is an obstacle to reduction. In other cases, however, judgements are,
perhaps, less clear. The next example involves "extraction":
Extraposition:
(67) *c It was the glass they hated that Jack and Alan (each) stared through.
(68) *c It is the cake their mother makes that every child prefers.
(69) *c It is only the most succulent tomato that the chef will serve or the custo¬
mer will eat.





(70) *c Susan threw her rubber in the air and Joan did the same thing.
(71) *c Jonah spat out his fish and Peter did the same thing.
(72) *c Dex admired his own table and Bobby did the same thing.
Vice-versa:
(73) *c Tom gave Jim the tin he owed him, and vice-versa.
(74) *c Captain Hook gave Smee the coffee he wanted, and vice-versa.
(75) *c Tony spilled Richard's shampoo, and vice-versa.
The evidence of identity of sense tests examined so far points strongly in favour, then, of
ambiguity. However, these tests have all involved deletion and Zwicky and Sadock (op.
cit.) point out that constructions in which a proform remains as a relic of the ellided
material don't inhibit crossed interpretations so strongly. They suggest that in some cases it
may be what they classify as the perceptual difficulty of assigning two readings to a single
lexical token that impedes such interpretations.
39
Semantically, these constructions are polar opposites. They seem to utilise a prepo¬
sitional pro-form, and so represent an intermediate stage between the previous tests involv¬
ing deletion and those involving pro-formation with a successively narrower domain which
follow.
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One such test involves the pro-form so does which is a VP placeholder. For consistency, I
will adapt the examples used for VP deletion above.
(Fred has an iron to mend, while Derek has a sack of iron to sell).
(76) *c Fred had insured his iron, but Derek never does/and so had Derek.
(Danny loves cheese and Robin often buys an edam).
(77) *c Danny shares his cheese with you and so does Robin.
(Stan's favourite dish is a plateful of fried mushrooms, while Ollie prefers a (single) stuffed
mushroom).
(78) *c Ollie always finishes his mushroom and so does Stan.
(Ben has a glass of water in the morning and Stephen has lots of water in the evening).
(79) *c Ben drinks his water too quickly and so does Stephen.
This still points towards ambiguity, and any sense that these examples are "better" than
those of deletion involves a fine judgement. It might be that it is the absence of a pronomi¬
nal in particular that is continuing to obstruct the crossed readings, and so I consider next a
test of precisely this hypothesis.
A related criterion, more applicable to NP's, is that if a word is vague in relation to some
semantic distinction, then it must be possible to erect an anaphor-antecedent relation
between the two readings. (Bolinger, 1973 makes a similar point; the test is also implicit
in Jesperson,1914 p99n and has been advocated by Frei (1961, reported in Coseiru &
Geckeler,1981; Nunberg 1979 also uses it). First, as one might expect, this is not possible
where idiomatization has occurred:
(80) *c John read a paper, while Derek drew on some.
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(81) *c Simon makes horseshoes with iron, while Nigel presses his clothes with
one.
In such cases, it's hard to escape the sense of punning (cf. Nunberg (op. cit.). In the more
general case in which idiomatization has not occurred, instances in which the form of the
anaphor marks the type of reading can be distinguished from those in which it does not.
There are two strategies which can be followed, because now there is a choice of either
using pronominals which do disambiguate/specify the appropriate reading, or of using
other pronominals which do not achieve this.
Let's consider first the latter strategy, not using the pro-form to clarify the reading. Prag¬
matic considerations will prevent a crossed reading if anaphora involving identity of refer¬
ence is employed. One way to avoid the identification of anaphor with antecedent is to use
possessives, which facilitate other readings; consider the following examples:40
(82) *c I won't want your cheese when I've got Samantha's.
(83) *c The tea in this pot will be cold when mine arrives.
Neither crossed reading seems to me to be alright here.
When it comes to pronominals which do mark the mass-count distinction, it is of course
again important to avoid an identity of reference reading, and such readings are prone to
arise through the postulation of an underlying partitive.41 This is demonstrated in the fol¬
lowing example:
(84) He bought a large cheese, and Margie sent some [of it] to Cairo.
A way to avoid the difficulty about possible underlying partitives is to construct the context
so that, if there is an underlying partitive, its kernel can't be identified with the antecedent
For example:
(My local Gourmet Club has a tasting of one type of food each month).
40
In fact, the examples involving deletion rely on this device too.
41
This option was obviously also impossible in the examples involving deletion, since
only one surface form was available.
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(85) Last month I took along a Stilton, but the Secretary said there was already
plenty.
Here for the first time, a mass reading of an anaphor founded upon a count antecedent does
no violence to my (admittedly somewhat numb) intuitions. The partitive reading is not
possible because the two quantities of cheese are explicitly disjoint. The only it that there
could be plenty of would be the mass term stilton. It cannot be an implicit plural because
of the presence of singular was. In contrast, the analogousconstruction for a count anaphor
is downright ungrammatical:
(86) * Last month I took along some stilton, but I was told there were already
plenty.
(87) * Last month I took along some tea, but the Secretary said there were al¬
ready plenty.
Another way to yield an explicitly count anaphor is to use a spatial superlative to modify
the anaphor. Thus:
(88) *c Each year there is a competition to find the tastiest cheese in the county,
and Jamie's biggest always tastes best.
(89) ?c There was a cheese competition and Dod entered the roundest one.
The result, then, is that although pronominal anaphora is slightly more favourable than
other tests of identity of sense, such criteria tend to indicate that the mass-count distinction
is an ambiguity. This conflicts with the other criteria discussed, and I will briefly consider
which should be given more weight.
Part of the difficulty here lies in the semantic relationship between mass and count read¬
ings, which is similar to privative oppositeness. As with privative opposites, what appear
to be contradictions on the surface turn out to be interpretible:
(90) That cheese is not a cheese.
This semantic difference was noted above, albeit in different terms. It means, however, that
it is always possible to interpret such sentences by assigning a mass interpretation
throughout, and so problems with interpretation will not be manifest. Zwicky and Sadock
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(1975) suggest that tests based on identity of sense must be void in relation to privative
opposites because, they argue, it will not be possible to disambiguate the readings and
determine whether a crossed interpretation works. The privative oppositeness creates severe
difficulties in making interpretability judgements and, more particularly, in supporting one's
judgement with disambiguated examples. I have endeavoured to contextualize the trickier
examples, and in the case of pronominal anaphora a formal way of specifying the second
reading was found. Nevertheless, the applicability of identity of sense criteria is in some
doubt.
Secondly, it should be pointed out that some of Nunberg's instances of polysemy fail some
of these tests too. Take the use-mention distinction, for example:
(91) ?c Lager looks like beer and so does beef.
cf.
(92) Lager looks like beer and beef looks like beer.
Thirdly, and crucially, it is not clear whether such criteria demand "identity of sense" at a
conceptual level or at the level of a lexical concept - they are only relevant if it is the latter.
It may be, for example, that this is the difference between deletion and anaphora: deletion
requires two propositions to intersect around an instantiated concept, while anaphora allows
them to share a lexical concept. One might speculate, then, that if crossed interpretation is
alright for anaphora but not for coordination reduction, these constructions differ semanti-
cally in the number of positions they make available for the conceptual realization of enti¬
ties denoted. This, however, goes beyond theories of the mental modelling of anaphora,
such as Johnson-Laird 1983. In particular, it indicates that an anaphor doesn't point back
to a conceptual representation (analagous to a token) of a previously introduced entity, but
to some intermediate representation from which a new token can be generated. Coordina¬
tion reduction, on the other hand, would oblige two propositions to share a single concept.
Zwicky and Sadock (op. cit). point out this difference between the classes of construction
and attest to its generality. They suggest that it may be due to the perceptual difficulty of
having to give two readings to one form. To paraphrase, according to the perceptual
hypothesis, the crossed reading is neckered. Either analysis is, of course, speculative, and
more extensive work involving experimentation would be required to take it any further.
Nevertheless, the conceptual hypothesis forces consideration of the different levels at which
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a word can be said to be vague, for I have assumed that vagueness in the lexical concept
does not entail vagueness at the conceptual level.
The difficulty is that theoretical understanding of these phenomena is not sufficiently
advanced to settle such questions at present. In particular, it would be useful to be able to
place a theoretically motivated bound on the basis of identity of anaphor and antecedent
Zwicky and Sadock observe that they must be equally sincere (ie. both sincere or both
insincere).42 It is furthermore obvious that phonological identity is insufficient and we can
speculate that referential identity represents an ideal, but it would be a great advantage to
have a theory underpinning such data.
One hypothesis would be that differences in meaning that impinge upon the "scope of pred¬
ication" (Langacker 1982b) of the antecedent, or which are "relevant" (in the sense of
Bybee 1985) to the denotation of the antecedent, will rule out identity of sense, at least in
relation to the parameter of meaning they affect. However, I'm not sure that there are any
questions such a formulation doesn't beg.
I have suggested that pronominalization is based on lexical concepts rather than instantiated
ones, and evidence for this comes from the nature of the relation between anaphor and
antecedent after instantiation of both in cases of lazy pronominalization. Classic examples
are like this:
(93) Every man who gets a paycheck beats his wife with it.
and involve a token-token indeterminacy: different paycheck tokens and different wives for
the different men. This doesn't take us too far in itself because, assuming for the moment
the prototype theory of concepts, a concept may be vague in relation to different tokens - it
represents a type. That is, this form of indeterminacy doesn't let us differentiate concepts
from lexical concepts. However, some of Nunberg's cases provide the evidence required,
because they imply a type-token distinction between anaphor and antecedent which, as we
saw in an earlier chapter, precludes prototypes at least. For example:
42
They base this on some observations of surprising perlocutionary identity. Sincerity
should be taken very broadly in this context.
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(94) That flower [token] didn't grow in your garden because it [type] requires
lots of sunshine.
Before leaving the identity of sense criteria, there is one more class of example that should
be examined. In this example context is used to clarify the sense of both antecedent and
anaphor, but now the pronoun itself does not mark the distinction.
(There was only one left. I asked the detective if he wanted it).
(95) He rolled me the cream, and it whitened my coffee.
In this case the cream strongly suggests a small catering pack, but the it that whitens can
only be the mass of cream. An instance involving deletion is:
(96) It was my mouse that Robert squashed and David scraped up.
Indeed, these are rather special examples, because they involve identity of reference in the
traditonal sense that the same real world object is referred to. The account of reference I
have adopted, however, has no difficulty with this, because it allows that the same entity
may be picked out differently by different phrases: the two referents are two distinct cogni¬
tive perspectives on a single entity.
Overall, then, a variety of criteria have been examined, and some have given clearer indica¬
tions than others. I have argued that criteria like productivity favour treating the distinction
as lexically vague. On the other hand, identity of sense criteria motivate a diagnosis of
ambiguity, particularly in cases involving ellision as opposed to anaphora. However, I
have suggested that the identity of sense criteria compare noun-phrases rather than nouns.
This implies that noun-phrases that are indeterminate with respect to the mass-count distinc¬
tion are to that extent ambiguous, whereas nouns should be regarded as vague. At the very
least, there is no strong evidence against the proposition that the mass-count distinction is
an emergent property of phrases.
Indeed, if we assume that noun-phrases correspond to concepts, and assume for the
moment that a concept, as opposed to a lexical concept, can be characterised as a proto¬
type, it follows that noun-phrases must be specified as either mass or count, at least impli¬
citly. If, for example, the concept is a prototype of a basic level concrete noun, it will
make the distinction because the prototypes of such nouns encode information about shape,
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and anything construed as having a characteristic shape is going to be countable.
In addition, I have argued that this polysemy among readings of nouns may hold only for a
subset of the possible referential functions relating them. That is, some mass-count transfor¬




So far I have argued that evidence derived from ambiguity tests implies that nounphrases
are ambiguous while nouns are vague with respect to the mass-count distinction. This
means that the raw noun is parameterized (in the sense of chapter 6) for mass-count-hood
and suggests that the closed class words, the determiners, specify the classification of a
given noun-phrase.
There is a consensus along similar lines in the philosophical literature. For example, Cart-
wright 1975 says that the distinction is not lexical but rather a property of:
"...the grammatical structure of the contexts in which [the words] occur."
Bunt 1985 states that "nouns per se cannot be classified as count or mass" (pi 1).
The evidence of lexicalisation and idiomatisation shows that sometimes the determiner acts
like a flag, indicating either one familiar concept or another. For example,
(97) some iron
picks out the metal while
(98) an iron
typically picks out the household appliance.
On the other hand, phenomena such as productivity and re-lexicalization demonstrate that
sometimes the determiner acts as a tool in the construction of a new meaning, or concept.
Having argued that being "mass" or "count" is an emergent property of phrases involving
nouns rather than of nouns themselves, there falls an obligation to provide an account of
the process of emergence.
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Carlson (1983) considers alternative ways of providing a semantics for a phrase structure
tree. One of these alternatives ("propagating nodes") will be a convenient analogy to
employ. The idea is in fact very simple: at certain nodes in the phrase structure tree of a
syntactic analysis features will gather together, and so if the rules of interpretation are
directed towards these "propagating nodes", these rules can take account of the properties
of several constituents when prescribing the correct interpretation of the phrase.
There are two reasons to focus on the closed class words that appear in noun-phrases. First,
there is a prima facie correlation between sets of these words and readings. Often in the
literature (as I mentioned at the outset) the correlation is described as a syntactic index of
the mass (or count) status of a noun: a noun will occur with one set of items if it is mass;
the other if it is count. I propose instead to take the view that the meaning of the closed
class words determines the reading. (A comprehensive table of acceptable combinations is
provided on pp127-128 of (Close 1975)). For present purposes I will adopt the idealization
that an NP corresponds to a use of a noun and denotes a concept, while the noun itself
corresponds to just a lexical concept.
The second reason for focussing on these closed class words is syntactic. Their depen¬
dency relation with the head noun is, according to Allerton (1982) the same as the semi-
subordinative relation between a verb and its direct object, the potence of whose modulat¬
ing effect was demonstrated above. Allerton cites the following criteria in support of this
analysis: determiner and noun agree in number; only a few nouns can appear without a
determiner. Thus the determiner is essential to phrasality and plays a "vital ancil iary role"
(Allerton 1982:13).
Before analysing the relevant aspects of the meaning of these words, a couple of general
remarks on the distinction between open and closed class words. This is not an exhaustive
list of differences. For specific criteria and discussion of related distinctions see eg.
Matthews 1981. The purpose of these remarks is merely to locate what follows in terms of
some broader issues.
First, the role of closed class words in comprehension is controversial. Bradley 1983 has
argued that they may be recognised by different mechanisms (adducing evidence concerning
differences in frequency effects) and speculates that they may have a crucial role in the percep¬
tion of the syntactic organization of language. This is supported by their linguistic behaviour
(often thev delimit
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constituents and sometimes they are effectively case-markers, for example) and by evidence
from aphasia and acquisition data (Bates et al 1983). However, Bard 1987 points out that
closed class words are not acoustically salient, as one might have predicted a perceptual
anchor would be. Furthermore, Gordon and Caramazza (1985) present evidence that some
of Bradley's results may have been due to the narrow frequency range of the closed class
words in Bradley's materials.
The second observation is that such words are semantically subdued relative to open class
words. Here I draw heavily on Bybee 1985 who argues that the formal realization of
semantic distinctions ranges along a spectrum from lexical expression to derivational and
inflectional morphology, to clitics and finally syntactic expression. She provides evidence
that, for example, the evolution from derivational to inflectional form involves both phono¬
logical and semantic lenition. While Bybee does not deal with closed class words
specifically, it makes sense to introduce closed class words at some point on this continuum
(roughly between derivational and lexical)43 One prediction that can be bome out is that
open class items are sometimes semantically subdued. Indeed, this is precisely what was
argued in chapter 2 in relation to semantic illusions and also the use of marked construc¬
tions to achieve foregrounding. Note that foregrounding Moses reduced the number of illu¬
sions by about half in Erickson and Mattson 198l's experiment, and that background items
(and given information generally) tend to be phonologically reduced. This is one of the key
phenomena I set out to account for.
There are two ways in which the subdued semantics of closed and open class words can be
interrelated. First, the former represents a conventionalization of instances of the latter. And
second, closed class words that enter into certain constructions with lexemes can be viewed
as instruments of the precization or enrichment of the meaning of the lexemes. Specifically,
I intend to adopt the position that the determiner (or quantifier etc.) actualizes the head
noun of a noun-phrase. Hewson 1972 provides an analysis of definiteness and
indefiniteness carried out within the framework of the writings of Guillaume. The character¬
ization of the general relationship between the meaning of nouns and the meaning of
43
I am grateful to Lorraine Tyler for pointing out the parallel with Bybee's work. In
fact, closed class words assume roles that range from relative fullness (he went to Lisbon) to
the inflectional (he read the message to Tony). Moreover, productivity and "relevance" are
said to be characteristic of inflections.
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articles that is presented there is an insight fundamental to the analysis here.
Hewson attributes to the definite and indefinite articles a kinetic value and "[this] move¬
ment which is the sole content of the articles operate[s] as a clarifier of the notion to which
it is attached" p75. For example, the notion of the indefinite article is oriented from the
general and universal towards the particular and singular. Hewson's claim is that:
the bare noun, calling into play as it does the great extensivity of notion belonging
to the potential significate, presents the limitless, formless, continuate entity; when
this vague representation must be limited, reduced, clarified, defined, refined, res¬
tricted, the article comes into play. (p94)
He argues, further, that demonstratives, possessives, quantifiers and the plural morpheme all
stand in a similar relationship to the noun. His position, moreover, is that the mass-count
distinction is rooted in precisely this relationship:44
In English, the noun without article does not represent a mere idea, a total abstrac¬
tion. It may represent, in fact, a concrete reality, but a reality without clarifying
exterior form, a mass-word or continuate. Add an article and the concept is given
form and becomes a thing-word or class-word; the threshold [between use and
non-use of an article] in English lies between the presentation of the notion as a
formless, non-numerical entity, and its presentation as a separate singular entity,
member of a class and necessarily having form .... a class word is merely the mass
word defined and given form by the use of the article. (p77)
The central theme that it is important to take from Hewson 1972 is the process of "notional
ideation" (p65) (the "operation de discernement") whereby a particular notion is discerned
among the many that present themselves. The determiners and the plural morpheme can be
viewed, then, as affecting notional ideation in a manner that can resolve cases of polysemy
such as those under discussion.45 (Weinreich 1966) discusses a similar approach, and what
he said will be examined in some detail since it is close to the account that will ultimately
44
In English - Hewson claims that languages differ in respect of the extensivity of
their nouns. For example, French needs articles even for mass words because of the
greater extensivity of the noun in modem French. By extensivity, Hewson appears to mean
abstractness; the more extensive a concept is, the less it is tied to a particular concrete reali¬
ty-
45
The approach to be taken here viewed as being in the spirit not only of notional
ideation, but also of Weinreich's (1966) transfer features, since it affects the semantic in¬
terpretation of the noun with which it is in construction.
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be adopted here.
First of all, Weinreich points out the flexibility of adult language: we cannot simply outlaw
certain article-noun combinations, because there are readings on which examples like a
water or some pillow are acceptable.
Secondly, he argues against the idea of creating new space in the lexicon for water#2 etc.
on the grounds of economy and points out that in general, one sense is more basic. Regard¬
ing economy, Nunberg (1979) argues that the size of the lexical list is not of general
theoretical importance. Regarding markedness, Weinreich's approach in deriving one sense
from the others differs from that of Nunberg who argues that the different senses of a
polysemous word have equal cue validity. Here I take a middle course that has already
been outlined: whether there are distinct lexical entries will depend on whether specific
senses have been lexicalized. For some words there will be two entries, for others just one.
However, the possibility for further creation of readings always remains. This can be
demonstrated in some relatively rare instances where more than one derived sense is
idiomatized. For example:
iron: golf club; domestic appliance; equestrian equipment
pot: liquor; earthenware; marijuana(?)
These examples show that this is true for the derivation of both mass and count readings.
Thirdly, Weinreich considers marking determiners for count status and marking the noun in
any nounphrase as being in concord for this feature, but argues that even though deter¬
miners such as the, this, any and my are neutral with respect to the mass-count distinction,
some nouns appear to be more readily interpreted as mass than count and vice versa when
in construction with members of this subset, for example:
the blood, mass;
the flood, count
On this point, we should bear in mind Crain & Steedman (1985)'s counsel to be wary of
judging what interpretation would be assigned to a potentially ambiguous piece of data in a
hypothetical neutral context. The presupposition carried by the definite article - that the
nounphrase can be matched with some previously mentioned entity - can only exac erbate
any such problem with these examples: it's less clear that we prefer this blood to be mass.
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This point is significant, and is discussed more fully later on.
Weinreich's eventual solution is to introduce the feature COUNT as a property of the NP
as well as marking it in the lexical entries for both determiners and nouns. The rewrite rule
for a nounphrase becomes:
NP [@COUNT] -> Det[@COUNT] + N[@COUNT]
This will lead to double-valuing of the feature COUNT on those lexical items that are






And in cases such as the above in which the values are contradictory the so-called Seman¬
tic Calculator will have to construe an interpretation. Weinreich gives no detailed explana¬
tion of how it would do this. Nevertheless, he is satisfied that as a first approximation,
"this accounts for both the interpretability and the oddity of 'a blood'"(p437).
The analysis which follows is an attempt to overcome difficulties with the mles proposed
by Weinreich. This will be a syntactico-semantic analysis. Firstly, some grammatical
features are introduced and evidence for postulating these features is marshalled.
46
This feeling of untidiness can be expressed in more precise terms. The extension of
N achieved by unification in this example is not a legitimate (partial) function from features
to values (Gazdar et al. 1985).
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8.1. Delimitation
First I isolate a feature that will play an important role: DELIMITATION. Let me
emphasise that this feature does not exhaust the meaning of the words it is associated with:
it deals only with only one aspect of a plurifunctional group of items (Karmiloff-Smith
1979) This feature is essentially associated with the category of determiner (and predeter¬
miner) but its value has consequences for the interpretation of phrases which dominate it.
Its role in the noun-phrase of which it is a constituent will be the principal concern for the
moment, however. The notion is whether or not the determiner places a boundary on the
quantity of the referent of the noun. Examples of determiners which do are: all and a.
The notion of boundedness is linked in the literature of traditional linguistics to the mass-
count distincton. For example, consider Close's (1975) observation that "concrete objects
having shape" (pl09) are prominent among those typically used as count nouns. And
again, Jesperson 1914:
"... we have a great many words which represent 'uncountables', that is, which do
not call up the idea of any definite thing, having a certain shape or precise limits
(pi 14)."
However, it would not be correct to say that DELIMITATION entails a count reading or
vice-versa. For example, the non-numerical quantifier all appears in some noun phrases
(such as all bread) which are given a mass interpretation. Conversely, the phrase some
girls must receive a count interpretation, even though some is [-DELIMITATION], This
analysis of some follows Jespersen (1949) who describes it as follows.47
"Some is the pronoun of unspecified quantity, denoting an unknown or unspecified
amount (before mass-words), number (before plurals), person or thing (before
singular countables)."(p608)
It is as if the plural is undelimited at a higher level:
"Plurals are semantically related to mass-words. Both of these in themselves
denote an indefinite quantity, the difference being that mass-words denote uncount¬
able, plurals countable quantities.... [The plural] denotes all members of the genus
47
This quote and the next one from Jespersen's grammar are in fact due to Neils
Hailslund, who prepared the final volume for publication (writing some of the chapters
himself) following Jespersen's death.
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rather than the genus as a whole."(p442) (Jespersen 1949)
Many linguists have commented on the semantic similarities between plural and mass
nouns. On this analysis, I can offer the following generalisation: some plurals share with
typical mass nouns the property of being undelimit ed in their main profile. In the case of
mass nouns, it is a lack of delimitation at the level of the individual. For plurals, the lack
of delimitation occurs at the level of the ensemble (Bunt 1985).
Zemach 1979 enumerates four ontological frameworks (ie. fundamental ways of categoriz¬
ing entities in the world). He argues that all are philosophically adequate and, indeed, that
they are not mutually exclusive. The ontologies have in common that they characterize the
domain of existence as the four dimensions of space and time. They differ regarding the
number of dimensions along which entities are bounded. For example, the ontology that
characterizes everything as bounded in space and time will describe material things as "lazy
processes", whereas the one that characterises them as bound in space but continuous in
time leads to common sense conclusions such as "the definition of a pin specifies that
whatever is a pin must have a certain characteristic spatial shape, but it says nothing about
the kind of career a pin should have...." (p67). The thrust of Zemach's paper is that each of
the four ontologies is useful for different kinds of entity. What should be noted for our
present purposes is the crucial role of boundedness - it lies at the very heart of Zemach's
system of ontological distinctions. If we accept this system as an account (perhaps only
partial) of the fundamental matrices of cognition within which human beings must concep¬
tualize their world, then we will possess an explanation of the feature DELIMITATION —
it occurs in the grammar because it is a cognitive primitive (primitive in the sense of Carey
(1982))
The role of ontological knowledge in lexical aquisition has become a hot issue in recent
years (see, for example, Keil 1984) and both Carey (Carey 1983) and Keil (Keil 1979, Keil
1983) indicate that they regard "boundedness" as a strong candidate for the status of onto¬
logical primitive. Keil has argued that children use such knowledge to infer further proper¬
ties about entities to which some predicate has been applied. The inferences are based on
the premise that an entity of which a given predicate has been used must belong to the
ontological category which that predicate spans, and are legitimated by the powerful ten¬
dency for ontological categories to form a strict hierarchy. Carey (1983), however, uses the
example of the cross-classifiability of entities along the dimensions of "boundedness" and
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"materiality" to demonstrate that the ontological categories are not confined to a strict
hierarchy. She argues instead that ontological constraints on the induction of word meaning
be explained in terms of the scientific theories held (by the child) at the time of induction:
predicates are appropriate to an entity if they enter the same theoretical domain. The
scientific theories would consist of core and peripheral concepts expressing the relevant
phenomena and causal laws (or mechanisms), the core concepts being, in Carey's view, the
best candidates for representation at the ontological level.
Research, then, on assessing the role of ontological knowledge in the development of word
meaning is still at an early stage. Nevertheless, it does not seem to contradict the
hypothesis that the feature DELIMITATION is, in fact, the grammatical reflex of an onto¬
logical primitive. If this hypothesis is indeed correct, then it will come as no surprise, as
suggested by the work of both Zemach (1979) and Carey (1983), to find that DELIMITA¬
TION is applicable to more than one type of entity.
There is a close relationship between delimitation and definiteness. It is worth noting that
in the singular, definite articles are quite neutral with respect to the mass-count distinction.
It appears that the reading should be "inherited" from the member of a shared discourse set
which is being referred to (cf Hawkins 1978). Jackendoff's (Jackendoff 1978) observation
that stuff can be referred to by the pronoun "it" in the same way as countable entities is
relevant in this connection.
Hawkins (1978) has analysed definiteness in terms of two aspects: location and inclusion.
Roughly, location requires of definite reference that it refer to an entity which is either
present in some shared discourse set (or, as Langacker (1982b) puts it, "in the shared
epistemic space of speaker and hearer" (p48)) or else explicitly linked with an entity in
some such set. In this connection, it should be observed that possessive pronouns are like
definite articles in as much as when the head noun is singular the noun phrase is indeter¬
minate with regard to the mass-count distinction. Following Hawkins (ibid.) we will adopt
the notion that the two serve similar functions as what might be termed relational matching
filters. In procedural terms, both presuppose that the head noun can be linked with some
48
For example, a shadow is immaterial but bounded, while gold is concrete but un¬
bounded; conversely, a table is both concrete and bounded while the sky is neither.
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entity in a shared discourse set and that in the case of the definite article the relation this
entity has with another (that must be explicitly contained in the relevant discourse set) may
be one of identity, while with the possessive it is nominally a relation of possession (in fact
the range of relations which possessive pronouns may cover is extremely wide). The hearer
is "instructed" to match the referent of the definite noun phrase with the related entity,
using the description in the rest of the noun phrase to filter out candidates. Frequently such
reference is used to add properties to the description of the entity picked out, and meeting
this end may come into tension with obeying the Gricean maxim of Quantity.
Inclusiveness refers to the requirement (especially relevant in the case of plural and mass
reference) that the entire set of objects satisfying a definite description are to be taken as
having been referred to. It is important to note that what is necessarily included is the
relevant entity or set of entities, rather than all those known about. That is, inclusiveness is
always relative to some shared discourse set.
What, then, is the relationship between DELIMITATION and Hawkins' "inclusion"? It
seems reasonable to suggest that it is because definite reference is inclusive in the sense
described above that it is [+DELIMITATION], That is, because the meaning of the
definite article requires the whole of the referent, the referent's linguistic representation
must be [+DELIMITATION].
8.2. Number in English
In this section, the grammatical category of number is analysed. This is done with specific
reference to English in which the principal distinction is between singular and plural. This
will be marked by the binary feature SINGULAR.
It is possible, however, to go one step further in the analysis of the plural morpheme, and
to identify two syntactico-semantic component features. The first is INDIVIDUATION:
when the noun is plural the noun phrase must be interpreted as countable. The second is
MULTIPLICITY - both are binary.
The association between plural and semantic individuation is observed by (Dekeyser et al.
1979) who describe collective nouns as "individuated" (pl25) when paired with a plural
verb. For example:
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(99) the family are deeply shocked
emphasises that each member is shocked, while:
(100) The family is deeply shocked.
focuses more on the collective shock of the family. That is, the singular verb portrays the
people in the family more strongly in terms of their role as family members.
Palmer 1976 notes the following interesting case of a language in which the "plural" mor¬
pheme is clearly a marker of individuation:
"In Tigre there are many mass nouns which have a singulative (individuating)
form made by a suffix, eg neheb "bees", but nehbat "a bee". But the singulative
form is the form used with all numerals - not merely 'one' [eg] hatte nehbat "one
bee", satas nehbat "three bees" etc. What seems to be important is not plurality,
but individuation."(pl25)
That is, in Tigre, the morpheme is neutral with respect to MULTIPLICITY — it is a sort
of Trubetzkoyan archi-plural.
While noting the individuating function of the plural, Jespersen (1914) also points out a
few exceptions such as brains. In the case of brains and similar examples what we seem
to have is neutralization of the INDIVIDUATION. One might speculate that the availability
and neutralizability of these components of plurality are universals of some kind.
8.3. Relating the primitives to the mass-count distinction
In the next chapter I associate combinations of these properties with particular determiners.
I wish, however, to first show how these features relate to the mass-count distinction drawn
in traditional grammar.
First of all, the mass-count distinction as drawn up by semanticists is not directly derived
from these features. There is therefore no need for rules relating combinations of the
features to mass readings on the one hand or count readings on the other. Rather, the
categories "mass" and "count" in linguistic semantics are abstractions which summarise
metalinguistic reflection on the meaning of noun-phrases; noun-phrases whose meaning has
been actualised in some context. In other words, mass readings and count readings are
- 119 -
lexicographic entities. Underlying these readings is the determiner system and, in particular,
the properties of delimitation and individuation. These properties are to be seen as a mask
on the meaning of the bare noun, constraining the interpretation which can be evolved.
The "mass" or "count" reading which the lexicographer is aware of involves further ela¬
boration and interaction with background knowledge.
At the same time, I would argue that there is no possibility of actualisation without some
specification of these features. In the next chapter, I will argue that the type of an entity is
provided by these features. I contend that there is no semantic realisation without typing.
In particular, the bare noun has no meaning in isolation; it must be construed in the context
of some phrasal unit (ie. a noun-phrase). This means that it is futile to attempt to isolate
the essential meaning of a noun by studying its denotation when it appears as a bare noun.
To be interpreted, it has to be built into a phrase, using a null determiner if necessary.
There is no privileged access to the pure noun meaning.
Philosophers, reflective people, have worked hard on the denotations of bare nouns and
their relation to the mass-count distinction. They have drawn a broad distinction between
nominal and predicative usage. Roughly, nominal uses are generic, while predicative uses
are particular. Quine (Quine 1960), for example, assumes that these uses are associated
with different syntactic positions, but in fact they are conditioned by a number of syntactic
and semantic features of the context (see Jackendoff 1983, for example). Bunt 1985 argues
that this distinction can be applied to count nouns as well and that, therefore, it is orthogo¬
nal to the mass-count distinction. For this reason, I take it no further, and follow Bunt in
confining my discussion to predicative uses.
Consider INDIVIDUATION. An entity which is individuated must have structural parts,
even if the structure relating those parts is only "inside as opposed to outside". This follows
because individuation distinguishes entities; to distinguish entities we must be able to iden¬
tify a place where a different entity begins. This place is necessarily distinguished structur¬
ally from other parts of the entity. Individuation does not entail that the entity is a structural
part-of some larger entity.
[+ DELIMITATION] does not entail that the entity has structural parts. This is because
delimitation may bound the totality of some substance: in the case of a single sprawling
object it is not necessarily the case that we can point to some part of the entity and identify
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that part as its boundary. Note that when DELIMITATION is applied to a plural it applies
to the set of entities.
[- DELIMITATION] presents an entity as not having structurally differentiated parts. In
other words, it portrays an entity as being homogenous. There is an important philosophical
issue of how to handle homogeneity. The difficulty concerns the minimal parts hypothesis.
This hypothesis claims that only parts of a certain size of a homogenous substance can
themselves be described properly as instances of that substance. Mereological accounts find
this a serious problem. There seems to be no way of sifting out the two types of part -
those which the predicate is true of, and those of which it is not true. For elements, for
example, sub-atomic parts are sub-minimal; for compounds, the molecular level sets the
limit. For colloids and mixtures, it is difficult to be precise about what constitutes a
minimal part: is the shard of carrot that is the sole relic of a bowl of broth accurately por¬
trayed as broth? Only metonymically, I suspect.
Bunt (op. cit.) points out that to simply invoke a subset relation which includes only parts
bigger than the minimal parts is not adequate. A general relation of this type could not be
specified, because the scale of the minimal part varies from substance to substance. The
introduction of specific subset relations (one for each substance) will fail because no rela¬
tion can evade including the minimal parts and, hence, sub-minimal parts will exist in every
subset derived by the relation.
One problem is the realist perspective which has been assumed in the literature. From the
cognitive standpoint, for example, there isn't a lot of difference between an element and a
compound. Every day talk of cheese is not concerned with its microstructure. A possibilty
would be to talk instead of homogeneity limited by the acuity of the naked eye, and divisi¬
bility restricted to division that can be performed manually. There would be three problems
with this approach. First, there are manual operations that fail to preserve mereological
transitivity. For example, the preparation of ultramarine for use as paint involves grinding it
to a fine powder. However, if it is ground too finely its blue colour is lost. Second, some
types of homogeneity are not objectively available for inspection by the naked eye. For
example, the theoretical homogeneity of substances produced by the Universal Grinder can
only be imagined. Third, some types of homogeneity are functional or social rather than
perceptual. That is, the homogeneity is defined in relation to some form of interaction.
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I adopt a subset relation that doesn't gate out non-minimal parts, but instead excludes parts
which do not satisfy the properties satisfied by the whole. Specifically, c retains the3.
affordances (Gibson 1979) of the superset. This will retain the key entailments. Transitivity
is assured because this is a general relation applicable to any substance. Parsons 1970 uses
a similar approach, but the use of affordances differentiates this approach from Parsons',
and solves a difficulty concerning the relationship between the words WOOD and FURNI¬
TURE in a universe in which they are co-extensional. Wood and furniture may coincide,
but only furniture affords comfort, say. That is, wood and furniture will always be
differentiated by their respective affordances.
A difficulty with Parsons' approach is its apparent circularity. Quantities may exclude sub¬
minimal parts, but they are informally defined: Parsons simply stipulates this property. It is
a desirable property, for sure, but the key issue is how we attain it, and stipulation finesses
this question.









The final part builds on the theoretical approach already outlined. Chapter 9 provides a
detailed model in Space Grammar of the approach advanced in chapter 8. This is imple¬
mented in Unification Categorial Grammar. The theory is then extended to other linguistic
phenomena before the chapter concludes with an integration of the results of Part 3 with
those of Part 2. Chapter 10 proposes some psychological experiments and describes how




Modelling and clarification of the analysis.
This chapter is concerned first to model the analysis just presented of the mass-count dis¬
tinction, and then to integrate this with the general account of lexical concepts sketched in
chapter 2. I will characterize the general framework within which I intend to model, and
then present the model along with some examples of its application. The model is then gen¬
eralised to a broader range of data. The second part of the chapter draws the account back
into the sphere of chapter 2 before presenting an integrated account of lexical combination.
I conclude with some remarks on lexicalization.
9.1. Space Grammar
Ronald Langacker has over the last ten years or so been developing a representational sys¬
tem he calls Space Grammar, which is one of the "cognitive grammars" now emerging
which seem to spring almost directly from the work of Uriel Weinreich (whose work also
provided some of the impetus for generative semantics). Space Grammar is congenial
because it explicitly contracts the domain of idealization - more factors are included in the
domain of the model than are included, for example, in Chomsky's conception of com¬
petence (Chomsky 1965). I believe Chomsky's general approach to competence is correct.
However, for certain enterprises additional variables have to be taken into account.
Let me focus on three factors Langacker incorporates. First, the grammar is (in principle)
embedded in knowledge of the world. Langacker explicitly describes a view of words, for
example, as embeddings in theories of the world (although he uses the term "domain").
Secondly (as I mentioned briefly in chapter 2), provision is made for differences in the rela¬
tive prominence of information. And thirdly, Langacker allows for a continuum between
syntax and lexicon which amounts to a distinction between forms "generated" or "sanc¬
tioned" by schemata (Langacker 1982b:26) on the one hand, and forms having "unit status"
on the other. This will be a useful approach when it comes to considering lexicalization.
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Space Grammar is a formalism in which language may be described, but it also expresses a
philosophy about language. For Langacker, a grammar of a language will contain "content
units" (roughly "lexical items") and "schemata" ("rules"). There are semantic, syntactic and
phonological units, but a syntactic unit is simply a bipolar unit, one pole being phonologi¬
cal, the other semantic. Thus, syntagmatic combination of units is at once syntactic, seman¬
tic and phonological. The way in which units are combined is controlled by two parameters
of the schema which permits the combination. The schema indicates which of the combin¬
ing units is autonomous (units which are not autonomous are dependent) and which is







Briefly, the autonomous item elaborates a gap in the structure of the dependent item (its
"e-site") ie. provides the missing element. In the tree, the horizontal arrrows indicate syn¬
tagmatic combination, and lead "from the dependent component to the autonomous one
(p37)". Typically, the resultant composite structure will have the grammatical "profile" of
the dependent item, and so the dependent item is characterized as "profile determinant"
(underlined in the constituency trees). Note however, that the autonomous item can be
profile determinant, as in the case of the final combination in the example given.
Combination of this sort is underpinned by the possibility of combining items without
necessarily having a schema. The structures of the items are compared, and where they
match they are joined. Precisely what constitutes a match is not, in fact, defined beyond the
following statement:
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"Correspondences are established between substructures of the components; and
corresponding substructures (marked by lines of integration) are equated as refer¬
ring to the same conceived entity. This overlap is what permits the components to
unite in a coherent, integrated, composite structure."
The schemata only emerge as abstractions over series' of similar combinations.
Langacker makes a particular point of assigning some composite structures unit status in
the interests of psychological reality. Units are delimited with square brackets, composite
structures with parentheses. Thus, for example, [PIN-PL] is said not to require "construc¬
tive effort" (p24) and exists in the grammar as a unit at the same time as the schema
[[COUNT N]-[PL]], "the elaborative relation between [them] ...[serving] only to categorise
the [former] and to group it with other instantiations as manifestations of the same general
pattern."(p36). This stance involves explicit rejection of economy of description as a goal in
itself and provides a "continuum of lexicon, morphology and syntax."(p37). This is also
connected to the important concept of "analysability" "the salience of the relation between a
composite structure and its components."(p28). That is, the components of units will differ
according to the degree to which they are traceable.
For Langacker, analysability provides the hinge ("pivot" p28) for his claim that "the mean¬
ing of a symbolic expression is not the semantic structure alone, but is rather the composite
structure in relation to all the components out of which it is built." (p28). For example, the
kinship semantics of "father" can be represented as [male-parent], but in the phrase "male
parent" the same components are "active semantic components" and so the appropriate
representation is [[male]-[parent]].(p29).
Langacker also makes cmcial use of the notion of conceptual imagery (semantic structure
"is simply conceptualization as conventionalized for linguistic purposes"(p38)). Taking a
Whorfian line (different languages use different conventional imagery) he argues that five
conceptual abilities with imagery are relevant (he mentions six, but repeats himself once -
the third and the sixth are equivalent). To select two, first he points out that an image can
be conceptualized at different levels of abstraction (analogous to different degrees of
microscopic examination). Second, he notes that the relation between figure and ground can
be reversed. The latter point is the essence of his analysis of the passive: what was figure
becomes ground and vice-versa. Both of these conceptual abilities are relevant here.
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The semantic pole of a symbolic unit is known as a predicate and designates an entity
which may be either a thing or a relation. This entity is represented as a bounded region
(figure) in some domain (ground), and the semantic value of the predicate lies in the rela¬
tion between the two. For example, [UNCLE] is defined as follows:
In the case of relations, one of the entities is designated as trajector (tr), the other(s) as
landmark (lm), this designation being "another layer of figure/ground organization within
the relational profile"(p44). The subject of a sentence is a prototypical trajector. In an





In figure 3 the profile determinant is indicated by shading its outline more darkly. Note also
that [THE] locates an object in the shared "epistemic space" of speaker and hearer.
Langacker's concept of different types of space will be important.
Langacker (Langacker 1983) sets out to give a notional definition of the ostensibly syntactic
category "noun". He presents a development of his own view that nouns denote a "bounded
region in some domain". For example, a beep is bounded in both "pitch" and "time"; a
flash, however, is bounded in time but not in the visual field - bounding need not occur in
every domain with which a given noun interacts. "Scope of predication" is an important
concept which Langacker describes as follows (pi99):
"The scope of a predication (which is equivalent to its base) is the extension of its
coverage within relevant domains.... I will speak of bounding only when an entity
is fully included in the scope of predication (with respect to a particular domain),
so that its outer limits are a specific matter of predication."
He emphasises that he refers to the way a person conceptualizes a thing, rather than the
objective condition of the object itself. Considerable space is devoted to describe a concept
of distance (a crude similarity metric cf. Osherson 1987) applicable to more than just physi¬
cal space. This is intended to underly the optimization of nouns like team, for example.
Thus, the members of a team are said to be construed as parts of a single object because of
their abstract (specifically, co-operative) homogeneity. There are doubts about some of this
(whether the similarity metric he specifies holds up empirically, or whether any of the
specimen definitions given are satisfactory, for example), but it is what Langacker says
about the relationship of bounding to domains that is important.
On mass nouns, Langacker expresses a view similar to the one I am taking here.
"Mass nouns are problematic for this characterization primarily because the bound¬
ing they imply is more subtle and less central to their meaning than with count
nouns. I will suggest, in fact, that what distinguishes mass nouns from others is
that any necessary bounding in primary domains lies outside their scope of predi¬
cation.
[ ... ] The source of this indefinite expansibility/ contractibility is the effective
homogeneity of a mass ...[which] is construed as being effectively homogeneous
for expressive purposes...."(pp209-210)
This is similar to the view expressed in the last chapter. He also suggests, as others have,
that quantifiers can provide bounding and that bounding can be in what he terms "quality
space" (p211) as well as physical space.
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Important differences from the account I have sketched above are that Langacker states that
quantifiers like some are involved in bounding, and appears to equate bounding with repli-
cability (that is, what I have called individuation). We will see shortly how useful it is to
distinguish these, but he does state his intention to look at these problems more closely in
the future - this is but an interim account. It is also the case that Langacker associates
bounding with the noun itself, whereas the minimal unit with which bounding can be asso¬
ciated on my account is the noun-phrase.
9.2. Unification Categorial Grammar
I will shortly put this theoretical apparatus to use, but first I wish to argue that a useful
subset of Space Grammar can be expressed in terms of Unification Categorial Grammar
(Zeevat, Klein and Calder 1987). Specifically, it will be convenient to employ the notation
of UCG in what follows. I must emphasise that the fragment created here is not a fragment
of UCG, but rather a fragment of Space Grammar. Nevertheless, I will draw out what I
see as the correspondence between the two wherever I can. To begin with, aspects of the
UCG notation can serve as a metaphor for features of Space Grammar.
First, the process of "instantiation" (ie. unification) gives us just the test for a match that is
required. Second, "stripping" (which yields the result of combination in UCG) corresponds
closely to the presentation of a new profile which inheres in the relationship of profile
determinance. Typically, the functor will be the profile determinant and dependent item.
There is even a convergence of terminology: that which Langacker calls the " elaboration site''
corresponds to the thing which Zeevat et al term the "active symbol".
UCG provides several advantages: the syntax and rules of combination are more explicit;
ordering can be represented; and a parser is readily available. For a brief introduction to
UCG, see Zeevat et al (op. cit.), whose rules of combination are used here. I provide this
translation as a useful result in itself.
I begin by presenting some categories for nouns and the determiners described above. The













NP/ noun: N: noun': post
[+DELIMITATION . . ]noun'
epistemic
some





















NP/ noun: N: noun': post
[+DELIMITATION]noun'
O
Note that the entries do not distinguish many from few, or each from every. This
highlights the fact that these are only partial definitions; only the information relevant to the
mass-count distinction is noted. The last category given means that the phonological form
all is syntactically a function taking a following noun as an argument and yielding a noun-
phrase with the meaning [+ DELIMITATION]noun'. In addition to the categories given
above, a category is required for so-called "bare nouns" which occur in sentences like:
(101) Johnny ate bacon for breakfast.
This category will be called the "null determiner", and is broadly equivalent to some.
6
NP/ noun: N: noun': post
[-DELIMITATIONJnoun'
O
Jespersen and Close independently note that a 'zero' article before a noun indicates either a
generic use or reference to "an indefinite, unidentified amount" (Close, 1975 pl31) - what
Christophersen (reported in Jespersen, 1949) calls the "parti-generic" sense.

























This captures in mechanical fashion the description of the previous chapter. An important
point is the use I have made of the position in semantic structure reserved for the "index"
in UCG; I have put my features here. This is not too surprising, since one of the distinc¬
tions marked by indices in UCG is the mass-count distinction. The additional claim that I
would stress is that the "sort" of a construction = its main profile.
9.3. Classifiers and the partitive
In order to establish the utility of the characterization presented above still further, and to
integrate it more closely with Langacker's work, I consider here two constmctions: the par¬
titive ("Q of NP", where Q is some quantifier) and classifier constructions (which I confine
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to "a Y of NPhead_x"). Examples would be (respectively):
(102) Some of the cake.
(103) A slice of the cake.
I begin with the classifiers, since they turn out to be a little more straightforward. The first
observation to make is that there is a continuum of nouns which can instantiate Y in
classifiers. At one end are "measures" like pound which can only occur freely as the object
of a cognate (stative) verb, and which cannot be promoted by passivization.50 Measures
can't enter into compounding. Thus:
(104) He weighed a pound at birth.51
(105) *A pound was weighed by him at birth.
(106) She bought a pound of sugar.
(107) *She bought a sugar pound.
At the other pole, Y is construed as being constituted of the substance denoted by the ker-
52
nel noun-phrase. Here compounding is possible :
(108) She ate a stick of carrot/ cube of sugar.
(109) She ate a carrot stick/ sugar cube.
Occupying the middle ground are nouns which can be construed as containers:
(110) She drank a cup of tea.
49
These terms are arbitrary.
50
I omit consideration of cases where Y is lack or absence because these seem to
behave differently.
51
It isn't possible to construe this as an event occurring at the birth of the pound
without figuratively promoting it on the scale described here.
52
On compounding, many other interpretations of such compound nominals are in
principle feasible, of course (cf. Coulmas 1983).
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(111) ??She drank a tea cup.53
(112) She ate a slice of apple.
(113) ??She ate an apple slice.
Next, it is necessary to be able to construe the kernel as undelimited (ie. it has to be given
either a plural or a mass reading).
(114) He bought a pound of sugar/ chestnuts / cu* a chestnut.
(115) He bought a cup of cheese / grapes/ cu* an apple.
(116) He bought a stick of sugar/ ants/ cu* an ant.
The cases of an indefinite kernel in these examples are excluded on a reading as a count
noun (that's what the symbol *cu means) but the first could be given a mass reading (eg.
it's a particularly big chestnut). I return to indefinite kernels shortly.
Thirdly, quantifiers are ungainly in the kernel, seeming redundant and repetitious:
(117) ?He bought a pound/ cup/ stick/ of some sugar/ ants/ apple.
The sense of awkwardness is particularly strong if all is the quantifier in the kernel, and
numerals are downright bad, unless individuation is construed as being in quality space:
(118) *A pound of three cheeses.
(119) *A cup of three cheeses.
53
These judgements indicate that the reading in which the compound is paraphrased
by the classifier is not available. In both these cases a distinct reading is possible. Note
also that many nouns can be construed at more than one point on the continuum. For ex¬
ample: cup of china versus china cup. Even measures can be promoted (by compounding
with a cognate noun eg. pound weight, pint pot). Conversely, it is also fairly common for
containers to have specialist readings as measures, notably in the fields of cooking and agri¬
culture.
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(120) ?A stick of three ants.
The exception is the case in which the classifier is viewed as constituted of the kernel.
When quantifiers do appear in the kernel (superficially in the kernel, that is), they in fact
have semantic scope over the entire construction:
(121) He put a pound of cheese in the bag.
—> the bag weighed lib
(122) He put a stick of three ants on the counter.
—> there was one stick
Compare the following:
(123) He put a pound of each cheese in the bag.
—> the bag weighed nibs
(124) He put a cup of each cheese on the counter.
—> there were n cups
In general, quantifiers cannot appear in the kernel of a classifier. Whenever they appear to
be acceptably ensconsed therein either they in fact have wide scope or they suffer percep¬
tual neglect (although I have no evidence for the second of these claims). A pragmatic filter
(unspecified) will, then, gate out any cases of quantifiers in the kernel.
Indefinite kernels follow a complex pattern. In the case of measure classifers they can be
fine, being converted to a mass reading. In all cases, if the kernel is read as being a type
or sort then the construction is legitimate. That is, when quality space is the domain of
individuation, there is no obstacle to requisitioning a part of the whole to serve as the con¬
tents of a container or the material constituting some object. However, when physical space
is the relevant domain, a constraint is placed on these two types of classifier that can be
hard to satisfy: the Y must be construed as a structural part of the kernel, in the sense that
a leg is a structural part of a table, while a crumb is not a structural part of a cake. Here
are some relevant examples:
(125) A pound of a cheese.
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(126) A cup of a cheese.
(127) A stick of a cheese.
Despite this requirement, however, definite kernels are fine (so long as they conform to the
other constraints). That is, their delimitation in epistemic space doesn't preclude a lack of
delimitation in the space relevant here, which one imagines to be three-dimensional space.
Overall, the greater acceptability of kernels delimited in quality space and epistemic space
suggests that the domain of classifier quantification and the requirement for a lack of delim¬
itation is physical space, and that classifiers profile an entity in this domain. Parallel con¬
structions like "a type of' and "a sort/kind of presumably profile in quality space, and a
corresponding shift in judgements can be predicted.
The closed class word of appears to play an important role. For example, it seems to be
obligatory:
(128) *A cup cheese.
I believe of plays a necessary semantic role in coercing the undelimit ed profile on the ker¬
nel (cf. Langacker 1982b. When it combines with the kernel NP, of is dependent and
profile determinant. For purposes of number agreement, for example, the classifier is the
head of the construction as a whole. However, the view that this noun-phrase determines
the profile of the whole is only partially correct; the dependent o/-NP profiles an important
layer of figure-ground structure. Nevertheless, one could argue that this figure-ground rela¬
tion is implicit in the indices of the nouns (this will become clearer shortly), and allow the
classifier to be an autonomous profile-determinant (which is exactly what Langacker 1982b
claims the quantifier in a partitive is). In order to draw out this important relation, how¬
ever, I adopt the following category for of:
of
NP/Wj! [Ijjnpj': pre/W2: [I2]np2': post
F-G([I ]np ', [-DELIMITATION]np')
O
Where F-G is a relation between two entities such that the first is figure and the second
ground. That is, of is profile determinant. An example will be instructive.
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For some evidence in support of the assumptions about constituency that I have made, con¬
sider, for example:
(129) Of David's chocolates, John ate a whole box
The construction ofNP can appear on its own in no more than a handful of archaic or lexi-
calized cases, such as:
(130) We ate of meat and bread.
or
(131) Nicola speaks of you often.
It is therefore appropriate to treat it as dependent.
The partitive has much in common with classifiers, and one has the intuition that there may
be grounds to view quantifiers as degenerate nouns, one step less substantive than meas¬
ures. Some evidence to support this emerges shortly, but it will also be important to bear
the difference between the two in mind in evaluating the data that follows.
First, the quantifier in a partitive appears to be of the same category as the classifier in
classifiers (cf. (129)):
(132) Of David's chocolates, John ate a whole box and Mary guzzled many.
Neither is in the semi-subordinative relation to the kernel that obtains between a determiner
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and noun. Rather, both appear to be the head of their construction as gauged by number
agreement, and in some sense determine the profile of the whole (I have already noted that
Langacker analyses the quantifier as profile determinant in partitives). Classifiers are clearly
endocentric, but the situation is not so clear with partitives. On the one hand, there is the
evidence of examples like:
(133) David brought sufficient cheese that everyone could have some.
(134) Some came to the match, but most preferred to watch it on TV.
This example suggests that the word can be used as a pronoun or non-anaphoric substan¬
tive. On the other hand, some of these uses have an elliptical feel (as noted in the previous
chapter) and there is no doubt that these substantives are semantically "defective" in the
same sense that /h/ can be considered phonologically defective (Lass 1976). Lass's term
"gesture" is highly appropriate; this isn't quite the full-blooded deixis of anaphora, but there
remains a strong sense of the presence of another player in the wings. Semantically an
argument is obligatory, but syntactically it is not (it can be understood from situational con¬
text, for example).
This breakdown of the parallel between syntax and semantics creates a dilemma. Before
advancing a possible solution, I consider some similarities between partitives and classifier
constructions.
One similarity is that both demand that the kernel noun-phrase be either plural or constru-
able as mass. A few quantifers have the stronger requirement that the kernel must be plural.
For example:
(135) He bought many of *the sugar / the slaves
At first it looks as though this is a case of straightforward agreement between quantifier
and kernel: their indices must match. Indeed, Zeevat et al {op. cit.) propose that indices can
be used in just this fashion to aid anaphora resolution. Examples like the following refute
this hypothesis, however:
(136) He bought each of the slaves / *the boy.
Singular each demands a plural kernel. (That each is singular can be demonstrated by exa¬
mining number agreement on verbs). The same constraint applies in anaphora:
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(137) When the boys / *boy arrive(s), each has / *have a bath.
That is, the antecedent must be plural, and cases where indices match are ungrammatical.
The parallel with anaphora is evidence that the pronoun and the quantifier are of the same
category.
A further similarity between the constructions is that quantifiers are again ungainly in the
kernel. Additionally, quantifiers that cuckoo into the kernel have wide scope in partitives
too:
(138) The process wastes much of every tree.
—> the number of portions of waste = the number of trees
I will assume that the same pragmatic filter screens both classifiers and partitives.
One difference is that the structural part interpretation of classifiers with indefinite kernels
is not available for partitives (although possibly my lack of ingenuity is the only obstacle).
Moreover, straightforward mereological part interpretations are feasible:
(139) Tracy ate some of a cheese.
In this respect, the quantifiers pattern in the same way as measures.54 This is strong support
for the hypothesis expressed above that the quantifiers represent a point on a continuum, a
continuum on which measures occupy an intermediate position. Furthermore, quantifiers
like measures resist compounding:
(140) *He bought a carrot-some.
54
There is a divergence, however, in relation to passivization, which I cannot readily
explain:
(141) He weighed some.
(142) Some were weighed by him.
(143) It weighed a pound.
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One thing that must be noted is the ungrammaticality of:
(145) *Noddy ate every of the apples.
This can be accounted for in terms of "blocking" (Aronoff 1976, Romaines 1983), cf.:
(146) Noddy ate every one of the apples.
which has the intended reading of (145) That is, the underlying concept cannot be realised
as every because the form every one has been lexicalized with that meaning. This alterna¬
tion of form is good evidence that the partitive employs a substantivized determiner: in the
case of every, the substantive element is realised formally and separately.










The symbol 'c' means that the argument is syntactically covert and may, for example, be
understood from the situational context. Similarly, 'T' indicates that the physical location
of a token representing the covert argument cannot be predicted. I should add that these
symbols have not been implemented computationally and go beyond the rules of combina¬
tion provided in Zeevat et al (op. cit.). Space Grammar, too, would need to be augmented
to handle this type of phenomenon.
Syntactically, the quantifier functions in the same way as an NP, and so combination with
of is feasible. The differences between quantifiers will be marked primarily by differences
in the profile 'I ', and the agreement conditions observed above will be noted on the profile
of the covert category T2'. Thus, for example, the instantiation of this schema for each will
(144) *A pound was weighed by it.




NPc W2: NP: [+INDIVIDUATION]noun2': T
[+SINGULAR, +DELIMITATION]noun '
O
And each of the boys will instantiate as:
of the boys




Clearly, I am simply assuming a mechanism that will associate *noun2" with 'boy".
I mm now to one or two particular phenomena that occur in special cases. Naturally, I will
try to account for these anomalies. First consider examples involving a bare noun in the
kernel: the so-called "pseudo-partitives" (see eg. Lehrer 1986. By and large, quantifier
pseudo-partitives are ungrammatical:
(147) *He ate some of sugar.
(148) *He shoved many of boys.
Or to put it another way, pseudo-partitives are only alright with classifiers. One wants to
be able to handle this while retaining the assumption that both quantifier and classifier are
syntactically noun-phrases. One reason - beyond elegance - for not seeking a syntactic
bifurcation is that certain classifiers (specifically, those Allen 1977 terms fractional
classifiers) share this property with quantifiers:
(149) *Three quarters of whale have been sold.
(150) ?A tenth of air is left.55
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The difficulty seems to be that the bare noun forces a "constituted of reading, such that the
classifier is constitued of the kernel. Because, in the case of quantifiers, no entity is denoted
whose constitution any substance might compose, there is an obstacle to comprehension.
The covert argument of the quantifier is too insubstantial to serve, and fractional classifiers
are equally ethereal. This explanation would also account for the unacceptability of prepos-
ing the prepositional kernel of a pseudo-partitive (this is in contrast with partitives, see
(159)).
(158) *Of men we invited a group.
(159) Of the men we invited a group.
(158) is bad, then, because of the pragmatic peculiarity of placing focus on the material of
which an object is composed. This is a difficulty for other constructions, too:
55
Compare the acceptability of:
(151) One tenth of all air is left.
There are some exceptions among quantifiers. For example:
(152) Lots of boys came to the party.
However, (153) suggests that the sequence lots of is lexicalized as a quantifier:
(153) *Lots boys came to the party.
More challenging are the following observations:
(154) Plenty of boys arrived.
(155) Plenty boys arrived.
This may be associated with the delimitation plenty predicates in what, for want of a better
term, I'll call "goal space", since:
(156) Enough of boys take up computing, but not enough girls do.
(157) Sufficient girls but insufficient of mothers understand the offer.
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(160) ?Of girls I saw a picture.
That is, it is not specific to the pseudo-partitive.56 Furthermore, the obvious prediction that
acceptability will be restored when context is more supportive is borne out by the follow¬
ing:
(161) Of sticks we made a chair.
The final piece of evidence is that where a filler for the covert argument slot can be under¬
stood from context, even the straightforward pseudo-partitive can be rehabilitated:
(Of what did you make those decorations you sold?)
(162) Some of wood, and many of glass.
Similarly, certain fractional classifiers have a conventional reading associating them with a
specific container (or possibly measure), and these readings are fine with pseudo-partitives:
(163) I'd like a half of lager.
(164) I'd like a quarter of toffees.
Among other things this set of data shows that, in a very tangible sense, being constituted
of some substance is not the same thing as having the denotation of that substance; such a
denotation is insufficient. One issue I haven't addressed is why the 8N noun-phrase forces
this reading, and for the moment I will only suggest that it is probably due to some con¬
straint that 6 places on the interpretation of N.
Before going on to the other important anomaly, I wish to briefly consider the possibility of
using the sort of figure-ground reversal with which Langacker 1982b characterizes the rela¬
tion between active and passive sentences to capture the rough paraphrase of classifiers and
certain prepositional phrases. For example, the difference between these:
(165) a cup of tea
56
The last three examples and associated judgements have been taken from Lehrer
1986. For clarity, I should add that some quantifier pseudo-partitives fail because of
number agreement, and cannot be resuccitated by context.
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(166) some tea in a cup
is prima facie that in (165) tea is in the background and cup is in the foreground, while in
(166) tea is in foreground, with cup in the background. Three considerations mitigate
against this attractive hypothesis. First, classic tests of "bar level" differentiate classifiers
from prepositional phrases (see Radford 1981):
(167) A cup of tea with a handle.
but
(168) *A cup with a handle of tea.
(169) *A cup of tea and with a handle.
(170) *A cup of sugar and in a bag.
By analogy with Radford's conclusions about students of physics, such data imply that the
classifier denotes a single "property", while the prepositional phrase denotes two. Langacker
1982b argues that prepositional phrases denote a relation between a trajector (ie. a figure)
57
and a landmark. This is similar to Miller and Johnson-Laird's (1976) conclusion that a
relation between an entity and a relatum is denoted, and fits with the assertion that the rela-
tum is also profiled in a prepositional phrase, being indeed the second property referred to
by Radford.
Further evidence for this comes from the differing strength of the implication that there is a
cup involved - it is strongest in prepositional phrases and weakest in the pseudo-partitive.
Compare:
(171) Tea in a cup with a handle
(172) ?A cup of the tea with a handle
57
He also assigns the same analysis to quantifier partitives, but the data here demon¬
strate that whatever analyses are correct for classifiers or partitives and prepositional
phrases, they are different from each other.
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(173) A cup of tea with a handle
(174) A cup of tea in a mug
(175) ??Tea in a cup in a mug
(These findings are the same for other possible prepositional paraphrases of classifiers,
involving, for example from and out of.) Another complication obstructing the establish¬
ment of a general schema is the sloppy nature of the identity of the kernel of a partitive
and the figure of the corresponding prepositional construction:
(176) A cup of the tea.
(177) The tea. in a cup
Unfortunately, tea. and tea. are not strictly identical. On the assumption, however, that
sloppy identity is a general problem not specific to this relation, we can afford to defer it.
This allows the following schema to be postulated:
[np^ of NPj]: F-G (NPk, NPj) k
[ NP, [ Prep NP, ]]: F-Lm (NP„ NP,)
np 1 pp * k 1 k
Where (1) the symbol ' I—' is to be interpreted as meaning that an instantiation of the left-
hand-side will sanction the appropriate instantiation of the right-hand-side and (2) the rela¬
tion F-Lm holds between a figure (trajector) and landmark.
The final phenomenon I wish to address is the possibility of dropping the medial of from
partitives. This seems to be available only for a few quantifiers (Langacker 1982b):
(178) All the cheese
(179) Both the boys
(180) *Some the cheese
(181) *Many the boys
Langacker (op. cit.) argues that of cm be omitted when its "restricted subpart" meaning is
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redundant, pointing out that of and both subsume the whole of the kernel. However, a
slightly different meaning has been attributed to of here - I have characterized it as coercing
an undelimitted perspective (ie. as a sort of "universal spreader"). Nevertheless, the general¬
ization can be captured as follows: of can be omitted when the profile produced by the
quantifier is delimitted. This also captures:
(182) Half the boys
which would trouble Langacker's account. There is, moreover, a consequence. Omission
of of removes the source of figure-ground organization from the surface, and there is a ten¬
dency towards loss of separation of figure from ground. That is, the profile of the kernel
tends to be assimilated to the profile of the whole construction. In the limit, the separate
article of the kernel is dropped as well, as in:
(183) A half-day
(184) A ha'penny
It becomes difficult to refer to the kernel as opposed to the whole. Compare the following:
(185) We celebrated half of the day Denholm had his 21st birthday.
(186) ?We celebrated the half-day Denholm had his 21st birthday.
When all is the quantifier, a singular kernel cannot be construed as individuated, it is
necessary to use the form in (188) instead:
(187) cu*All the cheese
(188) The whole cheese
(188) however, also makes isolation of the kernel difficult:
(189) ?Did you eat the whole apple Sally cooked.
There seem, then, to be (at least) four levels of semantic availability an entity may have. It
may be figure, landmark, ground or it may be assimilated. This is an important result
because it substantiates the discussion of foregrounding and prominence in chapter 2.
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9.4. Aspect and the mass-count distinction
Looking at classifiers and partitives, then, has let me illustrate the way combination works
at the level of entity profiles. One can see how entities are established in cognitive space
using the profiles provided by closed class words. This approach can be applied to more
than just determiner-noun combinations, however. I will now explore the influence of the
direct object of a verb on the aspectual denotation of the verb phrase.
Aspect is a grammatical category, relevant to the temporal contour of events or processes
denoted by a construction. An important point to bear in mind, is that, as with the mass-
count distinction, any real entity can be construed in different ways cognitively. In relation
to aspect, Sapir puts it like this:
"Logically and psychologically, nearly every activity can be thought of as either
point-like or line-like in character, and there are, of course, many expressions in
English which definitely point to the one or the other, but the treatment of these
intuitions is fragmentary and illogical throughout." (Sapir 1951:117)
Classically, linguists and philosophers have differentiated verbs according to their temporal
contour: for example, Vendler 1957 distinguished verbs of accomplishment (eg "run a
mile") achievement (eg"recognize"; "find") activity (eg "run") and state (eg "love";
"know"). More recently, people have argued that these are categories of the verb phrase
(Moens and Steedman 1986, Moens 1987), or of predications (Mourelatos 1978). Essen¬
tially, the argument is that the grammatical category of aspect interacts with the meaning of
particular verbs, so that in different contexts the same verb can occur in different
categories. This is parallel to the claim here that the mass-count distinction is not a property
of lexical entries for nouns, but results from an interaction of lexical concepts with deter¬
miners and background knowledge.
Mourelatos 1978 and several authors in Hopper 1982 go further and explicitly draw a
58
parallel between the mass-count distinction and the imperfective-perfective distinction.
58
Bolinger (1972, pl61) makes a similar point:
"The singularity of nouns is so typical that the count noun is viewed as basic, with plurals
generated from them and with mass nouns treated as a kind of exceptional class. Verbs are
typically mass or plural-like to begin with and are 'singularized' by being tied to a time
and a place.
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For example, Mourelatos argues that events are inherently countable and points out that
nominalizations of event predications are "count quantified" (eg "Mary capsized the boat"
=> "There was a capsizing of the boat by Mary") whereas nominalizations of state and pro¬
cess predications are not (eg "Joseph was painting the stable" => "There was painting of
the stable by Joseph"). Hopper writes:
"... an event must be bounded at its inception and conclusion in order for its limits
in respect to adjacent events to be maintained without overlap and hence without
ambiguity."(p6)
(190) He swallowed.
contains no limitation on the extent of his swallowing:
(191) We knew the poor man was nervous because he swallowed so.
Only contextually can we be sure that a single point action is involved:
(192) He swallowed hard when I looked at him a moment ago.
This is to say that fundamentally verbs are extensible, like mass nouns - a fact that is
plainer when one notes that verbal nouns are normally mass nouns, and are difficult to
singularize without a fair amount of context:
(193) He talks too much.
(194) There's too much talking.
(195) *One talking is enough.
He also notes that "the recognition that durative aspect in verbs is equivalent to mass aspect
in nouns is credited to Sweet by Harold V. King in "Language & Learning" (1969)." Close
(1975) makes the observation, of relevance here, that "often a word can be used as a mass
noun when it refers to a substance, material or phenomenon in general, but as a count noun
when it refers to one separate unit composed of that substance or to an occurrence of that
phenomenon"(plll). Here we see the conceptual basis of the nominal vocabulary overlap¬
ping with that of the verbal. Among Close's examples are: "This is the age of science",
"Physics is a science"; "I will come with pleasure", "It'll be a pleasure to see you".
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That is, boundedness (cf. DELIMITATION) is seen to be an important element of the dis¬
tinction. Lyons 1968 discusses aspect in Russian, and observes that the perfective is associ¬
ated with completion and the imperfective is neutral with respect to whether there has been
a conclusion to activity. Mourelatos gives the example of imperfective lecit "treat" the addi¬
tion of the perfective prefix to which yields vylecit meaning "cure".
Crucially, Mourelatos observes that verbs whose objects are count nouns must be inter¬
preted as events (ie. as occuring over a delimited period) while the verbal sisters of mass
nouns are interpreted as processes. Thus we have (196) as opposed to (197)
(196) he played some Bach
(197) he played a Mozart sonata.
The first observation I wish to make is that the direct object is semi-subordinate to the verb
(Allerton 1982). This, of course, is the same as the relationship between a determiner and a
noun.
The semantic interaction can be examined fruitfully in terms of Space Grammar. I will not
pursue the translation to UCG here, because it would not further the argument.
Roughly, verbs are characterized in Space Grammar as ordered sets of configurations of a
trajector and one or more landmarks ie. a set of configurations of participants ordered over
time. If this "trajectory" has a positive profile in both time and space, it is perfective. For
example, if "John enters the room", the spatial relationship between them changes in the
course of the "execution" of the trajectory. Imperfective processes by contrast, are "degen¬
erate in regard to the non-temporal dimensions" (p270) of the trajectory and so describe
"the mere perpetuation of a configuration through time without essential change." (p271).
For example, if "John hates the room", then he stands in a constant affective relationship
with it. Langacker says of auxiliaries that epistemic (modal) predicates and aspectual
predicates intervene between the "ground" ("the position of the speaker and speech
situation"p278,1979) and the objective situation being talked about. Furthermore, "the lexi¬
cal head organizes the objective scene and provides it with an initial temporal profile, and
the aspectual predicates adjust this profile and determine the ultimate temporal extension of
the objective situation as it is viewed by the speaker for purposes of linguistic expression."
p287,1979. "Each aspectual predicate in the sequence adjusts the profile it receives from the
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predicate below it" (p283,1979).
Langacker 1982a discusses in detail the application of this approach to the aspectual predi¬
cates BE, PERF and ING. Note the difference there is in applying PERF to perfectives and
imperfectives. In general, "PERF derives a state from a process by focussing on the point
at which the trajectory is fully instantiated. In the case of perfective processes this can only
be the end point, but ... an imperfective process ... defines a configuration stable through
time, and for this reason any point within the imperfective process meets the condition for
being singled out...." (p280-281). Thus we can begin to see how the various semantic
representations can interact.
Within this framework, we can see the direct object as instantiating the trajectory denoted
schematically by the verb and other aspectual predicates. For example, when someone
plays music, they follow a trajectory through the music, and the precise nature of that tra¬
jectory will be influenced by the contours of the music. In particular, if the music has a
limit, then so will the trajectory.
Other participants will represent landmarks on the trajectory. For example, if John goes to
the zoo, his path will lead to an entity - the Zoo. In short, the other participants, like the
direct object, will contribute to the instantiation of the relatively schematic trajectory
denoted by the verb and any aspectual predicates.
The interaction depends also on the case role of an object. In particular, the object has the
strongest influence when it is a range, result or patient. The influence is weaker for a
source, goal or benefactive. Compare these examples:
(198) John will paint some pictures
(199) Jonn will paint for some friends
This can be understood in terms of the manner in which the landmark interacts with the tra¬
jectory. If the trajectory passes across some plane of the object, rather as a torch beam
traverses an object in its path, then the trajectory is moulded around that object and is
instantiated by that object. In the same way that a trajector progressively conceals a
patient, it progressively discloses a result. If an instantiating participant is bounded, then
the trajectory in evitably inherits that bounding. On the other hand, if the trajectory merely
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approaches a given landmark, for example, then the path followed by the trajectory is par¬
tially instantiated not by the landmark but by the location of the landmark instead.
Langacker's general theory of aspect allows us to predict that there will be no interaction
when the spatial trajectory is degenerate. When the spatial trajectory is degenerate, there is
nothing for a landmark to instantiate. Stative predicates have degenerate spatial trajectories
according to Lanagacker (a state involves no change). The following examples are stative,
and there is no interaction with the direct object:
(200) He resembled a matchstick.
(201) He resembled some cheese.
Some predicates presuppose that their direct object has some semantic property. For exam-
59
pie, SEE presupposes that the direct object is visible. Similarly, the verb ROLL presup¬
poses that the direct object can be rolled. This entails that the object has shape and is
therefore individuated. Thus, for example:
(203) He rolled some cheese.
suggests that the cheese was countable. This example shows that there is an additional
interaction between a predicate and the landmark. Both place constraints on the trajectory,
but both must also accommodate to it. Background knowledge also plays a role in deter¬
mining, for example, whether the object derives its shape from the action, or has the shape
from the outset. Consider, for example:
(204) He rolled some tobacco and some cheese.
Because I concentrate here on the delimitation of the noun-phrase, rather than its status as
mass or count per se, it is possible to correctly predict that a verb whose direct object is
plural and hence countable, but is nevertheless [-DELIMITATION] (eg. many boys), will
59 Modal verbs can affect this. For instance, this example doesn't carry the usual
presupposition.
(202) He couldn't see the ship.
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not be read as referring to an event. This can be tested with reference to the "imperfective
paradox" to which accomplishments are claimed to be vulnerable (Moens & Steedman,
1985). Thus, even if Seb Coe was running a mile, we are unable to conclude that he ran a
mile - he may have been run over by a truck after sixty yards. However, if he was simply
running, it is clear that he ran, whatever befell him. To return to the hypothesis in question,
(205) He was running some miles when a truck hit him
does seem to me to imply that he may have run some miles before the accident. In other
words, the undelimitted but countable direct object does not turn the predicate into an
accomplishment. A reading along the lines of
(206) he was running four miles before breaking four minutes
smacks of stage-Indian.
This is strong evidence in favour of an analysis which distinguishes DELIMITATION and
INDIVIDUATION, rather than using the traditional categories "mass" and "count" directly.
DeJong and Waltz 1983 describe a representational system for verbs called "Event Shape
Diagrams". In it, a verb is decomposed as a series of overlapping temporal contours. For
example, EAT would have contours for DESIRE, INGESTION, DIGESTION, and so forth.
DESIRE would rise and then begin to fall away. INGESTION would cease just after
DESIRE. This is similar to a decomposition of the trajectory associated with a verb, and is
consonant with Langacker's general approach. I discussed in chapter 7 the way Dejong and
Waltz modelled the interaction of the direct object with the Event Shape Diagram, and how
they used this to give an account of certain kinds of metaphor. It is easy to imagine imple¬
menting the analysis of the interaction of delimit ;d objects with verbal trajectories in terms
of Event Shape Diagrams.60 The aspectual alternatives would be related in the same way as
alternative metaphorical readings, with the object contributing to the choice of an appropri¬
ate reading.
60
There is also a strong resemblance to the "ease-in, ease-out" diagrams used in ad¬
vanced computer animation.
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9.5. Lexical concepts and theories
This section makes more explicit the model outlined in chapter 5, and integrates it with
some of the results discussed in the last chapter. It includes a brief discussion of the nature
of "theories" and the interface between "theories" and lexical concepts. First let me review
some key points.
I have indicated that a lexical concept can be thought of as a set of parameters used to
guide the flow of background knowledge into some semantic representation. This represen¬
tation may or may not be a prototype. Background knowledge is seen as a naive theory of
the world, and was conceptualised as a semantic net for illustrative purposes. Plastic inheri¬
tance was the idea that a given lexical concept could be attached to different theories and
thus receive different interpretations.
The mass-count distinction arises from the combination of a noun and a determiner. The
noun is parameterised with respect to its profile; a noun-phrase actualises a noun (possibly
as a concept) with a profile. Some readings are lexicalised and do not have to be con¬
structed on-line.
9.5.1. Lexical concepts
To take into account the question of representing relationships among the parameters, as
discussed at the end of chapter 5, lexical concepts will be augmented with a configurational
parameter. This parameter is called the GESTALT parameter. This is the parameter that
features such as INDIVIDUATION and DELIMITATION instantiate. This parameter
would also be used to represent information about the inherent orientation of an entity, for
example. It is appropriate to link inherent orientation with the mass-count distinction
because possession of an inherent orientation entails countability.
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As indicated in the previous chapter, this parameter is realised as the profile of an entity in
Space Grammar. This is realised as an index in the CUG formalism. Note that, on
Langacker's account of semantic structure, the substructures representing entities, for exam¬
ple, are retained as embeddings in the overall structure of a sentence. What Space Grammar
gives in addition is a representation of the relative prominence of these entities in the
overall structure.











Of course, the notation means nothing without some interpretation (see chapter 3), and
there are two parts to the interpretation of lexical concepts. First, there is the general frame¬
work which attributes a role to lexical concepts in language understanding. This was dis¬
cussed in chapter 5. Second, there are the "theories" which provide the semantic material
to actualise lexical concepts.
9.5.2. Theories
Theories are not clearly defined anywhere in the psychological literature to which I referred
in chapter 5. To some extent, it remains to be seen how they differ from knowledge
representation schemes in the a-intelligence literature, such as KRL (Bobrow and Winograd
1977) or KL-ONE (Brachman and Schmolze 1985). Nevertheless, it is possible to clarify
one or two points. (These points are developed in Dunbar (in preparation b)).
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First, rather than considering theories as individual semantic nets, they should be seen as
collections (indeed, configurations) of knowledge structures. On different occasions, the set
of knowledge structures that is active will vary. This will affect the availability of informa¬
tion for any semantic representation, and the interpretation assigned to lexical concepts will
therefore be subject to the composition of the set of currently active theories.
In particular, we should distinguish local theories from global ones. A local theory is linked
to a particular episode and represents a subject's current understanding of that episode. In
many instances, the local theory is precisely the semantic representation which lexical con¬
cepts are helping to construct. Nevertheless, local theories as well as global ones will be
used in assigning an interpretation to lexical concepts. Local theories could, obviously,
provide a mechanism for the pre-emption discussed in chapter 2.
As indicated earlier, default values are supplied by theories. If the set of active theories
changes, the default values are also liable to be labile. A concept of default set of defaults
can be derived by postulating a default active configuration of theories. Context-
independent properties can be understood in the same way: a set of properties which are
constant and frequently accessed under the default active configuration of theories. Simi¬
larly, Weinreich's notion of default mass and count readings for lexical items can be seen
as default cognitive perspectives. This is a subtly different concept from the notion of a
default context which is justifiably criticised by Crain and Steedman 1985.
9.5.3. Theories, lexical concepts and the mass-count distinction
This section looks at the way mass and count readings can be derived from the noun-
phrases analysed earlier in the chapter. Obviously, the way I represent theories is simplistic;
the aim is to illustrate the structure of the system in terms of the relationship between
theories and lexical concepts.
Consider a cheese. The currently active configuration of theories must instantiate an indivi¬
duated entity with values on the parameters TEXTURE, COLOUR and FLAVOUR, say. In
this case, we will assume that the current theories lexicalise this schematic phrase, and
directly supply default values to actualise the phrase.
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Now consider a bread. Let's assume that the same parameters must be satisfied but that on
this occasion, no lexicalised concept is furnished. The hearer must work out the scale of
the individual denoted. There are two ways of doing this that I want to emphasise. First,
background knowledge may contain a disjunction like "individuals of bread are slices or
rolls or loaves". It may also contain a probablistic rule of inference like "at dinner an indi¬
vidual of bread is a roll" which can be combined with a premise from the local theory (for
example, "this is dinner") to select the "roll" unit. The current theories may then supply
default values for the parameters of "roll". The second possible mechanism involves pre¬
emption. For example, a roll may be being pointed to by the speaker. Because of the sali¬
ence of the speaker (the hearer is tracking the speaker; that is the definition of listening) the
object indicated will dominate the local theory.
Once a concept has been actualised it is likely to be cached in some fashion, ready for re¬
use. That is, although the concept is potentially transient, there is often some utility in
retaining it temporarily in case, for example, the discourse subsequently refers back to it.
However, the form of caching is a problem for theories of discourse (or text) processing
and anaphora resolution and so I leave it for now. It is worth noting, however, that caching
is probably the first stage of lexicalisation.
I have described how modification would be handled in chapter 5. Here, I simply illustrate
it with a fresh example: some blue cheese. The adjective masks the COLOUR parameter of
the head, constraining its instantiation. This example shows that the tailoring of blue is not
a function of the default colour of some cheese but is instead subject to background
knowledge about "cheese". In particular, cheese coloured the default "pale yellow-orange"
is suffused with the colour; blue cheese is veined with the colour. In addition, there is no
sense in which the hue or saturation of the blue is some function of the hue and saturation
of "focal blue" and hue and saturation of "pale yellow-orange". It is largely independent of
these colours, deriving instead from a theory about stilton. Often background knowledge
will be less specific about the colour and the pattern of its application, but the general prin¬
ciple will remain the same.
So far, I have assumed a model in which the goal is to create a prototype. This is not
always the case, of course. Consider (208) and (209) as alternative responses to (207)
(207) Did Eric say whether he was coming?
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(208) He said he wanted to peel some tomatoes.
(209) He said he wanted to peel three tomatoes.
Perhaps the local theory has a goal to answer the question "should we keep Eric's seat for
him?" It might use the responses simply to satisfy this goal. Of course, it's stretching
things to imagine that the hearer really would use the distinction between a delimit ed and
an undelimit ed activity to make his decision, but it is conceivable and, in any case, I only
wish to demonstrate the mechanism in principle.
Drawing together the main points to emerge from this chapter:
The theoretical apparatus of Space Grammar has been helpful in general, and the attempt to
translate the analysis into the notation of UCG has succeeded.
The type of a phrase and its main profile are the same thing.
While determiners have the syntactic category NP/N, quantifiers have the additional
category NP. Quantifiers therefore present a local ambiguity. The quantifier is only profile
determinant when it has the semi-subordinate role of NP/N.
Langacker's notion of a multi-dimensional semantic space has been useful in permitting us
to differentiate types of delimitation.
The meaning of a nounphrase has four possible depths which can be distinguished gram¬
matically. In addition, the "head" noun of a classifier construction can be placed on a
semantic continuum running from quantifiers through measures to full substantives.
Participants in a proposition interact with the main verb in the actualisation of the trajectory
of the process.




The role of experimental psychology.
In the first chapter I argued that experimental psychology could play an important role in a
cognitive science of lexical meaning. I claimed also that it could not be used simply to
provide a transparent test of a linguistic theory. Rather, the two disciplines would each fur¬
nish their own data, each type of data carrying implications for different aspects of an
integrated cognitive theory. In particular, different types of evidence are relevant at
different stages in the development of a theory.
This chapter shows in detail how this approach can be applied to the topics of this thesis. I
discuss some problems and issues that arise from the model developed so far. I then show
how these can be resolved experimentally. Unfortunately, pressure to finish the thesis
within four years means that the experimental program has not been pursued properly.
Nevertheless, I describe two proposed experiments in detail, and present data obtained from
one of them. Several other experimental possibilities are discussed in less detail.
I address three issues. First, is contextual influence on conceptual instantiation related to the
combination of concepts, or is it unrelated to the syntactic structure of language. Second,
can psychological techniques differentiate concepts which have been lexicalised from tran¬
sient denotations which have been derived on-line. And, finally, does the cue validity of a
referential function affect the representation of the alternative readings.
I begin by reporting an experiment addressing the first issue.61 Barsalou 1982 proposed that
two kinds of property were associated with any concept: some activated on all occasions
(CI) and others activated only when context encourages them forth (CD). For example,
"has a smell" is said to be a CI property of skunks, while "where cooking can occur" is a
61
Many thanks to Joe Levy and Martin Shepherd for their help with programming the
BBC. Thanks are due also to Terry for advice, encouragement and above all, his great pati¬
ence in bearing with the gestation of this experiment. Statistical analysis was performed
using GENSTAT and 1STAT software.
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CD property of hospitals.
Barsalou correctly predicts in his own experiment, that subjects reading sentences contain¬
ing some noun (the target noun) will verify that it possesses some property (the probe)
more quickly if sentential context supports the property only if the property is CD. If the
property is CI, then the presence of facilitatory context makes no difference to verification
time because, he argues, the property is activated anyway. For example, consider the
target-context-probe triples below.
1 The hospital served meals all day. -where cooking can occur
2 The hospital had many famous surgeons, -where cooking can occur
3 The skunk stunk up the area. -is smelly
4 The skunk ran across the road. -is smelly
Verification of the probe is typically faster in one than two, but no quicker in three than
four.
Barsalou's hypothesis is clearly of potential importance to our study, particularily as he
offers an account of the acquisition of the two kinds of property and an indication of an
interesting range of problems upon which the CI-CD distinction might have a bearing
[much like the one constructed in chapter 1]. Further, his method could provide a tool with
which to explore context effects (in particular, the effect of articles on the interpretation of
nouns).
A striking aspect of the materials used by Barsalou is that, if it were the case that
comprehension involved semantic decomposition, then the decomposition of his examples
of "related" predicates would include as a member the property to be verified. For example:
(210) The hospital was quiet when dinner was served.
This leaves open the possibility that reaction time advantages accruing when related predi¬
cates are used are not due to modulation of the representation of the subject noun, but
rather are due to activation of the property itself. This problem in fact covers two separate
questions, both of which will be addressed in the experiment reported below.
First, is it necessary to include the property in the set of properties that prima facie would
make up the semantic decomposition of the predicate in order to facilitate verification time?
In practise, it will be necessary to generate predicates which can reinforce a property
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without mentioning it directly. That is, predicates which would not innevitably introduce
the property on every occasion of use. There is, however, a familiar phenomenon which
can guide us to appropriate materials; many lexicographers discuss "syncategorematicity" in
relation to adjectives like GOOD and GREAT. Such adjectives reinforce, or emphasise
different properties according to which noun they are used to modify (Keil 1979, Miller
1977). For example, a great painting is not (typically) "great" for the same reason as a
great hammer. Thus, if we can obtain syncategorematic predicates, and if these predicates
can facilitate property verification, then it must be by modulation of the subject noun. In
the design of experiment 1, then, a new factor is crossed with context type of predicate.
This new factor has two levels: "original" predicates are similar to those used by Barsalou
and mention the property fairly explicitly; but "syncategorematic" predicates might rein¬
force a different property if predicated of another noun. For example,
(211) The rose stained the carpet.
Here the verb phrase draws attention to the redness of the rose, but could equally well
draw attention to the yellowness of custard or the darkness of coffee.
Secondly, is the grammatical relationship between subject and predicate required for facili¬
tation to occur, or can it happen even if the property is simply mentioned in the verb
phrase, without that VP standing in the relationship of predicate to the sentence subject?
That is, is it necessary that the grammatical context explicitly connect property with sub¬
ject, or is it sufficient that the property be mentioned in the general vicinity? If the latter
holds, then the phenomenon is analogous to the transferred epithet figure of speech under
whose auspices, for example, the phrase "the man drained the drunken glass" can attribute
the property of being intoxicated to the man. If the process is, on the other hand, one of
modulation, then we would expect the predicative relationship to be an essential component
of the effect.
In order to test this, a third level is added to the factor of context-type of sentences: as well
as using reinforcing and neutral predication, predicates will be used which mention the
relevant attribute without predicating it of the subject noun. Thus the context can "juxta¬
pose" a property and a noun, as in the following sentence (the property being "is red"):
(212) The rose made the girl blush.
A similar control appears in the context of a study of encoding specificity, in Anderson et
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al. 1976.
Thus, to test the assumption that contextual interaction is due to the modulating effect of
syntagmatically related material, we can test the generality of Barsalou's results with the
experimental conditions described. The predicates he uses as reinforcing context are fairly
explicit in their reference to the property under scrutiny. The question I ask is whether
predicates reinforcing a property without mentioning it could provide reinforcing context as
ably as ones as explicit as those used in Barsalou's original study. A second issue related
to this is whether it is the mere mention of a property which matters as opposed to mention
within the subject-predicate construction. If interaction depends on combination, we will
find first that for both levels of subject-relatedness and at least Barsalou's levels of
context-type, syncategorematic predicates affect reaction times in the same manner as origi¬
nal ones, and second that juxtaposition of targets and properties does not have an effect like
reinforcing predication. If the data pattern within the constraints of these expectations, then
the questions raised above will have received a satisfactory answer.
Finally, the relationship between target and property is said to underly the results, but in
Barsalou's materials non-overlapping sets of properties were used for the two types of
probe. Thus, the relationship between probe and target was confounded with probe. In
Experiment 1, this confounding is undone by using each property in both conditions: will
the results mentioned above still appear? They should unless Barsalou unwittingly used a
procedure for assigning properties to conditions that was biased, such that the properties
used were inherently CI or CD.
10.1. Method
10.1.1. Procedure
Subjects sat in front of a vdu and rested their forefingers on two response buttons about 8
inches apart. To start a trial, the subject pressed the space bar of a keyboard linked to the
vdu. This lay behind the two keys. After a 500ms interval a sentence appeared two-thirds
of the way up the screen. All sentences began with THE followed by a flashing subject
noun (Gsubj) and a predication (Pred) of the subject noun. Subjects were instructed to
understand the sentence and to read it aloud. After 6s a property label appeared below the
sentence (about one-third of the way up the screen). If the flashing noun in the sentence
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possessed the property, subjects pressed the "true" key (which was always beneath the
forefinger of the dominant hand); otherwise they pressed "false". Reaction time was meas¬
ured from first appearance of the property label to response. Subjects were instructed to
respond as quickly as possible but to avoid error. They received 24 practice trials and 48
test trials. They could take a break at any time, but rarely did, typically completing the
experiment in around twenty-five minutes.
10.1.2. Subjects
Subjects were 12 young adults (mean age= 21yrs lmth) all of whom and all of whose
parents were native speakers of English (self-report). They had between zero and four years
experience of undergraduate psychology.
10.1.3. Materials
Materials consisted of 12 properties each linked to 6 sentences which represented the six
treatment combinations obtained by crossing the factors of grammatical subject and kind of
predicate. The Gsubj could be either highly or weakly related to the property, and the Pred
could be related, unrelated or "juxtaposed" to the property. These relationships were
verified by the ratings of an independent group of 4 judges. Each of these judges (graduate
students of cognitive science) rated all Gsubj's and Preds. For "juxtaposed" Preds only the
keyword was used. Each item was written on one side of an index card, on the back of
which was written the property. Judges rated how much the item made them think of the
property from 1 "it didn't come to mind at all" to 7 "it came to mind immediately". The
cards were randomly ordered for each subject.
ANOVA's were performed on these ratings in order to check that they fell in the predicted
patterns.
Looking first at predicates, the prediction is basically that the different levels of predicate
should vary in relatedness, but that Preds of a given level should have similar relatedness
whether they were to be used with a highly related grammatical subject or a weakly related
one. It should be noted that frequently it was possible to use the same predicate with both
grammatical subjects, which of course means that in such cases there was no difference in
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the relatedness of the predicate to the property. The method used for syncategorematic
predicates had to be slightly different since these were specifically designed not to be
fO
inherently related to the property . The technique used was a variant of the "free associa¬
tion" method. Subjects were presented with questions of the form:
(213) If the Gsubj Pred, then [what value does it have for] PARAMETER?
For example,
(214) If the bath fills quickly, then what does it contain?
Subjects had to supply a value or tick a "don't know" box. If the value was the one to be
used in the experiment ("water" in the last example) then this was scored as 7. Any other
value was scored as 1 unless it was a partial synonym of the value to be used, in which
case it scored 4. "Don't knows" were scored as 2. For syncategorematic predicates, then,
the prediction is slightly different: with a highly related Gsubj, scores should be higher than
with a weakly related one. Means are shown in table 1.
Table 1 Ratings of predicate association.
Original Syncategorematic

















Separate analyses of variance were done for original and syncategorematic predicates. For
originals, the main effect of relatedness was not significant (F(1,3)<1), while the main
effect of predicate was (F(2,6)= 23.46, p< 0.01). For syncategorematic predicates, both
were significant: relatedness, F(l,3)= 115.46, p< 0.01; predicate, F(2,6)= 89.4, p<0.01.
These results support the view that related predicates were more related to the property than
unrelated ones, and that this relationship was the same for both strongly and weakly related
subjects.
62
Note that for all syncategorematic items, the same predicates instantiated a given
condition for both highly and weakly related subjects.
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Second, it was necessary to establish that highly related nouns had been rated more highly
than weakly related ones, and that there was no difference between original and syn-
categorematic grammatical subjects in this respect. Note that because the same noun-pair
was to be used in both CI and CD conditions, any effect of context which differs with con¬
dition cannot be attributed to a difference in the relatedness of noun-pairs used in the
different conditions. The main effect of grammatical subject was significant as predicted
(F(l,3)= 51.39, p<0.01), while the main effect of "Type" (syncategorematic versus original)
was not (F(1,3)<1). There was no interaction of these factors either (F(1,3)<1). The means
appear in table 2
Table 2 Mean ratings of grammatical subjects.
Type Original Syncategorematic
Relatedness
of Gsubj HI 6.33 6.54
LO 2.54 2.71
24 sentence-property pairs were also constructed, each sentence having a subject noun that
clearly did not possess the property. (The same 12 properties being used as for the "true"
items). They were, however, constructed in such a manner as to represent the six key treat¬
ment combinations (Gsubj x Pred) with respect to some implicit property. The purpose of
this was to prevent subjects from being able to anticipate the correct response on the basis
of the relationship between a grammatical subject and a predicate alone. For example, if a
subject noticed on a given trial that the predicate was highly related to some property to
which the grammatical subject was also highly related, this observation would not give him
any information as to the appropriate response in advance of the appearance of the pro¬
perty; the correct response could only be decided by examination of the property label.
Finally, there were 24 sentences representing in roughly equal distribution the 12 treatment
combinations of the experiment (true-false x Gsubj x Pred), and these were presented first
to subjects and used as the practice items.
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10.1.4. Design
For each property, there were six experimental sentences. These six were grouped into 6
63
pairs such that each subject could receive one pair from each of the twelve properties
With the aid of a computer a skeleton list of items was produced for each subject. These
lists encoded which pair the subject would get for each property, and what order the 24
"true" items would appear in. This order of presentation was randomized separately for
each subject, but constraints were placed on the assignment of pairs to subjects such that
firstly all subjects received each treatment combination twice and secondly each property
appeared in each treatment combination exactly four times across subjects.
A specially written lisp program (Appendix A) was then used to prepare materials files
from these skeleton lists, adding a random number of false items between successive true
ones. The relative order of the 24 false items was the same for all 12 subjects. Each subject
received his list of 48 true and false items after first receiving the 24 practice items. All
subjects received the practice items in the same pseudo-random order.
10.2. Results
Analyses of variance were performed on the correct "true" item's latencies by subjects (Fl)
and by items (F2). For subjects, the latency used was the average of two latencies within
each treatment combination, and for items it was the average of four.
Planned comparisons were evaluated using the Bonferroni t test, with the adjustment for
repeated measures recommended in Myers (1979).
Fl and F2 were first calculated without juxtaposed predicates. The overall main effect of
grammatical subject was significant for RT's (Fl(l,ll)= 17.475, p<0.01; F2(l,10)= 36.37,
p< 0.01), and also for errors (Fl(l,ll)= 15.476, p<0.01; F2(l,10)= 62.83, p< 0.01). How¬
ever, the main effect of Pred was not significant for RT's (Fl(l,ll)< 1; F2(l,10)< 1), and,
63
These pairs were selected in such a way as to avoid repitition of lexical material,
and were as follows (in terms of subject relatedness and predicate relatedness respectively):
a) HI.REL & LO.UNREL; b) HI,UNREL & LOJUXT; c) LO,UNREL & HIJUXT; d)
HI.JUXT & LO,REL; e) LO,REL & HI,UNREL; and f) LOJUXT & HI,REL.
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although it was significant for errors in the items analysis (F2(l,10)= 5.517, p<0.05), it
wasn't by subjects (Fl(l,ll)= 1.658, p> 0.20). Contrary to the expected result, the Gsubj
by Pred interaction was not significant for RT's either (Fl(l,ll)< 1; F2(l,10)< 1), but it
was significant in terms of errors 64 (Fl(l,ll)= 4.459, p< 0.10; F2(l,10)= 5.976, p<0.05).
Indeed, as can be seen from table 3, the error rate was rather high.
























Turning now to the specific comparisons indicated by the experimental hypotheses regard¬
ing the levels of Pred, let us examine first the difference between related and unrelated
predicates. With highly associated grammatical subjects, related predicates did not permit
faster verification than unrelated ones (tl= 0.243, df=ll; t2= 0.182, df= 10) or fewer errors
(tl= 0.407, df= 11; t2= 0.247, df=10). For weakly associated grammatical subjects, how¬
ever, there was unexpectedly no difference between verification times (tl= 0.117, df=ll;
t2= 0.217, df=10), although there were significant differences in error rates (tl= 2.59, p<
0.10; t2= 3.704, p< 0.05) for the two levels of predicate.
The main effect of Type was not significant (Fl(l,ll)< 1; F2(l,10)= 1.631, p> 0.20) and
neither was its interaction with Pred (Fl(l,10)< 1; F2(l,10)= 1.313, p> 0.20). Furthermore,
although the interaction with Gsubj was significant by items (F2(l,10)= 5.516, p< 0.05),
and the second order interaction with Gsubj and Pred approached significance by subjects
(Fl(l,10)= 3.893, p< 0.10), neither interaction achieved significance on the other analysis
(Fl(l,10)< 1; and F2(l,10)< 1, respectively). I shall return to the three-way interaction
shortly, but the conclusion from these results that syncategorematic type predicates affect
64
"... CD properties in irrelevant contexts are normally inactive and errors for these
sentences occur when subjects decide to respond prior to this information's becoming ac¬
tive." (Barsalou 1982:86)
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RT in the same manner as original ones is borne out by the analyses of errors, which found
the main effect and all interactions of Type to have F's uniformly <1. The mean RT and
error rate for each condition in the subject's analysis is shown in table 4
Table 4 Mean response latencies and error rates.
Pred RELATED UNRELATED
Lms E% Lms E%
Type of
Pred SYNCAT 1485 25 1422 35.4
ORIGINAL 1456 20.8 1561 33.3
As was noted above, the Type-Gsubj-Pred interaction approaches significance. An unex¬
pected feature of table 4 is that for syncategorematic types, weak predicates were faster
than related ones. Although no specific prediction was made about this pair of means, it's
clear that we would not have expected the weak predicates to be quicker. Table 5 gives a
three-way breakdown of RT's and error rates.
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Table 5 Mean response latencies and error rates.
Pred RELATED UNRELATED
Lms E% Lms E%
Gsubj
SYNCAT High 1196 16.5 1277 12.5
Weak 1771 33 1563 58.4
ORIGINAL High 1211 12.5 1210 8.4
Weak 1683 29.2 1933 58.4
The correlation between mean verification time and error rate for these eight cells is high
and positive (r= 0.813, p< 0.02), indicating that no speed-accuracy trade-off is taking place.
Focussing now on the reaction times to sentences whose grammatical subject was weakly
associated with the probe, there is a nearly significant difference between related and unre¬
lated predicates for original-style sentences (tl= 1.828, df= 11, p< 0.10; t2= 0.615, df=10,
not sig.), but not for syncategorematic ones (tl= 0.007, df=ll; t2= 0.172, df=10). The most
obvious conclusion is that the relative explicitness of mention is vital for context (ie. the
verb phrase) to facilitate verification, but this will be re-examined in the Discussion.
Relevant will be the observation that for syncategorematic types, related predicates are on
average 200ms slower than unrelated ones when the subject is weakly associated with the
target property.
In contrasting the two types of sentence, it has been important to be abnormally lenient
with the alpha level, because the null hypothesis is that there will be a difference. That is, a
restrictive alpha level would be increasing the chance of supporting the experimental
hypothesis of no difference. Note further that, although t2(ORIGINAL, WEAK, REL v
UNREL) is not statistically significant (as noted in the previous paragraph), the magnitude
of the difference was 296ms, implying a lack of power.
In order to compare juxtaposed and related predicates, analyses by subjects and by items
were also carried out with these as the only levels of Pred. Again, the main effect of
Gsubj was significant, both in terms of RT (Fl(l,ll)= 6.697, p< 0.05; F2(l,10)=15.868, p<
0.01) and error rate (Fl(l,ll)= 10.735, p< 0.01; F2(l,10)= 17.521, p< 0.01). The main
effect of predicate is not significant in terms of RT (Fl(l,ll)< 1;F2(1,10) <1), and although
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there is a difference in error rate by items (F2(l,10)= 4.416, p=0.062), it does not hold in
the subjects analysis (Fl(l,ll)< 1). The interaction between grammatical subject and
predicate was not significant for RT (F2(l,10)< 1) or errors (F2(l,10)= 1.421, p> 0.20) by
items. By subjects, however, both RT (Fl(l,ll)= 8.461, p< 0.025) and error rate
(Fl(l,ll)= 4.452, p< 0.10) achieve significance. See table 6.
Table 6 Mean response latencies and error rates.
Pred RELATED JUXTAPOSED
Lms E% Lms E%
Gsubj High 1191 14.6 1370 8.4
Weak 1752 31.2 1613 47.9
.mn Specific comparisons between means at these two levels of predicate were non¬
significant for highly related grammatical subjects on RT's (tl= 1.772, df= 11; t2= 0.685,
df= 10) and error rates (tl= 0.814, df= 11; t2= 0.187, df= 10). For weakly related gram¬
matical subjects, the subjects comparisons just miss the 0.10 level (tl= 2.315, df=ll and
tl= 2.168, df=l 1 for RT's and errors respectively), but the items analyses fall short (t2=
0.685, df=10; t2= 1.873, df= 10, respectively).
Finally, a full analysis of variance was also run by both subjects and items, and it revealed
the anomaly that, with juxtaposed predicates included, the overall main effect of Type
achieved a degree of significance (Fl(l,ll)= 12.148, p< ; F2(l,10)= 2.896, p=0.12). This is
odd since it was not significant with juxtaposed predicates, and since these two cells of jux¬
taposed predicates are meant to be functionally identical. That is, no syncategorematic-
original distinction can be made for juxtaposed predicates since they must involve explicit
mention. There is clearly, however, a large difference in mean reaction time to the two
(289ms in the items analysis; 372ms by subjects). Since these conditions are equivalent in
terms of the experimental variables (by definition, as I have indicated), the difference
between them must be due to some difference between the particular items used (the factor
type is confounded with items in the design, see above).
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10.3. Discussion
The results are superficially unsatisfactory. There is a lack of differentiation of related and
juxtaposed predicates, and the difference between related and unrelated predicates with a
weak grammatical subject is found for original style sentences (thus replicating Barsalou
(1982)), but not for syncategorematic ones. It would appear to be the case that the key to
making context-dependent properties more available is no more and no less than simple
mention in physical proximity to the test stimulus. However, two principle features of the
data force a qualification of this interpretation. Firstly, differences that were not significant
in terms of reaction time were so in respect of error rate. Thus, more errors were made
when a weakly related grammatical subject was collocated with an unrelated predicate for
both sentence types. Secondly, there appeared to be a lack of power, with relatively large
differences (around 200ms) being declared insignificant.
Clearly, the experiment needs to be repeated, and a key problem that will have to be tack¬
led first will be the need to reduce subject error. On reflection, it was felt that the instruc¬
tions to subjects could have indicated more clearly that they were to judge whether the
grammatical subject could possess the property in question, rather than whether this particu¬
lar exemplar did have it. Furthermore, feedback could be given to subjects as to their accu¬
racy during the practice items. A reduction in error rate might be made a criterion for
beginning the experimental items. It would seem advisable also to increase the numbers
both of subjects and of items, in order to improve the power of the design. Having now
obtained estimates of error variance from this experiment, we are in a position to work out
with some precision how many to add.
Two anomalies emerged in the results. First, the expected relationship between related and
unrelated predicates (the latter should not be quicker under any circumstances) was reversed
for syncategorematic sentences with a weakly related grammatical subject. A careful review
of experimental tech nique has identified the difficulty in the method of rating the related-
ness of syncategorematic predicates to properties. The reader may recall that it was realized
that precisely because of the nature of such predicates, they could not simply be rated, and
so a variant of the method of free association was used, with weakly related ones being
defined as those which did not cause the judges to respond with the target property. What
I now realize is that this definition entails that judges must have been inclined to respond
with some other property. This theorem enables us to explain the anomaly; subjects were
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slower responding because a preferred association was interfering with their response to the
probe; unrelated predicates carried no such baggage.
The second anomaly we have drawn attention to is the apparent failure to successfully
match juxtaposed predicates in the two groups distinguished by the factor Type. The nature
of this failure is perhaps revealed by a post hoc qualitative analysis. Juxtaposed predicates
were subjected to a grammatical analysis, and the results are tabulated in table 7.
Table 7 Frequency table of juxtaposed predicate types.
Syncategorematic Original
High Weak High Weak
Direct_obj 1 1 3 3
Locative 3 2 2 2
Adjective 2 3 1 1
Obviously, it would be better if there was no discrepancy in the formal properties of
"matched" predicates.
10.4. Proposals for experiments
A possibility worth systematic investigation is that the relationship between contextual com¬
bination and interaction is subject to the processing mode of the hearer. For example, it
might be the case that subjects attending more carefully enjoy context effects more closely
tied to the combinatorial structure of the text. This possibility is suggested by the discus¬
sion of undifferentiated reference in chapter 2. It could be tested by blocking subjects by a
locus of control variable: field independent subjects would be predicted to process text
more analytically than field dependent subjects. Another possibility is that the
foreground— background structure of a text affects contextual interaction. In particular, the
discussion in chapter 2 and chapter 9 suggested that backgrounded entities, such as land¬
marks, may not be projected so strongly. One can ask, then, for example, whether the con¬
textual reinforcement of properties (Barsalou, 1982) or contextual adaption between head
and modifier occurs even in non-focal positions.
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Unfortunately, there is not time to pursue this experimental program further. I turn now to
the second and third issues raised at the beginning of the chapter. How can we
differentiate lexicalised readings from derived ones? And does the cue validity of the
referential function relating two readings affect the liklihood of their separate lexicalisation?
To tackle these issues, I propose using a technique investigated by Barsalou and Ross
1986. Their experiments involved presenting subjects with a list of nouns. Subjects then
had to estimate how frequently given superordinate categories (or context-independent pro¬
perties) had been instantiated by exemplars in the list. For example, the list might contain
apple, orange and pear among the nouns. After reading the list, the subject would be asked
to estimate how many fruits were in the list. Barsalou and Ross (1986) were particularly
concerned to discover whether frequency sensitivity was tied to strategic processing or was
a consequence of automatic processing. The result I rely on .however, is that subjects were
sensitive to the frequency of occurrence of superordinate categories in a condition in which
they were trying to leam the list for free recall. This is the condition I propose to employ.
Consider two readings of the noun lamb. On one reading, it is an "animal"; on the other, it
is "meat". If derivation of the reading "meat", for example, needs to pass through an inter¬
mediate designation of an "animal", then one would expect the frequency counting mechan¬
ism to increment its "animal" tally by one.65 If, on the other hand, neither sense is basic,
only the frequency estimate for "meat" should be driven up by this item. This would also
be the case if both readings were lexicalised separately.
The set of exemplars for each category should be either newly derived in one reading or
lexicalised in both readings. This would be a between subjects variable at the category
level. Each subject would receive both types of exemplar set, but for different categories.
One could then compare frequency estimates by subjects receiving a set of dually lexical¬
ised terms with estimates from subjects who have to derive one of the readings. The predic¬
tion is that the frequency estimate for "animal" should not be affected in the dually lexical¬
ised case, and will only be affected in the other case if subjects must derive the reading via
an intermediate designation.
65
I follow Barsalou and Ross (1986), of course, in not wishing to suggest frequencies
are stored in a literal way. See footnote 1, page 117 (ibid.).
- 174 -
One difference in design between such a study and Barsalou and Ross (1986) would have
to be the incorporation of each noun in a context sentence that made the reading clear. Bar¬
salou and Ross merely presented a list of nouns and relied on a default background context
to ensure subjects generated the intended readings.
The other question was whether the nature of the referential function would make a
difference. Specifically, would a function with lower cue validity such as "fur-of' (cf.
chapter 7) force derivation via an intermediate designation of the "animal"? This would be
accomplished by orthogonally varying the cue validity of the referential function. For
example, one subject's list might contain the items mink, ocelot and seal, contained in sen¬
tences like:
(215) The lady's coat was made of mink.
For the category animal, this subject's data would be assigned to the condition "low cue
validity, both readings lexicalised". The interesting condition would be the one involving
similar sentences containing nouns like cat or horse, for which the "fur-of reading is
novel. Would this condition differ from the more straightforward one involving novel
"meat-of' readings? If only the former inflates the frequency estimate for the category
"animal", then the hypothesis that cue validity affects the derivation of readings would be
supported.
An alternative to the frequency estimation approach would be the phrase-by-phrase reading
time task described by Janus and Bever 1985, and discussed in relation to metaphor in
chapter 5. One would predict relatively slower reading times for novel readings. This would
be particularly useful in cases of combination, such as the mass—count distinction. Again,
one could manipulate a "complexity of referential function variable". The frequency esti¬
mation task, too, could be used to look at the lexicalisation of complex concepts.
In connection with referential functions, an interesting question from a psychological point
of view would be to ask whether the function is computed using a "tool concept" like a
Piagetian operation (cf Cometa and Eson 1978). or, instead, using background knowledge
in the form of theories. This is a key issue in developmental psychology. It could be tested,
for example, by looking at the generalisability of referential functions to new knowledge
domains, for children and adults of various ages.
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This chapter has shown how experimental psychology can be used to test issues that can be
difficult to resolve using linguistic techniques alone (the second question); to show how
linguistic analysis can show us what data to look for (the third question); and to test
assumptions of the linguistic analysis (the first question). Unfortunately, it has more of the




My goal has been to understand better a range of phenomena of flexibility of meaning,
while at the same time developing an interdisciplinary approach within which the issues
could be studied further. I have argued that the lexicon plays a role in making information
available, and I have attempted to formulate an approach that lets it do this in a way that
takes account of the flexibility of lexical meaning. At the same time, my approach allows
for phenomena of precization. In this approach, lexical concepts are actualised by a
configuration of, more or less naive, theories. Actualisation may or may not yield a con¬
cept, which may or may not have a prototype structure. The form actualisation takes will
depend on the current goals of the hearer and the state of his background knowledge. Nei¬
ther concepts nor the edifice of background knowledge can be regarded as static. Actualised
lexical concepts may be cached or even lexicalised.
Precization is the complement of flexibility. I have argued that both are a function of lexi¬
cal combination and integration: they are two aspects of this single phenomenon. Preciza¬
tion is the consequence of a particular combination; flexibility the result of (or, better, the
prerequisite of) the generality of combination. I presented a fairly detailed description of a
way lexical concepts might combine with other lexical concepts, and of a way they might
combine with theories. Particular attention was paid to the role of dependency relations in
determining the manner of combination, especially the effect of semi-subordinate items on
the GESTALT parameter. I argued that the instantiation of this parameter, the main profile
of a construction, is its type.
This conception of the lexicon is radically minimalist (cf Cruse 1988). I won't repeat the
earlier discussion of these points here, but I do wish to elaborate on a small set of issues
that arise from them.
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From the beginning, I have emphasised a cognitive approach to meaning. The meaning of a
word is the contribution it makes to the understanding the listener arrives at. It can contri¬
bute to this understanding in different ways, but it should always be understood in terms of
this role.
The cognitive approach to semantics has allowed us to avoid certain problems that do occur
for a more realist approach. For example, problems with the minimal parts hypothesis were
avoided in this way. In short, not all problems in philosophy need to be tackled by Cogni¬
tive Science because a cognitive approach to meaning, and the willingness to allow a single
entity to be seen in different ways in particular, means that the issue does not really arise.
We will see another example of this shortly.
It is a mistake, standard in cognitive psychology, to regard the semantics of the lexicon as
a list of concepts which can be known by the categorisation judgements of the subject.
The concept of lexical semantics that pervades cognitive science is based on this idea of
semantic material, taken (or copied?) from the lexical entry and placed somewhere else. I
have argued, instead, that the lexicon supplies tools which can be used to construct all
manner of semantic objects. My approach in this regard is similar to one discussed by
Brian Cantwell-Smith (Cantwell-Smith 1986). He argues that one conception of the way
language influences the mind would be in terms of a sort of electro-magnetic causal force
operating at a distance.
I want to draw out a distinction between two modes of signification which lexical items
may use. I don't believe this distinction can be drawn sharply, but nonetheless the poles
can be clearly differentiated.
First, they can be used in the cognitivemanner I have concentrated on. They interact with
other parts of the cognitive system to construct a new semantic object - something I have
termed a transient denotation. And on the other hand, they can be used in the manner of a
gesture to nudge an evolving representation (local theory) along the appropriate path of ela¬
boration. This mode becomes increasingly likely when the shared context is rich. It is
therefore more common in spoken language and especially common towards the end of a
spoken utterance. The sort of example one finds is:
(216) She is a fiery, tempestuous, vicious woman.
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Predicates are added like splashes of colour on an impressionist canvas, until the speaker is
satisfied that the portrayal is correct.66
A special case of the second mode of signification is allusion to a culturally conventional
lexicalised concept. The stereotype of this is the idiom (see Becker 1975). The speaker uses
a conventional formula to remind the hearer of an idea they share (with the presupposition
that the speaker typically believes it is relevant to the situation and that the hearer has not
realised its relevance).
Lexicalised concepts, in general, are not lexical concepts. Rather, they exist only in
configurations of theories. On this view, ambiguity only arises if both senses are lexicalised
in the current active configuration of theories. A lexicalisation in another active
configuration can only be accessed if the word-form is marked in some way. Similarly, if a
lexicalisation is available it is used; a novel reading is only derived if there is no lexicalisa¬
tion accessible or if the word-form was marked (for example, stressed). This view of ambi¬
guity allows me to account for the register-specific nature of "blocking". In different regis¬
ters, the active configuration of theories differs, and so the newly derived form does not
have to compete with the same set of lexicalised concepts. It may therefore find a lexical
gap in one register that does not exist in another.
One issue worthy of more investigation is the question of what motivates the lexicalisation
of a concept. Typically one finds the suggestion that it is a matter of rote learning (for
example, Bybee 1985), but this is not very plausible psychologically. It is likely that two
types of factor are important - personal factors and social factors. On the one hand, people
are likely to lexicalise concepts that are vivid or useful (Barsalou 1985) to them personally.
On the other, they are likely to be influenced by the way words are used by significant oth¬
ers and public commentators. In this respect, it would be interesting to look at the use of
the word strike among British television and radio football commentators in the period dur¬
ing and after the 1986 World Cup, for example, and its spread among the printed media
and everyday language. Socially, one might expect some distinction between the effect on
Scottish English as opposed to the sassenach dialects. Another interesting factor would be
the relationship between the timing of repetition and lexicalisation - how soon must the first
66
How the speaker guages this is an interesting question.
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re-iteration follow; does there need to be a gap between an initial group of uses and a
"confirmation group"? With Romy, I noticed that when she was learning her first words
she used a technique one might call "parental cross-bearing" to identify interpretations
worth learning. A concept was attractive, then, if mummy and daddy both used it in the
same way independently of one another. That is, she was sensitive to the utility of social
consensus. An alternative starting point would be to look at the motives likely to produce
the caching of lexical concepts, since this is probably the first step towards eventual lexical-
isation (rather as canonisation is the first step in beatification) and since one might be able
to identify some linguistic variables affecting the probability of caching.
I have emphasised the cognitive approach to meaning. Within this approach I have
motivated the feature DELIMITATION, in particular, as an ontological primitive. Support
was found in the way the perfective—imperfective distinction appears to use the same dis¬
tinction, and from the way the two distinctions interact. This feature was built into an
ontology, that is, a type theory, by arguing that the main profile of a construction was its
sort. Using Langacker's notion of a multi-dimensional semantic space, this theory of types
could be extended to a theory of categories. In particular, a category can be defined as a
pair of a type (as just described) and a set of parameters (ie. a semantic dimensionality).
As Ryle 1954 says:
"there are not just two or just ten different logical metiers open to the terms or
concepts we employ in ordinary or technical discourse, there are indefinitely many
such different metiers and indefinitely many dimensions of these differences."
(plO, quoted in Drange 1966, p75).
This definition gives some useful results. First as I suggested in chapter 5, it can help us to
account for anomaly. In chapter 5, I argued that anomaly was the result of trying to apply a
value to a parameter which a lexical concept did not possess. If the lexical concept did pos¬
sess an appropriate parameter, the bizarreness reaction did not result even if the concept
realised contradicted background knowledge (eg. carnivorous sheep). This approach is simi¬
lar to that advocated by Drange 1966, Strawson 1952. Strawson is quoted by Drange:
"The reason why 'loud smell' makes no sense is [that] ... [referring to something
as a smell proscribes as senseless the question whether it is loud or not loud: it
does not commit the speaker to one of two incompatible answers to the question."
(p27)
Drange (1966) argues at length that "type crossings", as he calls them, are not attributable
to definitional falsity if an ordinary knowledge restriction is placed on the notion of
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definition to exclude clauses like "what pertains to the olfactory sense cannot have an audi¬
tory property" (p30).
The other useful result, which comes from the nature of parameters, is that the actualisation
of a category (or lexical concept) is constrained. A word cannot be used to denote any con¬
cept, it can only denote a concept in the semantic space defined by its dimensionality. It
cannot occupy other dimensions and it cannot be realised in fewer dimensions. This is a
refinement of Langacker's notion of subtypes (Langacker, 1983) as a delimited zone within
the space defined by the dimensions of the superordinate: I have added the constraint that
the exemplar must exist in the same set of semantic dimensions, no fewer and no more. At
the same time as constraining the actualisation of a lexical concept, this makes certain pred¬
ictions regarding diachronic change. It allows, for example, for diachronic change from one
meaning to its opposite.
The constraints expressed in the last paragraph, however, express tendencies rather than
firm rules. Drange (1966) argues that there is a sharp distinction between phrases which are
type crossings and phrases which are not. For Drange, a type crossing is an objective fact.
"Thus, just as pegs come in all shapes and sizes, so also things are of many
different types. And just as pegs are not the right shape or size to fit in a give
hole, so also things are sometimes not of the right type to have the properties as¬
cribed to them in propositions." (pl48)
I would prefer to talk of a graded distinction. From the point of view of cognitive seman¬
tics, it is not, in general, useful to focus on objectivity. The shape of both hole and peg is a
function of the cognitive system which is construing them. Within the theoretical frame¬
work I have developed, one must allow for the flexibility of construal. For example, I
would allow categorial promotion (cf the discussion of the promotion of measures to living
beings in chapter 9), which Drange explicitly forbids. Drange says that a stone moving
under its own steam is no longer a stone. From the point of view I have described, whether
a phrase expresses a type crossing will be a function of the conceptual creativity of the
hearer and the current active configuration of theories. The current theories can ameliorate
what is superficially a type crossing by sanctioning the construction directly (eg. by lexi-
calising a concept for the construction) or by allowing the cognitive system to move with
more or less difficulty to a configuration that does sanction the construction.
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I have been at pains to emphasise the distinction between a lexicographic attitude to word
meaning, and the approach of the cognitive psychologist. These differences result in very
different characterisations of lexical meaning. The lexicographic technique uses concor¬
dances - samples of actual usage together with the (linguistic) context of use - to provide
data. The lexicographer categorises the uses and assembles constellations of readings. This
process reflects emergent meaning back into the lexical entry. The lexicographer has the
task of apportioning meaning to the lexical items in the example string, and tends to do this
in such a way that none of the meaning, none of the semantic material, is left over. In other
words, lexicography ascribes the precise interpretation of strings to the precise senses of
words. My approach, in contrast, ascribes precision to the process of combination and
integration inherent in lexical actualisation - lexical concepts are not so much vague as
meaningless. A corollary of this approach is the lexical version of Heisenberg's uncertainty
principle. The issue is whether the structure and representation I have described in this cog¬
nitive account are, in principle, accessible to processes of introspection.
Consider representations which we feel, subjectively, we can be conscious of: memories of
specific events, or the meanings of words. Our everyday experience is that we can bring
these things to mind. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the process of access itself contri¬
butes to and alters meaning. Take, for example, the literature on eyewitness testimony.
Loftus has demonstrated that the words used in asking about an event can affect the way
the event is remembered. In particular, presupposing something in a question (for example,
Did the man with the scarf hit her?, which presupposes that the man wore a scarf) tends to
convince people that that thing happened or was present. In other words, we do not have
privileged access to even our own cognitive lexicons.
Lexicography, as a psychological activity, can be defined with some precision in terms of
the theory I have presented. Specifically, lexicography is the search for configurations of
theories which yield lexicalised actualisations of lexical concepts.
My starting point was a loose collection of phenomena, linked by the common theme of
lexical flexibility. Although the discipline of thesis-writing forbids too deep an exploration
of a wide range of phenomena, I hope that I have clarified the relationships among these
phenomena to a small degree (see chapter 5). I want to focus here on a distinction between
phenomena of depth of meaning and phenomena of the breadth of meaning.
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Phenomena of depth of meaning include differences in degrees of elaboration or availability
due to the manipulation of focus, and the semantic illusions studied by Erickson and Matt-
son (see chapter 2). Evidence for at least a four-way distinction (figure, ground, landmark,
assimilation) in depth of availability was presented in chapter 9 and related to Langacker's
Space Grammar. Langacker's notion of layers of profiling structure is especially useful and,
I believe, important. The neutralisation of the English plural in examples like drains and
woods (it no longer denotes individuation) is related to this, but is a phenomenon more of
diachronic lenition. Bybee (1985) discusses this in relation to morphology, and the argu¬
ment can be extended to closed class words (see chapter 9).
Depth of meaning is also related to mode of information processing, I have claimed. In a
holistic mode of processing, meaning is elaborated less deeply than in an analytic mode.
The analytic mode is less likely in what I take to be the most usual mode of language pro¬
cessing - goal driven augmentation of the local theory (see chapter 9).
Phenomena of breadth of meaning are connected to combination and integration. By
breadth of meaning, I mean the range of concepts a lexical concept has the potential to be
realised as. Adjectival modification, type crossing, theory change, pre-emption, profile
fixing and emergent meaning exemplify this.
The distinction that I have drawn here between depth and breadth of meaning cross-cuts
some traditional distinctions, such as the distinction between diachronic phenomena and
phenomena of figurative language (cf Ullman 1962). For example, metaphor and meto¬
nymy are breadth phenomena, while transferred epithets are, probably, a depth
phenomenon.
There is a major class of phenomena upon which I have barely touched. These are
phenomena concerned with non-monotonicity. I have tried to present an apporoach to the
breadth and depth of lexical meaning that is monotonic in spirit, and therefore do not
explore such issues here. However, in Dunbar (in preparation, a) I discuss them more fully.
The key to my approach on breadth of meaning is the complementarity of vagueness and
precization (see also Bosch 1983). The contextually driven notion of actualisation means,
of course, that a given lexical concept has the potential to be realised as any of an infinite
number of concepts. The proof is straightforward. Because realisation depends on context
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and because there is an infinite number of possible contexts (where contexts are indexed by
times, worlds, cognitive states, situations and so on), there are an infinite number of possi¬
ble actualisations. I have already argued that paramaterization of lexical concepts constrains
actualisation - it is not the case that just anything is possible. This, however, is not
sufficient to explain the large degree of agreement between subjects about the correct
interpretation of a particular use of a word. This must be explained in terms of the intersub-
jective similarity of knowledge structures. People's theories tend to be similar because peo¬
ple are constrained by the need to survive in the same world and because they are subject
to similar socialising forces. For this reason, I have sometimes referred to background
knowledge as "folk theories" (Dunbar 1989). Folk theories facilitate allusion to culturally
conventional concepts. Agreement on meaning is also controlled by the judgement of the
speaker, who can add predicates until he is satisfied that he has communicated the correct
message (see above). This is something people do skilfully. Well, I hope so anyway.
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Materials randomisation program listing
These functions are intended to do some randomizing, and then to assemble data files from
the code numbers generated.
(defun Fire (subjlist anslist) ;This arg is a list of files to fill.
(ports) ;Opens ports once & for all to Agendas
(Filer subjlist anslist)) ;and corresponding ESIT's.
(defun Filer (subjlist anslist)
(cond((null subjlist) ;Once there are no files left
(clam)) ;close the ports & go home
(t(EFwrite (read esitport) ;else, get to work on filling
(car subjlist)(car anslist))))) ;the first file.
(defun EFwrite (ESIT subjfile ansfile)
(setq outport (fileopen subjfile 'w))
(setq ansport (fileopen ansfile 'w))
(Falseopen)
(Copy (read agendaporl) ESIT))
;open up the newfile for writing
;and one to record approp responses
;open up port to the false items
;set up a recursion over Agenda
;ESIT can be plugged in by hand, subj by subj. It's a list of nos, the same
;length as the number of true items to be finally included. Adjacent nos
;specify which instances of an item are to be used. Successive pairs of
;numbers are associated with successive items in MAINLIST. If only one
;instance of each item is to be used, then an amended version would have
;to be used.
;Agenda required more complex randomizing, so read it from Aitch.
(defun Copy (Agenda ESIT)
(if (null Agenda)
then (clap)
else (Iet((item (addl(quotient(car Agenda)2)))
(specifier (nth (car Agenda) ESIT)))
(print (cdr(nth (subl specifier)










(readf)))) ;collect a variable number of false items
;before returning to true items.
(defun readf 0
(if (eq (Toss) 1)
then(let((lie (read falseport)))
(if lie
then(print lie outport) ;send the first false item
(terpr outport) ;newline





else(Copy (cdr Agenda) ESIT)))
else(Copy (cdr Agenda) ESIT))) germination - get a true
(defun rollo ()
(let ((tale (read falseport)))
(if tale
then (print tale outport)
(terpr outport)








(defun Falseopen () ;This opens a channel to file
(setq falseport (fileopen 'Falsies 'r))) containing the false items.
(defun clap ()
(rollo) ;tip residual falsies into the file,
(close outport) ;close this particular subjfile, then
(close ansport)




(close esitport)) ;tidies up at the end.
(defun ports ()
(setq agendaport (fileopen 'Aitch 'r))
(setq esitport (fileopen 'East 'r)))
(load 'sents.l) ;This binds a table containing the true items and their






(defun Rord (n fits) ;builds a fist ("fits") by randomly
(if (eq (length fits) n) ;ordering the nos between 0 & n.
then (print fits fvar)
(terpr fvar)
else (let ((N (Trandom n))) ;Set "N" to one of the nos, but
(if (memq N fits) ;if it's already in "fits"
then (Rord n fits) ;then try again with another number
else (Rord n (append (neons N) fits)))))) ;else stic it on fits
;you have to open
;an out file for
;yourself first.
Plain old "close" does the job when you've finished. There's an upper bound on the size
of the list you can randomly order with this function: between 40 and 50 on this version,
beyond which a namestack overflow occurs.
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CONCEPT COMBINATION AND THE CHARACTERIZATION OF LEXICAL CONCEPTS1
0. This paper examines the view that the meaning of a word can be charac-
2
terized as a conceptual prototype. This view has gained currency because of
its advantages over the so-called classical view of concepts in relation to
certain well-known psychological results. Here, it is argued that although
goodness-of-exemplar ratings indirectly reflect the meaning of a word, there
are seme good reasons for doubting whether the semantic part of a lexical entry,
the lexical concept, should be characterized in such terms. Four arguments will
be provided in support of this contention: (1) prototypes cannot be combined;
(2) seme properties inherent in prototypes are not inherent in lexical items;
(3) prototypes are not coherent in isolation frcm cognitive models; and (4)
prototypes are not constant (i.e. their inferential relations vary). In sum,
prototypes do not display those properties that would enable lexical concepts
to play a computable role in a natural language understanding system. Let us
examine each of these deficiencies in turn.
1 This paper is based on part of a chapter in Dunbar (forthcoming).
2 'Prototype' is defined here as in Dunbar (1987: 2): "a (possibly struc¬
tured) set of default values along certain dimensions to which exemplars
can be compared and rated for typicality in terms of some similarity
metric (examples departing least from the defaults being the most proto¬
typical) ".
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1. Syntactic non-compositionality of prototypes
One way of formalising the concept of prototype that has been adopted in the
literature is Zadeh's 'fuzzy logic" (1965). The key attraction of fuzzy logic
is that it replaces the characteristic functions of set theory, which are
binary (an entity is either in the set or out of it; the predicate is either
true or false of any particular entity; the 'middle' is excluded), with char¬
acteristic functions which assign values anywhere on a continuum between 0 and
1. Such functions offer an appealing analogy with distributions of 'goodness
of exemplar' (GOE) ratings (Roth/Mervis 1983). Thus, it has been argued, degree
of membership can be formalized in terms of the relative truth of the predi¬
cation.
Translation rules function in a logic to indicate how, given the interpretations
of its constituents, the interpretation of seme construction may be determined.
For example, in a standard predicate logic the set of objects which are red
squares is defined by a translation rule as being the intersection of the set
of objects which are red with the set of objects which are square.
One contention of critics is that the corresponding function in fuzzy logic
telling you hew relatively true it is that some object is a red square frcm
information about how red and how square it is,cannot be defined. Osherson/
9mith (1981) examine fuzzy intersection in relation to the concept striped
apple, which they take to be intersective. The obvious translation rule in
fuzzy logic (the 'min' rule) entails that the 'goodness' of a complex cannot
exceed its goodness as an example of either constituent concept. But, argue
Osherson/Smith (1981), a striped apple will be a better exemplar of the cate¬
gory striped apple than of apple, and so this translation rule is not adequate.
Oden (1977) proposed as an alternative a multiplicative rule, which he attrib¬
utes to Goguen (1969), whereby the GOE rating of a complex concept will be the
product of the GOE ratings of its constituents. To test this he asked subjects
to judge the truth of pairs of sentences, for example robins are birds and beds
are furniture. He systematically varied the degree of rated truth of the indi¬
vidual statements in such pairs and attempted to predict the truth of their
conjunction. What he found was an interaction between the ratings of the con¬
stituent statements. This could be better modelled by the multiplicative rule
than by the minimum rule. Although the multiplicative rule is a better match
to subjects' intuitions about cctplex statements, it too has serious short¬
comings. For example, an object cannot have a higher rating with respect to
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how good a member of the conjunction of A and B it is than its rating for ex¬
emplariness in either of the constituents. Indeed its GOE rating must be lower,
unless both of its constituent ratings are 1. Hence this rule, like the minimum
rule, cannot allow any striped apple to be a better striped apple than it is
an apple.
Osherson/Smith (1982) sketch a proof that, in fact, no simple function of the
constituents can adequately characterize their conjunction. This is done by
imagining a cube and a sphere which metamorphose in such a way that each grad¬
ually approaches the other's shape. At the half-way point, the object should
be equally as good a. ball as a cube. If the goodness of something's membership
in a conjunction is a simple function of its goodnesses in the constituent
categories, then this entity should be a round, ball to the same degree that it
is a round cube - a conclusion that violates one's intuitions. Thus, no simple
function of constituent goodnesses can predict correctly the goodness of an
exemplar in a carp lex category.
By way of response to these arguments, Zadeh (1982) discusses the 'normalization'
of ccrrplex concepts (raising the maximum value of the set to 1 by dividing all
values by the pre-normalization maximum). This is said to be brought about
through focussing on an intersection "by giving it a label" (1982: 291). This
makes it technically feasible for a member of this set to have a higher degree
of membership of it than of either of the constituent sets. Like ranking (Jones
1982) this result is achieved by considering the 'absolute' goodness of members
of a cctrplex category to be a function of their relative goodness with respect
to one another independently of their goodness in the constituent categories,
while deriving that relative goodness from goodness in constituent categories.
Both work (to oversimplify) by assuming that in any category there will be a
'best' member, and stipulating that that member's rating for goodness should
be 1. The crucial difficulty with normalization, pointed out by Osherson/Smith
(1982), is that, if it is based on the 'min' rule,it only takes account of one
half of the conjunct. For example, two red squares will be equally good as red
squares so long as their values for the poorer of these properties are equal.
Thus, if they are equally poor shades of red, even if one is a worse square
than the other, they will be equally good red squares (so long as both are
better 'squares' than 'reds'). This is counter-intuitive. Oshersan/Staith (1982)
also demonstrate that if a multiplicative rule underpinned normalization, then
if the best red flower were a perfect flower it could not be a perfect red
thing, because its goodness as a red flower would have to be less than 1 in
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order to prevent the product of the constituent goodnesses of any red flower
equalling their normalized product, and hence the goodness of the complex
concept. But, these authors ask, what contingency is there among properties
that impels no entity to be perfect in more than a single respect?
Jones' (1982) attempt to tackle these issues founders on technical problems
associated with the need to rank entities before determining their typicality
(Osherson/anith 1982). However, even if ranks could be assigned, there are
instances of concept conjunction that Osherson/Smith (1982) assert would defeat
the scheme. Jones' rule could not permit an entity which is prima in two cate¬
gories to be a better exemplar of their conjunction. But, although Paul Newman
[was] both the best actor and the most handscme entity, he [was] more highly
rated as a handsome actor. Paragons, it would seem, rise above the canons of
logic.
Cohen/Mutphy (1984: 51) describe concept combination as:
a process of combining representations according to certain generative
rules within a domain of knowledge.
They take from the knowledge-representation literature in AI the notion that
sub-concepts may specialize a super-rconcept by role modification (nouns are
treated as frame-like, having slots called 'roles'). They emphasise that the
process is "asymmetric [and] knowledge-dependent" (1984: 51), where by'knowl¬
edge-dependent they mean, for example, that which role gets modified will de¬
pend on context, different contexts promoting same roles for modification more
strongly than others. They argue that domain knowledge also modifies, for ex¬
ample, same of the role values of pet when it is used in pet fish. Thus, knowl¬
edge of the world influences the typicality structure of coplex concepts which
consequently, they continue, wri.ll not be predictable on the basis of the con¬
stituent concepts alone. They also note that the effect of a role value speci¬
fication on typicality can depend on the setting of other roles. For example,
the effect of baldness on a man's typicality depends on his age. Effects of
correlational structure such as this would, then, have to be considered in
evaluating typicality writh respect to complex concepts, but this would entail
further use of domain knowledge.
A crucial problem facing any approach to conceptual combination is that the
two terms in the conjunction rmay not be interchanged writhout altering the
typicality rating of an exemplar in the cotplex concept. Although the 'imin'
rule is undoubtedly wnrong to consider only one of the constituents in deter¬
mining exemplariness in the complex concept, it is not the case either that
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each contributes equally, as would be predicted by the multiplicative rule. As
Hampton (1988) has recently shown, for example, a constituent contributes more
to the determination of exemplariness in a complex concept when it is playing
the role of modifier than when it is playing the role of the head. His study
used expressions of the type: noun plus relative clause modifier, for example,
'Games which are sports'. He found that a given instance (for example chess)
might be rated more highly in relation to this form of the putative conjunction
than the other (i.e. 'Sports which are games'). Moreover, whenever there is a
'head-modifier' relationship between the terms, the head is typically the one
that determines the superordinate category."* Thus, for example, a cow catcher
is a type of catcher, and not a sort of cow; a milk bottle is a kind of bottle,
and not a dairy product; and a pancake is pottable but not a pot. Such non-
carmutativity confounds the attempt to model the combination of prototypes by
rmeans of fuzzy logic.
Thus there appear to be two difficulties confronting attempts to model the
combination of concepts by means of fuzzy logic; first, the knowledge-laden
nature of combination, and second its asymmetry.
2. Lexical indeterminacy of types
Our second reason to doubt that lexical concepts have a prototype structure is
motivated by the finding that same properties inherent in prototypes are not
inherent in lexical items. We will consider two sources of evidence, one de¬
riving from the work of Nunberg (1979), the other from Jackendoff (1983).
Nunberg's first, obvious, point is that many words can be used to refer to
more than one sort of referent. He argues that this is a very general process
that is not adequately handled by trying to list all the different senses. He
proposes instead to list only a few senses from which other uses imay be derived
by general pragmatic principles. The principles may be summarised in the fol¬
lowing way: the designatum, or basic sense of a word, can be used to refer to
3 Hampton (1988) has. produced tentative evidence that entities may be
treated subjectively as members of a complex category even if they are
regarded by the same subjects as non-members of the constituent cate¬
gories .
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an entity if the cue validity of the referential function (RF) napping from
the designatum to the entity is sufficiently high to clearly and unambiguously
pick out the entity in question frcm any alternatives. 'Cue validity' is the
exactness with which cues (in this case, referential functions) pick out a
given referent. Take,for example, an exam script. This object may be considered
with respect to two relations: firstly, it is related to the set of examination
candidates, and secondly it is related to a set of markers. Now candidates pro¬
duce only one script while markers handle more than one, and indeed, more than
one marker nay be involved with a single script. Therefore, the referential
function frcm the exam script to the candidate will have a higher cue validity
than the referential function frcm the exam script to the marker. Consequently,
if a speaker says, while pointing to the exam script, He has a good grasp of the
subject, he will refer to the candidate. (Given certain assunptions about the
background knowledge of speaker and hearer.)
Nunberg's argument continues as follows: Just as we can talk about relative cue
validity of referential functions in cases of deferred ostension, such as the
one we have just described, we can also use relative cue validity to determine
which senses of a word are most basic. Consider the word form Dylan. This can
be used to refer either to a singer, Bob Dylan, or to his work, the songs of
Bob Dylan. Which of the two is more basic? In order to ccnpute this, we must
determine the cue validity of the referential function frcm singer to song and
the inverse referential function frcm song to singer. The more basic sense of
Dylan is taken to be the one in the dcmain of the referential function with
higher cue validity. Since the cue validity of the referential function from
Dylan to his work is greater than the cue validity of its inverse, Dylan des¬
ignates the man.
Nunberg next considers the cases in which we are most interested for the pur¬
poses of this paper, cases in which it is not clear which of the two referential
functions has greater cue validity. That is, there are cases in which cue va¬
lidity appears to be equally high in both directions. Of his several examples
we will consider just one. It concerns the choice between a token or a type
reading of a phrase, e.g. three trees. Either this refers to tokens (the trees
themselves) or it refers to types (different species of trees). In this example,
cue validity is the same for the referential function from trees to species of
trees as it is for the inverse function from species to trees. That is, each
tree is of just one species, and each species picks out just some trees and
not others.
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If Nunberg's arguments about cue validity are correct, then his conclusion with
respect to the type-token distinction is of great interest and relevance to our
own argument. Rumelhart (1987, in a talk to the PHLING Conference, Edinburgh)
has recently observed that prototypes could as easily be termed 'types'. But if
that is the case, choosing prototypes as the characterization of lexical con¬
cepts would imply that the type sense is more basic, with the token sense being
derived from it. However, this is precisely the asymmetry that Nunberg argues
we cannot empirically justify. We reach the same conclusion frcm a consideration
of seme work by Jackendoff (1983), though we arrive at it by a different route.
Jackendoff (1983) provides same evidence that the choice of a type or a token
reading for an NP is determined through the satisfaction of a number of gram¬
matical constraints. Thus, choice of a type or a token reading for the predicate
NP (in English) depends upon its syntactic position; the choice of verb, and
definiteness of the article. If the verb is be and the article indefinite
{Margaret Thatcher is a politician), a type reading results. The definite
article, on the other hand, gives rise to an ambiguity with respect to a token
or a type reading {Margaret Thatcher is the woman drinking a martini) (cf.
Donnellan's (1966) referential-attributive distinction). A number of verbs
behave similarly (e.g. resemble and become). Others do not. When the verb is
buy, for example, all predicate NPs express tokens, regardless of definiteness.
Moreover, tense and aspect present a further source of constraint. Thus, if a
verb is stative all its NP arguments must be indefinite for a type reading (cf.
A policeman has a truncheon with A policeman has the truncheon). However, a
verb that expresses an event must appear in simple present rather than present
progressive for a type reading (cf. A spider spins a web with A spider is
spinning a web).
What Jackendoff's evidence suggests is that the type/token distinction is not
determined by a lexical feature of the head noun of a noun phrase. His ambiguous
instances, in particular, suggest that neither sense is the more basic. In these
cases the distinction is both lexically and syntactically under-determined and
would need to be resolved at the level of discourse representation. A type
reading does not derive frcm information inherent in a lexical entry. There
is a sense in which a type classification may be seen to be more basic in
Jackendoff's analysis, since both tokens and types incorporate features of
the type in which they are a member. However, there is a reciprocal relation¬
ship between types and tokens: just as tokens presuppose types of which they
are instances, so types presuppose tokens that exemplify them. Another way to
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interpret the sense in which types might be more basic than tokens would take
us into genetic epistemology, and therefore, well beyond the scope of this
paper. For the present, we take Jackendoff's evidence as further reason to
doubt that lexical concepts are prototypes.
3. Coherence of prototypes
Prototype structure has usually been described with respect to scane similarity
metric, where similarity has been taken as both the criterion of category mem¬
bership and the principle underlying conceptual coherence. Things belong to¬
gether in a category if they are sufficiently similar to the prototype. The
prototype reflects the central tendency of instances in relation to the dimen¬
sions along which similarity is computed. However, this position has been chal¬
lenged by those who believe conceptual coherence is determined by the theories
people have about their physical and social worlds, and in terms of their
current goals. According to Murphy/Medin (1985) GOE ratings are 'heavily con¬
strained' by knowledge of the world, and conceptual coherence is derived frcm
a theory that explains why things are the way they are.
As Miller (1978: 104) once wrote:
lexical knowledge ... is not isolated from [the] general conceptual system;
the lexicon has a cognitive structure only because it is an integral part
of everything a person knows and believes.
Earlier, Miller/Johnson-Laird (1976) had argued that semantic fields have a
conceputal core that derives frcm the implicit theories shared by members of
a linguistic coimiunity. In a similar vein, Lakoff (1987: 68) observes that our
categories are not determined with respect to properties of the real world, but
in terms of 'interactional properties' related to our exchanges with that world.
And this is so even in the case of basic level categories. Vfe "structure and
make sense of our experience" in terms of cognitive models (roughly, what
others have called variously 'images', 'frames' and 'scripts'). 'Cognitive
models' are defined "relative to idealized circumstances". Consequently, ide¬
alized cognitive models are what give rise to the prototype structure of our
categorizations, not the lexical concepts that cue them.
4. Instability of prototypes
Another doubt as to whether lexical concepts are prototypes arises frcm recent
studies which have provided evidence that typicality structure is not a fixed
property of a word, and that its focus can be shifted by context.
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Roth/Shoben (1933) base a study on a finding of Garrod/Sanford (1977) that the
speed of anaphora resolution depends on the semantic relatedness of anaphora and
antecedent, as if membership involved category membership verification (when
the antecedent is more general than the anaphora). Roth/Shoben examined whether
reading times were affected by a single QOE structure in differing contexts,
or whether context could affect speed of resolution by changing GOE structure.
The finding was that resolution for typical exemplars (typical for the cate¬
gory in isolation) was slower when the context was biased to make that exemplar
a bad fit than vhen the context was neutral. Thus robin is a poor exemplar in
the context The bird walked across the barn-yard.
Barsalou/Sewell (1984, reported in Barsalou 1985) found that GOE structure can
change dramatically when people take different perspectives on a concept. Their
subjects rated exemplars (e.g. robin, ostrich, swan) for typicality as birds,
but assigned them different degrees of centrality according to the cultural
perspective ('American1, 'African', or 1 Chinese') they had been asked to assume.
These results held for both taxoncmic and goal-derived categories. Thus, people
can flexibly generate different concepts in different contexts.
What various findings illustrate is that prototypes are unstable; they vary
with context.
5. Summary
Four arguments have been presented indicating that lexical concepts are not
idealized summary representations corresponding to prototypes. What then, are
lexical concepts? Dunbar (forthcoming) has put forward a view of the relation¬
ship between lexicon and cognition that attampts to solve these difficulties.
It is akin to some recent ideas proposed by Barsalou (1986) in its emphasis
on the dynamic nature of conceptual structure. In comparison, however, it is
more radically'minimalist'(Cruse 1988). Problems arise, however, and it is not
yet clear whether this approach will be viable, so for the moment we rest con¬
tent to record the observation that prototypes as defined appear to be unstable,
hard to combine, too specific and not independently coherent.
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